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Do not infest your mind with beating on
The strangeness of this business ; at picked leisure
Which shall be shortly single, I'll resolve you,
Which to you shall seem probable, of every
These happened accidents ; till then be cheerful,
And think of each thing well.
Come hither, spirit.
(uilliam Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act V , Scene 1)
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INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose of the Research
Explanation is considered a fundamental task in social sciences. 
Often conceptual frameworks are used to achieve this task and con­
sequently, to stimulate progress in fundamental knowledge. The 
International Relations scholars have sometimes tried to capture 
the basic features of the discipline into models or tried to relate 
a specific problem to a scientific research program.
Although the core of any social science can be easily extracted, 
its scope and organization are often less distinctive. The litera­
ture on International Relations has never been dominated by any 
general consensus concerning the dimensions of the subject or the 
appropriate mode of analysis. The specific nature of International 
Relations, i.e., the study of actors and activities affecting the 
behaviour of the units into which the international system is divided, 
makes a scientific analysis in this discipline not an easy task. 
Studies in International Relations often focus on historical expla­
nations of the individual behaviour of actors and/or activities 
within the international system, which only imply modest analytical 
evaluation. Although the explanation of single facts is a rather 
important task in this field, it does not always spill over into the 
more analytical framework of study. Therefore, in order to add some 
rigour to the study of International Relations, models from other 
social sciences have been introduced.
Often it has been assumed that a theoretical simplification can 
prove to be productive in scientific analysis : this can also be 
said for analysis in International Relations. By concentrating on 
relations between nation-states, some scholars have clearly hoped 
to be able to develop a model of International Relations that would 
capture the basic features of the discipline. The example of econo­
mics has been influential in encouraging such ambitions. Even 
when theoretical goals of International Relations' scholars can 
neither be as explicit nor as ambitious as those of economists, 
an analysis of International Relations in these terms is sometimes 
believed to be a necessary and entirely legitimate simplification 
of the reality.
Ue ackouledge the fact that there are serious problems in any 
transfer of analytical t o o l s  and m o d e s  of reasoning, developed 
uithin one discipline, to another discipline. One is often likely 
to overlook some crucial features or pecularities of the new field 
which make basic concepts rather less applicable. Nevertheless, 
economic reasoning has already significantly contributed to the 
understanding of non-economic processes.
In the terrain of International Relations economists have 
also transferred concepts and modes of analysis originally ela­
borated for the purpose of understanding economics. The extension 
of the neo-classical research program to the area of International 
Relations has proved to be a promising path of analysis in some 
instances. The basic conceptual structure that will be applied 
in the present study, is the Rational Actor Model. This model 
has often illuminated some relevant variables in the interaction 
among states.
Central to our study is the assessment of the capability of 
the Rational Actor Approach to International Relations. This is 
a broad topic and coverage of the present analysis can only be 
selective. Ue are only interested in the subsection of Inter­
national Relations that deals with the behaviour of nation-states 
towards international cooperation. Henceforth, the whole analysis 
on power relations among countries, in which the study of conflict 
constitutes a crucial aspect, does not form part of the present 
work. Here, we will only investigate to what extent the Rational 
Actor Approach can be useful and successful in explaining the 
behaviour of states towards international cooperation.
-2-
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In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the 
possibility of developing formal theories of political behaviour 
in uhich the main properties of political systems are derived from 
assumptions about the behavioural characteristics of individuals, 
much as micro-economic theory attempts to infer propositions about 
markets from similar assumptions. In particular, the public choice 
theory has appeared to be an extension of the neo-classical research 
program to the subject of political science. Our present research 
must then be framed uithin the attempts to stimulate scientific 
analysis in International Relations with the help of the neo-classic­
al research program.
The public choice theory, uhich can be defined as the economic 
study of nonmarket decision-making, or, simply the application of 
economics to political science, has certainly given a more scientific 
turn to the Rational Actor approach. Its basic behavioural postu­
late, as for economics, is decision-making by individuals who maxi­
mize their utility function under constraints, i.e., rational de­
cision-making by individuals. A public choice analysis may vary 
from positive to normative formulation, from pure theory to applica­
tions, from highly mathematical analysis to descriptive analysis.
More and more scholars take public choice considerations as the 
basis of a conceptual frameuork for analyzing issues in political 
science. Briefly, in many instances the public choice theory is 
assumed to be valuable as a help to systematic thought.
In the present study ue only deal uith that part of public 
choice theory uhich concentrates on the possible biases in the ope­
ration of the collective decision-making process, i.e., the problems 
uhich may result from the pursuit of individual rationality in a 
group. One possible basis for such a theory is the economists' con­
cept of public goods. In fact, it has been the basis for an impor­
tant body of economic literature on the function of the state. A 
substantial set of principles has been developed that has proved to 
be of interest to economists and others concerned uith the analysis
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of public policy. It uill be indicated that the existence of pub­
lic goods may lead to problems of collective action in a system of 
decentralized decision-making. Uithin the general framework of the 
neo-classical research program ue uill thus adopt a public goods 
perspective to our analysis of the behaviour of states towards in­
ternational cooperation.
Flore specifically, ue uill take Mancur O l s o n’s public goods 
theory as the main reference for our oun analysis. Olson argues 
that many organizations provide public goods to their members. 
Houever, follouing moat of the economic literature, he also argues 
that the ability of governments to supply such goods is based on 
their ability to tax. The main focus of the theory of collective 
action is on the conditions under uhich individuals or groups, often 
joined in voluntary organizations, can coordinate their actions to 
achieve common benefits or can overcome the difficulty of raising 
resources voluntarily. This provokes the question about hou non­
governmental organizations can provide public goods successfully.
The conclusions all center around the relation between group-size 
and the actual provision of the public good and on the cost-sharing 
uithin the small-sized group.
Ue knou that the economic theory of public goods has already 
been extended to the subject of International Relations. Here, 
our main interest is in the application of O l s o n’s special interest 
group theory to international organizations. The similarities be­
tween international organizations and special interest groups make 
this theory amenable to application to International Relations. By 
transposing the assumptions that guide the actions of individuals 
to the analysis of the interplay of states, Olson and others have 
shown that the problems of collective action among nation-states 
are exactly the same as in the case of individuals. The extension 
of this part of public choice theory to the analysis of the problems 
of collective action in International Relations has already thrown
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neu light on some problems of alliances, labour unions or world 
organizations ih general. It may also prove relevant when thinking 
about the realization of common interests in the international system.
For our last part of this study ue uill assess the relevance 
and the successfulness of the Rational Actor Approach and the pub­
lic goods perspective to the analysis of the behaviour of states 
towards development cooperation. Focus uill be on the applicabi­
lity of economic theory to the analysis of the aid performance by 
a number of donor countries within a specific organization. Accord­
ing to this approach, the relationship between the size of a donor 
and the aid performance is a crucial one in the analysis of the be­
haviour of states towards development cooperation.
The conclusions will point to some of the problems inherent to 
scientific studies in International Relations in general, as well 
as to some of the problems in a transfer of analytical tools and 
modes of reasoning from economics to International Relations. Al­
though the Rational Actor assumptions have proven to be fruitful 
in some standard models and theories in economic science as well as 
in political science, peculiarities in International Relations can 
make them sometimes less illuminating than one is inclined to think.
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2. Scope and Organization t)f the Research
Having described the purpose of the research, ue uill nou 
present its scope and practical organization. In the first part 
(Chapter I and II) ue uill introduce those parts of the theory of 
International Relations which will be taken as the main points of 
reference and comparison for the introduction of the economic theory 
into the discipline of International Relations. In spite of the 
relativity of any model in International Relations, it will be 
argued that a conceptual framework can prove useful. The 
first chapter will deal more specifically with some of these con­
ceptual frameworks. Although many theoretical structures have been 
proposed to analyze International Relations, discussion will be 
limited to a presentation of two overarching frameworks, i.e., the 
classical model and the complex interdependence model. Because 
the two models apply to differing situations, scopes or domains of 
behaviour, they will be considered as complementing each other. A 
combination of both models may provide the conceptual framework for 
analyzing issues in International Relations. Then it uill depend 
on the focus of the specific research subject which model is to be 
preferred as the basic structure.
In the second section of the first chapter we present the spe­
cific model that we will employ in our research. The main assump­
tions of the Rational Actor Approach will be explained. Reference 
will also be made to the possible relaxations of the Rational Actor 
Model as to the content of the utility function as well as to the 
concept of rationality. For the purpose of our oun research this 
neo-classical research program uill be transposed outside eco­
nomics to the field of International Relations. We uill also 
transpose individual rationality to collective rationality, in the 
sense of a consistency of choice of nation-states uithin constraints.
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According to the Rational Actor Model, 'size' is believed to 
be a major explanatory source of the foreign policy of a nation-state. 
Therefore, in Chapter II ue will try to situate our analysis in the 
wider framework of the study of small states in International Re­
lations. The concise summary of the existing literature on small 
states will indicate the little relevance of most classification 
schemes to the study of the behaviour of states towards internation­
al cooperation. Most of these studies are rooted in the analysis 
of power relations among states, i.e., an important section of in­
ternational relations which does not form part of our present study. 
Moreover, the literature will also indicate the lack of a theoretic­
ally defined term, 'small state', similar to the economic concept 
of the small state as a price-taker in the international market.
It will be argued that Keohane's theoretical definition of the small 
state as a 's y s t e m - t a k e r ' can be conceived as the only useful con­
cept in the present study.
Whereas the first part announces the subject from an Internatio­
nal Relations' perspective, the second part introduces the applica­
tion of economics to International Relations. The second part 
(Chapter III-IV-V) deals with the actual presentation and subsequent 
elaboration of the economic theory of collective action and with 
the relevance of this economic theory to International Relations.
I will engage in an enterprise of transferring and applying the 
basic conceptual structure of the Rational Actor Model to Interna­
tional Relations. Ue will introduce a public goods theory in order 
to explain the behaviour of states towards international cooperation 
when a public good is produced. Because the introduction of this 
public goods model will indicate some failures of decentralized 
decision-making, it may also illuminate possible problems of 
collective action among states.
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In Chapter III ue present Olson's economic theory of groups 
and organizations. The similarity of the assumptions of no 
coercion and non-exclusion of Olson's special interest group 
theory and the context of the international system makes the 
application of such a theory a promising path for research. One 
of the main conclusions of Olson's theory concerns the cost-sharing 
within small-sized groups. This has led Olson to the formulation 
of the hypothesis of the exploitation of the big countries by the 
small countries. His theory has been tested and v/alidated at the 
level of International Relations for defence alliances. Some of 
the positive outcomes of the ase of Olson's public goods theory 
to International Relations has stimulated us to search for further 
application. Moreover, it will become clear thet few criticisms 
have actually damaged the core of Olson's theory. Olson's concern 
is for the consequences of independent provision of the public good, 
whereas many further developments have taken different frameworks, 
assuming in one way or another coercion, a taxing scheme or an 
overarching capacity.
The fourth chapter will provide some conceptual qualifications 
to Olson's theory of collective action. We will discuss some major 
aspects of the application of this theory to International Relations. 
First, we will try to clarify the concept of public-good as it has 
been developed in economics. Ue will pay special attention to the 
introduction of the mixed public goods to the analysis. Secondly, 
we will explain the model of group behaviour in the presence of a 
public good on which Olson has based his theory, i.e., the noncoope­
rative Cournot model of independent maximizing behaviour. Thirdly, 
we will elaborate on the relevance and usefulness of the public 
good concept to analyzing international cooperation. A suggestive 
fourfold classification of international goods is discussed, which 
is said to reveal a better indication of the relationship between 
international cooperation and the actual provision of an internation­
al good than the relationship Olson's theory assumes. It will be
argued that international arrangements may provide simultaneously 
goods with differing characteristics and that international goods 
may be dealt with in differing frameworks of cooperation.
In the last chapter of this purely theoretical part ue uill in­
troduce tuo main theoretical qualifications to the analysis of prob­
lems of collective action in International Relations. First, ue 
uill argue that Olson's exploitation thesis can be qualified by the 
introduction of differential preferences of countries touards the 
consumption of a public good. This difference in preferences may 
result in a different burden-sharing of the production of the public 
good. To demonstrate this qualification ue uill discuss the equili­
brium conditions for the public good output uith the help of the 
reaction process model.
The second theoretical qualification uidens the analysis of 
public goods in the area of International Relations by introducing 
a distinction between national and international arrangements to 
achieve a country's objective. The international cooperation model 
inspired by Ruggie is a joint production scheme. This uill cer­
tainly add a more nuanced perspective of a country's behaviour to­
uards international cooperation. Also in this model, size is be­
lieved to be an explanatory source of behaviour. Ruggie's main 
conclusion purports an inverse relationship betueen the ratio of 
sources spent on international arrangements over resources spent 
on national arrangements and the total level of resources used to 
attain a specific objective.
Concerning the behaviour of states, Olson bases his analysis 
on the consequences of the existence of an international public good, 
uhile Ruggie's analysis is centered on the impact of the returns to 
scale in the production of national and international arrangements 
in order to pursue an objective. Olson's public goods model as uell 
as Ruggie's joint production scheme consider the size of a country 
as an important factor in explanation of a state's behaviour touards 
international cooperation. Both models uill be tested in the area 
of development cooperation.
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The last tuo chapters Jill deal more specifically uith the 
Foreign Aid sector. International Development Aid is taken as that 
area in uhich the assumptions and tools of the Rational Actor 
Approach uill be tested. In the sixth chapter ue uill describe the 
history of the Phenomenon of International Development Aid since 
UU II and uill present some of the general characteristics of the 
aid performance by a specific donor group, i.e., the Development 
Assistance Committee.
The last and final chapter uill make use of this descriptive 
analysis to assess the aid performance by the Development Assistance 
Committee for the period 1963-1977. This is done uith reference to 
the assumptions and tools explained and elaborated in the previous 
chapters. An important section uill be dedicated to a discussion 
of the nature of the international good of development aid. It 
uill be clear that the objectives and means of the foreign aid 
allocation by donors contain simultaneously public and private good 
elements. It uill be purported that from a conceptual standpoint 
an application of a public good model to the area of development 
aid poses a number of problems.
The empirical assessment of both Olson's public good model and 
Ruggie's joint production scheme for the period 1963-1977 uill tend 
to indicate that the aid performance of the donor countries as re­
gards the aid volume as uell as the composition of the aid flows 
have changed over the period concerned. Size uill tend to be 
less a determining explanatory factor in the behaviour of states 
touards international development cooperation.
In view of the results of the empirical tests the aid performance 
of the Development Assistance Committee uill be re-assessed. Some 
reasons uill be explored for the departure from the predicted out­
comes of Olson's and Ruggie's models, as to the association betueen 
the size of a donor and the foreign aid behaviour. This final dis­
cussion uill clearly reveal the difficulty of maintaining and testing 
simultaneously both models, i.e., the Rational Actor Approach and 
the public goods model for the area of development cooperation.
CHAPTER I ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS :
MODELS AND HYPOTHESES
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Introduction
Science and the growth of science is said to start uith prob­
lems and to be directed to problem-solving undertakings in order 
to obtain explanatory theories with, possibly, predictive beha­
viour (1). Such problems are to be analyzed from a conceptual 
frameuork uhich enables the analyst to relate a scientific prob­
lem to a paradigm (2).
Explanations by particular analysts often show regular and 
predictable characteristics, uhich reflect unrecognized assump­
tions about the character of puzzles, the categories in uhich 
problems should be considered, the types of evidence that are re­
levant and the determinants of occurrences. Bundles of such re­
lated assumptions constitute basic frames of reference or concep­
tual models. These largely implicit conceptual models have sig­
nificant consequences for the content of the thought of the ana­
lysts.
Thus, because explanation is considered a fundamental task in 
social sciences, conceptual frameworks or models are seen as help­
ful analytical tools to achieve this task (3). Such models give
(1) See, for instance, Kuhn, T., Logic of Discovery or Psychology
of Research, in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds.), Criticism 
and the Growth of K n o w l e d g e . Cambridge: Harvard University 
P r e s s , 19“?Q , pi 1-23; and P o p p e r , K., Conjectures and Refuta­
tions : the Growth of K n o w l e d g e , London: Routledge and Regan,
TWT.
(2) Blaug, PI., Kuhn versus Lakatos, or Paradigms versus Research 
Programs in the History of Economics, History of Political 
E c o n o m y , Vol. 7, 1976, p. 399-433.
(3) Hempel, C.G., Aspects of Scientific E x p l a n a t i o n , New York: Free 
Press, 1965; and Nagel, E., Problemen van b e g n p s -  en theorie- 
vorming in de sociale wetenschappen, in Nauta, L.U.(red.), Het 
Neopositivisme in de Socials U e t e n s c h a p p e n . Amsterdam: Van 
G e n n e p , 1^73, p. ¿7-^9.
C8rtain notions of uhich variables are important. Without such 
notions ue uould be confronted by a beuildering uorld, not knou- 
ing to look for uhat and uhere and uhy. Although simplification 
and overdetermination of such scientific endeavours is a funda­
mental problem of social science research (1), models still serve 
as interesting points of departure for any analysis. By emphasi­
zing certain variables, they may capture the basic features and 
trends of the problem, the activity, the behaviour or the event 
being studied
Although any research in social sciences should follou this 
ideal pattern, the depth and the outcome of such an endeavour is 
partly determined by the subjectmatter of the specific field. 
Here, ue are dealing uith the field of International Relations, 
still a rather ambiguous discipline (2). Time and again models 
have been elaborated to analyze and explain events and activities
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(1) For the concept of overdetermination, see Przewrski, A• and 
Teune, H., The Logic of Comparative Social Inqu i r y . New York: 
John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1970.
(2) Some authors have tried to give a concise summary of the prob­
lems of International Relations. Ue mention a feu contri­
butions :
Alker, H.R. and Bock, P.G., Propositions about International 
Relations, in Robinson, 3 . A . , Political Science Annual Volume
3, 1972.
Hyvarynen, R., Monistic and Pluralistic Interpretations in 
Study of Interna tl on a r T o T f H ™ 'T eu York: Praegar Publishers,T5TT.
Lijphart, A., International Relation Theory : Great Debates 
and Lesser Debates, International Social Science J o u r n a l ,
Vol. 26-1, 1974, p. 11-21.
Palmer, N., A Oesiqn for International Relations Research. 
Scope, Theory« Metnods and R e l e v a n c e . Enqleuood Cliffs, Neu 
York: Prentice Hall, I n c . , 19^2.
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in the international system (1). Some theories have been efforts 
to produce a conceptual framework in the form of a set of expla­
natory hypotheses within which the whole discipline could be cas- 
ted (2). Others have been less ambitious and have only tried to 
devise a right way of studying the phenomena of world affairs, 
i.e., constructing theories defined as a set of questions (3).
(1 ) Ue list here some of the literature in International Relations 
which has concentrated on the summary of theory-building in 
the discipline :
Burton, 3.U., International Relations, ft General T h e o r y « Cam­
bridge, M a . : Harvard University Press, 1967.
Coplin, U.D. and Kegley, C.U., Analyzing International Rela­
t i o n s . New York: Praeger Publishers, i § l S .
Groom, A.3. and Mitchell, C.R., International Relations Theo­
ry : A B i b l i o g r a p h y . London: Frances Pinter, 1978.
Hoffman, S., Contemporary Theory in International Rel a t i o n s . 
Englewood Cliffs, New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977.
Ibid., The State of U a r . New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965.
Holsti, K.3., International Politics : A Framework for Ana­
l y s i s . Englewood Cliffs, New York: Prentice Hall, inc., 19^7.
Kaplan, M., New Approaches to International R e l a t i o n s . New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1968.
Knorr, K. and Rosenau, 3.(eds.), Contending Approaches to 
International P o l i t i c s , PTinceton: University Press, 1969.
Taylor, T., Approaches and Theory in International Re l a t i o n s , 
London: Longman, 19 V ^ .
(2) The 'realistic* theory of International Politics, elaborated 
by Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for 
Power and P e a c e . New York: A. Knopf, 1970, is a good 
example of a grand theory. Also the philosophies of history 
by Hegel, Marx, Sprengler,Toynbee are theories defined as a 
set of answers.
(3) The system theory by Kaplan, Liska's equilibrium theory, or 
5nyder*s decision-making approach are examples of theories 
defined as a set of questions.
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In the present study ue are not so much interested in all 
that the theory of International Relations has produced. Here, 
ue only want to indicate that the literature in International 
Relations has never been dominated by any general consensus con­
cerning the dimension of the subject or the appropriate mode of 
analysis. In other words, the frameuorks for understanding in­
ternational politics and the underlying assumptions concerning 
the basic structure of the international system have always been 
under scrutiny.
This chapter addresses itself first to the question of compe­
ting frameworks, limiting itself to a discussion of the 'realist' 
model and the 'complex interdependence' model. Secondly, it will 
specify the basic assumptions of our own research, which is pri­
marily focussed on the behaviour of small states towards interna­
tional cooperation seen from a Rational Actor approach.
-15-
A. Competing Frameworks and the Study of International Relations
1. The International System : the Classical Model
a. Basics of the Classical Model
In a first section we try to explicate the basics of the 
classical framework in which many theories in International Re­
lations have been developed. Much research in International Re­
lations did start from two assumptions ï 1) the state-centric 
assumption, i.e., the governments are the only important actors 
in international relations and 2) the state-as-actor, i.e., the 
governments are unitary actors in the sense that one can usefully 
ascribe to them at least some of the characteristics of purposive­
ness and choice ascribed to persons. These two assumptions have 
long been at the core of any model explaining international rela­
tions (1).
In the 'classical' school power is the central concept. Na­
tional power and security are seen as the primary goal and strate­
gic choice as the emphasis of every governmental action. By fo­
cussing on the presumed common objective of maintaining the auto­
nomy of governments against the danger of military defeat, it is 
rather an easy step to the assumption that all governments are in­
ternally united by a desire for military security. This assumption 
makes it, of course, also more plausible that the states as cohe­
rent units are seen as the dominant actors in world politics. Uith- 
in this framework it is also assumed that force is seen as a usable 
and effective instrument of policy and that there is a hierarchy 
of issues in world politics from the 'high politics' of military 
security to the 'low politics' of economic and social affairs.
In spite of significant differences in interest and focus, 
many explanations within this 'classical' framework have indeed 
attempted to understand events in foreign affairs as the more or
(1) Wagner, H., Dissolving the State : Three Recent Perspectives
on International Relations, International O r ganization, Vol. 28, 
1974, P. 435-466.
less purposive acts of unified national governments. Each assumes 
that what must be explained is an action, i.e., behaviour that re­
flects purpose and intention. One focuses on problems between na­
tions in accounting for the choices of actors. Each assumes that 
the action is chosen as a calculated solution to a strategic prob­
lem. For each, explanation consists of showing what goal the go­
vernment was pursuing and how the action was a reasonable choice, 
given the nation's objectives. In sum, in the 'realist' school 
the analyst attempts to structure events as purposive choices of 
consistent actors in order to show how a state could have ration­
ally chosen that action (1). Allison has labelled this classical 
framework the Rational Actor Model (2).
Let me illustrate this model with the rapid tour of some major 
works in a number of areas central to the study of International 
Relations. All reflect to some degree the basic classical model.
In the introduction to his major work 'Politics Among Nations',
Hans Morgenthau clearly states the frame of reference upon which 
he relies : "To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign 
policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational 
outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign 
policy" (3). To analyze national action in specific situations, 
Morgenthau has provided explicit instructions : "Ue put ourselves 
in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of fo­
reign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves 
what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose 
(presuaing always he acts in a rational manner), and which of these 
rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these 
circumstances, is likely to choose" (A). His 'realist' theory of
(1) Important to note in this model is the fact that identity be­
tween individual and collective rationality is assumed. In a 
later part of this chapter ue return to this assumption.
(2) Allison, G.T., Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Wissile 
C r i s i s . Boston: Little, Sroun and uy, 19V1, p. lti-66.
(3) Florgenthau, H., o p . c i t . . p.5-6.
(4) Ibid., o p . c i t . . p. 5.
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International Politics has'been a plea for the development of a 
rational theory in which politics should be governed by objective 
laws, universally valid.
In the essay 'The Actors in International Politics' (1) Arnold 
Uolfers observes : "Until quite recently, the states-as-the-sole- 
actors' approach to International Politics was so firmly entrenched 
that it may be called the traditional approach" (2). Although he 
accepts contributions from new developments in International Rela­
tions, he defends the traditional 's t ate-as-actor' model as "the 
standard on which to base our exceptions of state bahaviour and 
deviations" (3). It establishes "the normal actions and reactions 
of states in various international situations" (4).
In an introductory note to his 'International Politics and Fo­
reign Policy' (5) James Rosenau indicates some common characteris­
tics of the majority of International Relations at that time :
"Most observers ... (posit) a state-as-decision-maker model of 
the actors who comprise the international system" (6). Although 
well aware of the weaknesses and the simplifications of this 
approach, he defends it as a necessary abbreviation.
Also Raymond Aron's 'A Theory of International Relations' (7) 
is dependent on the assumption of a rational, unified, national 
actor. He writes : "La théorie des relations internationales part 
de la pluralité des centres autonomes de décision, donc du risque 
de guerre et, de ce risque, elle déduit la nécessité du calcul des 
moyens" (8). Although he differs in emphasis with other theorists 
from the 'realist' school, the actor whose goals are sociologically
(1) Uolfers, A., The Actors in International Politics, in Fox, U. 
(ed.), Theoretical Aspects of International R e l a t i o n s « Notre 
Dame: University Press, 1959.
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p. 83.
(3) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p. 98.
(4) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p. 98.
(5) Rosenau, 3., International Politics and Foreign P o l i c y « New 
York: The Free Press, 1961.
(6) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p.78.
(7) Aron, R., Paix et Guerre entre les Nations, Paris: Calman-Levy, 
1962.
(8) Ibid., o p . c i t . . p. 28.
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determined and who acts in.a specific international system is al­
so for Aron a rational, calculating government. Uhen he explains 
national actions, Aron focuses on the calculations of this actor,
i.e., on the logic of the conduct of international relations.
Even in more recent approaches, which take into account the 
changing nature of the international system, governments are still 
seen as the-central actors in international relations. In the 
Intergovernmental Politics model we get a conventional picture of 
governments carefully aggregating domestic positions at the nation­
al level in any process of international cooperation (1). Con­
sequently, international bargaining and consensus-building devices 
are considered as mere refinements of intergovernmental diplomacy. 
Important in this respect is the distinction between two different 
logics in international cooperation, that of integration and that 
of diversity. The latter often tends to restrict the former to 
the realm of welfare. In sum, this intergovernmental approach 
attaches much weight to the perception by governments of the issues 
and the assessment they make of their implications for the defence 
and promotion of vital interests, hence Hoffman's categories of
'high' and 'low' politics (2).
b. Some Critiques of the Basic Assumptions
In an area of growing interdependence and consequent integra­
tion processes some of the basic assumptions of the 'realist' 
framework have come under increasing criticism. In other words, 
the changing nature and the more complex structure of the present
(1) The Intergovernmental Politics model has been explained in :
Rosenthal, G., The Hen Behind the Decisions : Cases in Euro­
pean Policy flaking. Lexington, fla.i Heath, 1^75 ; Wallace, H . , 
National Governments and the European C o m m u n i t i e s , London: 
Chatham House, 1^73 ; and Uebb, C., Introduction : Variations 
on a Theoretical Theme, in Wallace, H. (ed.), Policy-making in 
the European C o m m u n i t i e s , London: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1977.
(2) Hoffman, S., Obstinate or Obsolete : The Fate of the Nation Sta­
te and the Case of Western Europe, D a e d a l u s , Vol. 95, Summer 
1966, p. 062-915 ; see also Dahrendorf's interpretation in "A 
new Qoal for Europe", in Hodges, fl. (eds.), European Integra­
tion, London: Penguin, 1972.
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international system seem to suggest that quite some 'realist' 
contributions to the study of International Relations are outdated 
for genuine application. Different models have been proposed to 
integrate these changing characteristics of the system within the 
explanatory power of the realist framework.
An overarching framework which has mainly criticized the state- 
centric assumption of the 'realist' school is the functionalist 
and neofunctionalist approach. Functionalism stresses the impor­
tance of uelfare issues as the key factor in international relations, 
in particular, international cooperation (1). These welfare issues 
suggest a consensus on means and ends more likely to induce coope­
rative behaviour among states than the politically sensitive issues 
such as defense and foreign policy. The premises of this approach 
are those of "a very simple utilitarianism in which the calculation 
of welfare interests is the ultimate determinant of behaviour (so 
that) a harmony of interests may be contrived" (2).
Closely related to this functional assumption is the belief 
that interest groups, anxious to maximize their material well-being, 
will necessarily be frustrated and disadvantaged by nationally 
oriented, politico-economic systems. These groups are thus expec­
ted to join with their functional allies across national borders 
for a re-adjustment of political and economic structures in order 
to meet the realities and requirements of the present internation­
al system. In sum, the functionalist interpretation, governed by 
a pervading rationalism, stresses common interests, the recognition 
of a common goal and the necessity of joint action for its realiza­
tion along purely functional lines. Policy-making is a problem­
solving exercise rather than a political process, also at the in­
ternational level.
(1) For an analysis of functionalism as a theory and strategy for 
international cooperation see Groom, A.3. and Taylor, P. (eds.), 
Functionalism. Theory and Practice in International Rel a t i o n s , 
London: University Press, 1975.
(2) Harrison, R., Europe in Q u e s t i o n . London: Allen and Unwin,
1974, p. 28.
Recognizing, houewsr, the naivety of divorcing welfare from 
politics, the neofunctional approach has envisaged a positive con­
tribution to international cooperation of the political processes 
in national political systems (1). This model identifies the clash 
of group interests, competing for access to scarce resources as the 
fundamental characteristic of pluralistic and industrialized socie­
ties. Self-interest is seen as the prime motivator of all politi­
cal activity. Governments are not the only actors in internatio­
nal relations. They have to share the scene with interest groups, 
bureaucracies and political elites. They all compete for a maxi­
mum satisfaction of interest. This neofunctional approach presents 
an international version of the process of national policy-making 
in which interest group politics is seen as a harmonious process. 
Compared to the rather pessimistic intergovernmental model, neo­
functionalism provides the analyst with a more optimistic view of 
the policy-making in international cooperation.
Also the state-as-actor assumption of the realist framework 
has come under increasing criticism. New approaches have been 
proposed to include new elements in the decision-making process of 
governments in international relations. Governments are not longer 
seen as unified actors in the international system. In this con­
text Allison has introduced an organizational process model (2). 
According to this model a government actually consists of a "con­
glomerate of semifeudal, loosely allied organizations, each with 
a substantial life of its own" (3). Governmental behaviour is then 
understood "less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large 
organizations functioning according to standard patterns of beha­
viour". These outputs must be coordinated and coordination re-
-20-
(1) For comprehensive surveys of neo-functionalism, see Haas, E.6., 
Beyond the Nation State : Functionalism and International Orga­
n i z a t i o n , Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1964 ; Lind- 
berg, L.N. and Scheingold, S.A., Europe's Would Be Polity : 
Patterns of Chanqe of the European C o m m u n i t y , Englewood Cliffs, 
New York: Prentice Hall, I n c . , 1970.
(2) Allison, G.T., o p . c i t . , p. 67-143. For an excellent introduc­
tion to the organizational theory, see March, 0. and Simon, H., 
O r g a n i z a t i o n s , New York: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1958; and 
March. 3.. Handbook of O r g a n i z a t i o n s , Chicago: Rand PIcNally, 
1972.
(3) Ibid., o p . cit.. p. 67.
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quires standard operating procedures, i.e., rules according to 
which things are done. At any given time, a government consists 
of existing organizations, each with a fixed set of standard ope­
rating procedures (1). The dominant inference pattern is explained 
"by uncovering the organizational routines and repertoires, i.e., 
action programs, that produced the outputs that comprise the puzzle- 
ing occurrence" (2).
The model's focus on government action as organizational out­
put, partially coordinated by a unified group of leaders, balances 
the classical theory's effort to understand government behaviour 
as choices of a unitary actor (3). The model, however, concen­
trates on the aggregate behaviour of organizations rather than on 
individuals uithin organizations. It is a unified group of leaders 
which makes decisions within organizational constraints. Further­
more, because of the stress on routine behaviour uithin the out­
puts of organizations this model is probably most relevant when 
the subject matter is day-to-day administration rather than the ex­
planation of behavioural trends in international relations.
Apart from these more theoretical remarks the organizational 
process model does not serve the practical interest of our own 
research. In other words, we are not so much interested in the 
internal decision-making process of governments when they engage 
in a process of international cooperation. Ue merely assume that 
the internal decision-making process has no bearing on the ration­
ality of the state as an actor in international cooperation.
A new promising approach, which goes even further in its cri­
tique to the state-as-actor assumption of the realist school is 
the bureaucratic politics model. Certainly in economics there has 
been done quite some work to elaborate an economic theory of bu-
(1) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p. 68.
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p. 88.
(3) Bloomfield, I.P., The Foreign Policy Process ; Waking Theory 
R e l e v a n t , Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1974, p. 17 
24.
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re aucracy (1). In a sense this approach can be regarded as a re­
finement or extension of the organizational politics model. One 
moves from organizations to officials and leaders. Governmental 
behaviour is no longer understood as organizational outputs, but 
as results of a bargaining game involving players both inside 
and outside the government. The basic unit of analysis of 
the bureaucratic politics model is governmental action seen as bar­
gaining along regularized channels among players with diverse in­
terests and unequal influence (2). In other words, if a nation 
performs an action, that action is considered the resultant of the 
bargaining among individuals and groups within the government. In 
this approach the governmental actor is neither a unitary agent 
nor a conglomerate of organizations, but rather a number of indi­
vidual players whose interests and actions have an important effect 
on the government's decisions and actions.
The bureaucratic politics model has mainly questioned the state- 
as-actor assumption in International Relations. It emphasizes what 
is to be learned by disaggregating governments and examining the 
sometimes disorderly process by which collective decisions are 
reached within them. Certainly when economic language is introduc­
ed into the analysis this model achieves quite some explanatory 
power. However, the model requires a lot of information on each 
player's position and specification of various action channels that 
it finally becomes rather complex (3). Moreover, in spite of its 
promising results in some areas, the model remains a partial expla­
nation, focussing on the internal decision-making process of govern­
mental behaviour. Although we recognize the importance of this
(1) See Niskanen, U.A., Bureaucracy and Representative Gove r n m e n t . 
Chicago-New York: Aldine Publishing Cy., 1971 ; and b r z e c h o w s k i , 
U.P., Economic Models of Bureaucracy : Survey, Extensions, and 
Evidence, in Borcherding, T.E., Budgets and Bu r e a u c rats, The 
Sources of G o v e r n m e n t s . Durham, N.C.: University F^ress, 19^5.
(2) Allison, G.T., o p . c i t . , p. 162.
(3) For a critique of the Bureaucratics Model, see Art, R.3., Bu­
reaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy : A Critique, 
Policy S c i e n c e s , Nr. 4, 1973, p. 467-490 ; and Freedman, L.,
Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes : A Critique of
the Bureaucratic Politics Model, International Affairs, Vol. 56, 
1976, p. 434-449.
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process, in the present study ue assume that it has no bearing 
on the actual behaviour of the state as an actor in international 
cooperation. Ue merely focus on the relations among states as 
coherent actors in international cooperation.
2. The International System : The Complex Interdependence Model
The validity of the realistic frameworks, i.e., the classical 
theory and its further developments, some argue, is becoming more 
irrelevant to the contemporary international system and has been 
thoroughly questioned and criticized by a new 'globalist' or trans­
national view of the world. This complex interdependence model 
questions both assumptions of the realist school with, however, 
some more attention to the state-centric assumption.
This new approach to the study of international relations has 
mainly been developed by Keohane and Nye (1). The central assertion 
of the globalist view is that contemporary international system 
differs fundamentally from previous systems along several dimensions. 
It is argued that there are multiple channels which connect socie­
ties, that there is no clear or consistent hierarchy of issues and 
that the main instrument to achieve a nation's objectives is shifted 
from the use of military force to the manipulation of economic inter­
dependence in the issue-areas concerned.
The interdependence model suggests that the security politics 
paradigm is not any longer the only predominant one as it was in 
the realist school. Changes in the distribution of resources within 
issue-areas, the evolution of the international system, changes in 
the importance of transnational actors, etc., they all have an im­
pact on actual governmental behaviour. It further suggests that
(1) Keohana, R.O. and Nye, 3 . S. (eds.), Transnational Relations and 
Uorld P o l i t i c s . Cambridge, fia.: Harvard University Press, 1972.
Ibid., Power and Interdependence, Survival. Vol. 15-4, July- 
August 1973, p. 158-165.
Ibid., Transgovernmental Relations and International Organiza­
tion, Uorld P o l i t i c s « Vol. 27-1, 1974, p. 39-62.
Ibid., International Interdependence and Integration, in Green- 
stein, F. and Polsby, N. (eds.), The Handbook of Political 
S c i ence. Vol. 8, Reading, Pla.î Addison-Uesly, 1975, p. 363-414,
Ibid., Power and Interdependence. Uorld Politics in Transition. 
Boston-rorontos Little, brown and C y , 1977,
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the role and function of the nation-state in world affairs will di­
minish, a view best characterized by the 1 sovereignty -at-bay' model 
Other actors have emerged and should therefore be included in the 
analysis of international relations (1).
The complex interdependence model suggests some distinctive 
political processes and lead to different predictions about foreign 
policy affairs (2). The military security issues of previous eras 
have given way to goals which can only be achieved in a global sys­
tem. In short, the rise of the welfare state and the increasing 
sensitivity of national governments to the rising expectations of 
their societies have made them dependent upon the benefits provid­
ed by an open world economic system. This will of course lead to 
more international cooperation. Moreover, the multiple channels 
of interaction and subsequent transnational and transgovernmental 
relations have led the model to attach greater importance to the 
study of international organization.
Another suggestion which follows from the interdependence per­
spective is the stress on linkage strategies. Under realist con- 
*
ditions one expects linkages between issues to be made principally 
by strong states. However, when military force is largely immobi­
lized under the interdependence model, linkages by powerful states 
are more difficult and less effective. For small and weak states 
the situation is the reverse : "Linkage of unrelated issues is of­
ten a means of extracting concessions or side payments from rich 
and powerful states. And unlike powerful states whose instruments 
for linkage are often too costly to use, the linkage instrument 
used by poor or weak states,i.e., international organizations, is 
available and inexpensive" (3). These institutions provide a poli­
tically congenial and rather cheap platform for small and weak 
states to achieve and further some of their objectives.
(1) Nansbach, R.U., Ferguson, Y.H., and Lampert D.E., The Web of 
World Politics : Non-State Actors in the Global S y s t e m , Engle­
wood Cliffs, New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976.
(2) Sullivan, FI.P., Competing Frameworks and the Study of Contempo­
rary International Politics, Journal of International Studies. 
Vol. 7, Nr. 2, Autumn 1978, p. 9 á - 11 b .
(3) Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S., Power and Interdependence, World 
Politics in Transition, Boston-Toronto; Little, brown and Cy,
w r r r r r r r . --------------
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As to the state-as-actor assumption of the realist school 
this globalist view argues that "the assumption of states as uni­
tary actors fails to take into account ... that subunits of govern­
ments may also have distinct foreign policies which are not all 
filtered through the top leadership and which do not fit into a 
unitary actor model. Thus, scholars have recently developed a 
'bureaucratic politics approach' to foreign policy analysis ex­
plaining decisions of governments in these terms" (1). In short, the 
complex interdependence model absorbs the literature on bureaucra­
tic politics into its own paradigm. As a result, the model is able 
to include the possibility of 'transgovernmental interactions', 
i.e., the extension across national boundaries of the process of 
bargaining and coalition formation between bureaucrats and bureaus. 
It becomes possible in this view for bureaus in two different 
governments but with smaller policy interests to concert their 
actions in such a way as to influence the official policies of 
both governments.
The complex interdependence model has introduced assumptions 
quite different from the basic ones used in the realist framework, 
i . e . ,relatively independent government agencies which seek to 
maintain their autonomy by denying to others any influence over 
the subgoals with which they are charged, and different constella­
tions of interest groups, national and transnational, which grow 
up around these subgoals.
In their conclusion Keohane and Nye stress the need of a 
combination of both models. Although they acknowledge the 
superiority of the realist model in some cases, they argue, that in 
some circumstances, in some cases and in some countries explana­
tions and predictions based on 'realist' conceptions will be in­
accurate. Their analysis of the law of the sea negotiations, the 
international monetary affairs or the American-Canadian relation­
ship with the help of the complex interdependence model showed a 
better explanatory power. Briefly,both models can still be helpful.
(1) Keohane, R.O. and Nye, 3 . S., Transnational Relations and World 
P o l i t i c s . Cambridge, l*la.: Harvard University Press, 1 ^ 2 ,  p. 
331.
1
3. Competing Frameworks in International Relations : An Evaluation :
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Ue obviously cannot offer conclusive answers to the use of 
competing frameworks in International Relations. Here we may 
only briefly assess some of the main characteristics of the com­
plex interdependence model. A first component of the globalist 
position is the view that nations are no longer the major actors 
in international politics. Even those arguing that models of com­
plex interdependence may be more accurate than models based on
realist assumptions,they nonetheless admit that "government-to- 
government interaction in the 1970s remains the most prominent, 
conspicuous, and far-reaching in impact among the many different 
kinds of interaction in the world system" (l). Moreover, the in- \ 
creasing importance of non-state actors has not found strong em­
pirical support in the observed data of recent studies (2).
Similarly, although there is much talk of the decline in mili­
tary issues and the rise of economic issues, nonetheless an impor­
tant topic of discussion is still the dominant power of the U.S.,
the changes in U.S. power and the power relations or distributions 
within the system. While economic and other non-military issues 
seem to be more prominent today than in the past, this may simply 
mean that the surface issues have changed, not that the underlying 
issues have changed. The argument that the impact of international 
economic issues on nations will force nations into cooperative re­
lations can also be viewed from the opposite perspective, namely 
that the economic interest groups in many nations may be so power­
ful unlikely to produce growing cooperation.
Another argument which has claimed for the substitution of a 
globalist world view for the realist view centers around a dis­
cussion of the concept of power. One argues that the poor under­
standing of power has led to misconstrued theoretical models with­
(1) Puchala, 0. and Fagen, S.* International Politics in the 1970s : 
The Search for a Perspective, International O r g a n i z a t i o n . Vol. 
28, Spring 1978, p. 251-252.
(2) See Mansbach, R.W., and others, The Web of World Politics ; Non; 
State Actors in the Global S y s t e m « Englewood Cliffs , New York: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976.
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in the realist framework. Often the explanatory potency of pro­
positions based on power has been confused with the normative de­
sire to bring about a peaceful world. Hence, the distinction be­
tween empirical and normative analysis is not always maintained 
in the classical model. However, the discussion on the concept 
of power is of not much importance to this study, because here we 
focus on cooperation among states and not on power relations among 
s t a t e s .
To resume, rejecting the realist pardigm has been facilitated 
partly by the fact that changes have occurred in the contemporary 
system which might call that older paradigm into question, partly 
by the hope of many that we have entered into a new era of coope- 
ration-out-of-necessity and partly by certain misunderstandings 
concerning an important concept of that paradigm.
In 'Power and Interdependence' (1977) Keohane and Nye adopted 
an interesting predictive power criterium to test their t r a nsnation­
al relations approach. It brings a blending of theoretical and 
empirical work into International Relations' analysis and comes 
closer to what one should expect from a genuine scientific approach. 
However, Keohane and Nye do not claim to present a general theory 
of international politics. The purpose is not to replace the rea­
list paradigm, but to demonstrate that it, along with other models 
of international processes, is insufficient for describing and ex­
plaining the politics of relationships characterized by complex 
interdependence. It is thus not intended to replace other views 
of, or approaches to, international politics but rather to demon­
strate that in certain types of relationships traditional models 
fail at the levels of description, explanation, and prediction.
The model is proposed as a necessary tool for understanding some 
types of relationships (l).
(1) Holsti, K .3., A new international politics? : Diplomacy in com­
plex interdependence, International O r g a n i z a t i o n , V/ol. 28, 1978, 
p. 513-528.
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That the best explanations of foreign affairs are insightful, 
personalistic, and noncumulative has often been noted. Consequent­
ly, perspective analyses of particular happenings tend simply to 
illuminate these occurrences rather than to contribute to an accu­
mulating body of systematic knowledge in International Relations' 
theory. Some analysts justify this condition of the 'state of art' 
of theorizing about international relations as a consequence of the 
character of the enterprise. The complexity of the reality in the 
international system often creates a conflict between calls for 
more insight and demands for more cumulation of systematic know­
ledge within the discipline of International Relations. However, 
it is not the place here to make the critique of the scientific 
approach of International Relations. Ue only want to make some 
concluding remarks concerning the use of models in International 
Relations.
Uhat can be learned from this discussion is the fact that no 
single paradigm can account for all international behaviour. To 
demonstrate that the power paradigm appears unable to account for 
a particular decision, event, trend or other international beha­
viour does not imply the entire paradigm is outmoded, but merely 
that it does not account for that specific behaviour. It may be, 
as Keohane and Nye contend, that both models apply to different 
situations, scopes or domains of behaviour. That means that both n 
del»¿although they diverge along several important dimensions, sti] 
may be useful for understanding contemporary international politics 
That, of course, is the question which should be the focus of re­
search attention and not the forced imposition in every domain of 
the alleged importance of one paradigm over another. Therefore, 
one should know what kind of behaviour, scope, and domain a given 
framework is supposedly explaining.
Furthermore, accepting a specific framework with its basic 
assumptions as a launching point in International Relations' re­
search, must make us fully aware of the risk of explanatory over­
kill. Any analysist should ackowledge the modesty of the model 
which he is working with, i.e., its merits and limits. Also in
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our oun research ue incalculate a certain limitation of the 
generality of the used model, suggesting that history, different 
issue-areas or different institutional settings may require 
different explanatory emphasis, as Keohane and Nye already 
mentioned.
Houever, this position does not imply a reversal of the 
scientific approach to a rather descriptive historical position. 
Certain generalizations from models are possible. Certain law- 
like patterns do apply under certain circumstances. But the 
position is less ambitious than that of trying to fit all possibly 
relevant variables in a grand theory uith general applicability, 
be it the realist school or the complex interdependence view.
To sum up, we accept the relativity of any model in Inter­
national Relations, but are still convinced of the usefulness 
of a theoretical construction, in the sense that it stresses 
from a specific perspective some relevant variables. The choice 
of a specific model as a starting point and as a framework for 
research in International Relations, granted the simplification 
and limitations of the model, can still be helpful to analyze 
the basic trends and changing characteristics of the problem 
under study.
B. The Rational Actor Approach : Basic Assumptions of the Analysis
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By concentrating on relations between governments, some 
scholars clearly hoped to be able to develop a model of Interna­
tional Relations that, while not necessarily accurate as a des­
cription, would nonetheless capture its basic features. The ex­
ample of economists has sometimes been influential in the direc­
tion of what is called the Rational Actor Approach in International 
Relations.
However, the aim of scientific approaches in International 
Relations can neither be as explicit nor as ambitious as those 
in economics. It is said that the strength of economic theory 
is mainly based on 'large numbers', enabling theories to reach a 
sufficient level of abstraction. It is rather difficult to aim 
for a similar level of scientific approach in the study of Inter­
national Relations.
The study of International Relations has often focussed on his­
torical explanations of individual behaviour of actors and/or ac­
tivities within the international system. Ue should, however, add 
that explanation of single facts, akin to historical explanations, 
is more or less an unescapable central task of this field. A des­
criptive pattern of analysis is often dominant. This also ex­
plains the rather poor predictive power element in many Interna­
tional Relations theories. To resume,the specific nature of Inter­
national Relations has certainly had a significant impact on the 
development of theoretical constructions within the field.
In the present study the main interest of analysis is focussed 
on a subset of International Relations, i.e., cooperation among 
states within the international system. Although it is assumed 
that International Relations' models can not analyze processes 
in the international system with the same explanatory and predic­
tive power as it is often aimed at in economic models, we still 
propose the Rational Actor Approach with its merits and limits as 
the starting point and guide of our own analysis.
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In the following pages ue explain the basic assumptions 
from which our analysis starts. The primary focus is on the 
response of national states to the possibilities and problems that 
the contemporary international system generates. In other words, 
what are the underlying assumptions under which states with differ­
ing objectives and differing capacities may cooperate with 
other states in the international system?
1. General Framework
The general framework from which the basic assumption of the 
present analysis must be understood is the neo-classical economic 
'theory. This theory should be taken as a scientific research 
program in the Lakatos' sense. In other words, this is not a 
single model, but a whole range of models which are to be used 
according to the specific need of analysis. In short, we adopt 
this neo-classical economic theory as a box of tools guiding our 
own analysis.
Market economic theory has been useful for explanatory and 
predictive purposes to the extent the individual participant in 
its market relationship is guided by individual self-interest. 
Through the use of this specific assumption about human motiva­
tion, scholars have been able to establish for economic theory a 
limited claim as a positive social science. Ue must, however, 
immediately add that economic theory does not depend for its 
validity or applicability on the presence of the 'homo econoraicus'. 
B r i e f l y ,  in economics there has been a growing awareness of the 
explanatory and predictive power of theories built on the logic 
of decision-making by rational individuals, endowed with given 
preferences and facing alternative sets of constraints (1).
(1) For extensive references to this literature, see Amacher, R.C., 
T o l l i s o n , R.D., Willett, T.D. (eds.), The Economic Approach 
to Public Policy, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
T5TST See also the survey article written by Muller, D.C., 
Public Choice : A Survey, Journal of Economic L i t e r a t u r e .
Vol. X, Nr. 2, June 1976, p. 396-433.
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The models of the neo-classical research program, which all 
center on constrained decision-making with given preferences, 
have a common core, i.e., the concept of rationality. Any useful 
theory of human action, be it positive or normative in content 
or purpose, must postulate some rationality on the part of the 
decision-making units. Therefore, it is imperative to be clear 
about the meaning of, conditions of, and limits to rationality as 
it is used in the neo-classical theory.
Rationality is exactly what we postulate in actors that makes 
them behave in a regular way. The essence of this rationality is 
that actors relate their actions to their goal. Then the first
step to an interpretation of rationality is an explanation of goal- 
related behaviour, i.e., action which is related to selfish goals. 
To say that behaviour is related to goals is to say that there is 
purposeful action.
• Then rational behaviour isidBntified as a subset of purpose­
ful behaviour. Although purposeful action is the main element 
of the notion of rationality, the existence of purpose is known 
from the existence of preferences. It is a preferential ordening 
of goals and outcomes that reveals the existence of purpose, hence 
the importance of the utility function in economics. In short, ra­
tionality purports a consistency of choices within the context 
of maximizing a utility function under constraints.
2. Possible Relaxations
Relaxations of the neo-classical research program can be in­
troduced along two lines of reasoning. First, one may discuss 
and question the content of the utility function. In other words, 
what are the objectives that an actor may pursue to maximize his 
utility function under constraints? These objectives may vary 
according to the content of the utility function. This utility 
function may contain only pecuniary objectives (i.e., maximizing 
income, profits, ...), tangible objectives (i.e., maximizing con­
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sumption goods), non-tangible objectives (i.e., maximizing goals 
such as prestige, security, ...) and altruistic objectives (i.e., 
maximizing non-selfish goals such as caring for friends, family, 
etc.). Only in the last group of objectives there is an inter­
dependency of utility functions, in the sense that the consumption 
of others enters in one's own utility function. Ue should add 
here that the degree of measurability of the utility function is 
an important aspect of the predictive power of the theory. This, 
of course, depends on the specific goals which enter the utility 
f u n c t i o n .
A second relaxation of the neo-classical theory is directed 
to an introduction of the element of costs into the analysis.
The definition of rationality refers to an actor who identifies 
courses of action appropriate to the achievement of his goals, 
evaluates these courses both in terms of expected costs and gains 
and in terms of probability of success, and selects the one that 
indicates the greatest net gain of valued things.
Perfect rationality, however, requires not only a stintless 
search for possible policies, but also perfect information on the 
probability, costs, and gains of various outcomes. The difficul­
ties inherent in evaluating a large range of possible courses of 
action are usually insuperable because one lacks adequate infor­
mation and time. Moreover, the limited predictability of how ac­
tors act and react entails some uncertainties. In other words, 
the perfectly rational actor does the best he can, coping with un­
certainties, revising his policies, and knowing that he must be 
satisfied with less than the best solution. He knows that within 
his maximizing behaviour there are individual costs of information, 
decision-making and uncertainty. The introduction of these cost 
elements into the analysis has led to the notion of bounded ra­
tionality, compared to the concept of perfect rationality.
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Qoth relaxations have the tendency to reduce the predictive 
power of their analysis. The more one loosens up the box with 
tools the more one risks to end up with ad hoc explanations. 
Therefore, they should both be used with precaution. Still, in 
economics, particularly in the theory of public choice, there 
has been made some progress to the extent that bounded rationali­
ty may contain a predictive element. For the further course of 
our own research, we limit ourselves to the usual concept of ra­
tionality, as it is assumed in the neo-classical economic theory. 
Only in chapter VI and l/II we will consider some altruistic ob­
jectives in the utility function.
3. Main Transpositions
Turning to our own subjectmatter we must ascertain that the 
use of a Rational Actor Model in International Relations involves 
two main transpositions. Ue want to explain them briefly. First 
of all, we transpose the basic methodology of the neo-classical 
economic framework outside economics. The assumption of a consis­
tency of choices within the context of maximizing the utility 
function under constraints has already often been adopted to the 
field of political science (1). In our own case the neo-classi- 
cal framework is applied to the field of International Relations, 
more specifically to the cooperation among states in the inter­
national system.
In this context we may say a few words on the structure of the 
international system. The contemporary interstate system is de­
fined by J.G. Ruggie as a 'modified Westphalia system', still 
essentially decentrialized and based upon the will of states, but 
with each state willing to accept and to engage in some form and 
some extent in international cooperation (2). The international
(1) See for e.g. Riker, U.H. and Ordeshook, P.C., An Introduction 
to Positive Political T h e o r y . Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973.
(2) Ruggie, J.G., Collective Goods and Future International Collabo 
ration, American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, 1972—2,
p. 877.
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system may then best be defined as a 'mixed cobueb', in uhich 
states remain important actors, but have to share the interna­
tional arena with multinational corporations, transnational 
pressure groups and international organizations. These multiple 
channels of interaction imply a relaxation of the state-centric 
assumption, but they can still be incorporated in the analysis. In 
short t the multiplicity of actors in international relations, to­
gether with the complex patterns of interdependencies of decisions, 
events and developments and the extent to uhich states have esta­
blished collective principles and forms of decision-making have 
all modified the centralized structure of the system, much as the 
market economy is modified by governmental intervention and regu­
lation.
Here, ue concentrate on the nation state as the decision-making 
unit to uhich the behavioural characteristic of rationality is to 
be applied. Governmental action at the aggregated level is taken
as the basic unit of analysis. States are seen as rational
actors in the sense that their patterns of action in internation­
al relations are correctly designed touards goal achievement.
That implies that, in the present international s y s t e m ,purposeful 
action by states often requires a coordination of policies among 
countries to achieve commonly shared goals. In other uords, in­
ternational cooperation may often be seen as a realistic and ra­
tional response by states to achieve their goals.
In our oun research the individual nation-state is assumed 
to be a rational and important actor in the 'mixed cobueb' of
international relations. This does not imply that ue discard the
complex interdependence international system, but only that within 
this 'mixed cobueb' ue limit ourselves to an analysis and explana­
tion of the behaviour of states touards cooperation in the inter­
national system seen from a Rational Actor perspective.
Although we are aware of the incompleteness, partiality and 
limits of this perspective for International Relations' studies, 
ue still believe that some basic features of a state's behaviour
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touards international cooperation can be deriv/ed from this 
approach. Thus it is our purpose to examine the strength of the 
model as an analytical tool and to see hou far its explanatory 
power extends.
A second transposition which is assumed in this Rational Ac­
tor Model is the step from individual rationality to collective 
rationality. This transposition points to a question which is 
quite important to our analysis, i.e., what behavioural assump­
tion is used in analyzing cooperation among states in the inter­
national system. Referring to 3. Buchanan and G. Tullock's con­
ceptual framework for collective behaviour 0 ) ,  we take the indi­
vidualistic economic or the utility-maximizing assumption to ana­
lyze the behaviour of states towards international cooperation.
The economic approach assumes man to be a utility-maximizer 
in both his market and political activities. This approach has nou 
been applied and extended to the analysis of the problems of 
collective action in international relations. In other words, 
the logic of collective action is broadened to the field of Inter­
national Relations by transposing the individual-group relation­
ship towards the state—international system relationship. This 
means that a country, as it participates in 'the international sys­
tem, is assumed to be guided by the desire to maximize its own 
utility. The assumption implies that national interest, broadly 
conceived, is still to be a strong motivation force in the conduct 
of a country's international activities. It further assumes that 
states will integrate (or restrain) the pursuit of their interests 
with the international system, i.e., states will act in some accor­
dance with the rules the international system has set up for a 
better management of the interdependence-relations among states. To 
resume» all states, regardless the differing capacities to achieve 
their objectives, are assumed to be value—■aximizers. .
( 1 ) Buchanan, 3. and Tullock, G., The Calculus of Consent : Logic­
al Foundations of Constitutional d e m o c r a c y . Michigan: Universi 
ty Press, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, (1965) 1974.
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The assumption of consistency of choices at the aggregate 
level is very often done in economics, e.g., the assumption of 
the firm as a rational actor. Also in politics the transposition 
from individual to collective rationality has been used, e.g., in 
the assumption of political parties as rational actors in Down's 
theory of Democracy (1 ). In International Relations it may pose 
some problems.
Rationality is often limited in International Relations to 
the extent that the behaviour of states often represents respon­
ses to a specific set of historical, political, or economic cir­
cumstances. Those responses may be courses of action which are 
difficult to incorporate into the analysis. The Rational Actor 
Model further assumes that the policy maker has control over his 
bureaucratic instruments. The public choice theory has put much 
of all this into doubt. In particular, the bureaucratic politics 
theory whose main focus is on the internal decision-making pro­
cess has indicated that constraints and restraints emanating from 
bureaucratic behaviour impinge on the evaluation of choices.
The various limitations on the explanatory power of the Ration­
al Actor Models do not make it useless for application in Inter­
national Relations. Whatever the constraints that push the nation 
state to deviate from rational behaviour, the basic assumption 
remains that a state is a value-maximizer. It will try, as much 
as operating conditions and various idiosyncracies permit to do 
better for itself rather than worse. To that extent, admittedly 
variable, the country behaves rationally. Provided we are alert 
to the factors that limit rationality, this approach may still 
entail a great deal of explanatory power to analyze the behaviour 
of states towards international cooperation.
Although this strong assumption of collective rationality may 
raise a number of problems we will still assume for the further 
course of our analysis a consistency of choices at the aggregate 
level of the state in spite of the internal decision-making pro­
cess within the state. In other words, we assume that the inter-
(1} Downs. A.. An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper 
and Bios, V X T . -------------  ----------------
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nal decision-making process has no bearing on the actual beha­
viour of the state touards international cooperation.
As a concluding remark of this section on the basic assump­
tions of the Rational Actor Model in International Relations, ue 
may already briefly hint at the problem of public goods which is 
to be explained in Chapter III. Ue will see that the existence 
of public goods may lead to failures of decentralized decision­
making. In other words, the existence of public goods in Inter­
national Relations may lead to international 'market* failures 
in the sense of failures of decentralized decision-making and, 
consequently, to the need for cooperation among states in the in­
ternational system.
CHAPTER II ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY * SMALL STATES' î 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
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Introduction
Till recently research in International Relations had no or 
little interest in separate, scientific studies of small states* 
behav/iour in the international system. The element of smallness 
per se did not give rise to much concern or study. Apart from 
monographs on specific small countries, interest usually centered 
on problems common to countries small and large. Only feu authors 
analyzed small states as a category of international actors ex­
hibiting behavioural traits uhich distinguish them from big states 
( 1 ) .
The traditional—historically as uell as the more systematic— 
theoretically oriented analyses in the International Relations 
literature nearly all have studied and emphasized the pouer rela­
tions among big states. Some reasons can be put forward for the 
lack of interest in theorizing about small states' behaviour in the 
international system as a separate subjectmatter.
(1) See, for instance, Cremer, P., La notion de petite puissance
et sa réalité politico-militaire, Chronique de politique étran­
g è r e . Vol. XXVII, Nr. 3, May 1974, p. 323-338 ; East, M.A.,
Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour : A Test of Two Models, World 
P o l i t i c s . Vol. XXV, July 1973, p. 556-576 ; Fox, A.B., The frower 
o f S m a l T  States : Diplomacy in World War I I . Chicago: Univer- 
sity Press, 1959 ; Keohane, ft.O., Lilliputians' Dilemmas : Small 
States in International Politics, International O r ganization. 
Vol. XXIII, Spring 1969, p. 291-31Ô ; Ibid., The Big Influence 
of Small Allies, Foreign P o l i c y . Spring 1971-1, p. 161-182 ; 
Mathisen, T., The Function of Small States in the Strategies of 
the Great P o u e r s . Oslo: Universltetsforlaget, 1971 ; Nobel Sym­
posium 17. SmaTT States in International R e l a t i o n s , Stockholm: 
Almqvist and Wicksell. 1971 : Rothstein. R.L.. Alliances and 
Small P o w e r s . New York: Columbia University Press, 19éj8 ; 
Vayrynen, rt., On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power 
Status, Cooperation and C o n f l i c t . Vol. VI, 1971, p. 91-102 ; 
Vital, D., The Inequality o^ States : A Study of the Small Power 
in International Relations, Oxford: University Press, 196^.
First, the discrepancy in interest between big states and 
small ones may be understood in the light of traditional thinking 
in International Relations. Traditionally, big powers were con­
sidered as the subject, the 'mowers' of international politics, 
while small states were mere object, 'followers' of the system.
One is used to hearing definitions of the structure of the interna­
tional system in terms of the number of big powers involved. Why 
else should notions like balance of power, bipolarity or multipo­
larity have taken such an important place in the theory of Inter­
national Relations? Thus, the relations among the big powers were 
viewed as the determinant factor of the structure and the content 
of the international system. Inasmuch as power analysis has 
been an important domain in the study of International Relations 
(1), it is quite natural that little attention has been paid to 
the study of 'small states'.
Secondly, there has been a tendency to see 'small states' as 
nothing more than or no different from large states writ small.
The major implicit assumption which underlies this view is that 
the behaviour of 'small states' is seen as the result of the same 
general processes of decision-making that are found in larger 
states. Therefore, characterizing 'small states' as less power­
ful big states, does not give any reason to study small states as 
a separate category of states. Thus, this viewpoint stresses the 
fact that behaviour rules which are valid for big states may - 
with some correction as to the difference of size - be applied 
to the policies of small states.
This reasoning, however, has to be related to the specific 
mood of the international system. In the bipolar cold war system 
and the balance-of-power system the power relations among countries 
were the dominating trend of analysis. In the present internation­
al system, characterized by an Increased interdependence, a poli­
ticization of the international economic activity and subsequent
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(l) Baldwin, O.A., Power Analysis and World Politics : New Trends 
versus Old Trends, World P o l i t i c s , Vol. XXXI, Nr. 2, 1979, 
p. 161-194.
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changing relations among countries and groups of countries (1), 
a trend for more cooperation among countries has become apparent.
(1) The literature on this subject is quite extensive. I only 
refer here to some contributions :
Aron, R., The Ambiguities of Interdependence, The Atlantic 
Community Q u a r t e r l y . Uinter 1975-1976, p. 405-421.
Broun, S., New Forces in Uorld P o l i t i c s . Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1974.
Bergsten, C.F. and Cline, U.R., Increasing International Econo­
mic Interdependence : The Implications for Research, American 
Economic R e v i e w . Vol. 66-2, 1976, p. 155-161.
Camps, N., The Management of Interdependence. Neu York: Council 
of International Affairs, 15^4.
Cooper, R., The Economics of Interdependence : Economic Policy 
in the A t l a n t i c . Neu Vorki Me firaw-Hill Book Cy.. 1968.
Hoffman, S., International Organization and International Sys­
tem, in Ferguson, Y. and Ueiker, U., Contemporary International 
P o l i t i c s . California: Goodyear Publishing Cy., 1973.
Keohane, R.O. and Nye, 3 . S., Uorld Politics and the Internatio­
nal Economic System, in Bergsten, F. (ed.), The Future of the 
International Economic O r d e r . Lexington: Heath, 1973, Chapter 5.
Ibid., Power and Interdependence, Survival. Vol. 15-4, July- 
August 1973, p. 158-165.
Ibid., Transgovernmental Relations and International Organi­
zation, Uorld P o l i t i c s , Vol* 27-1, 1974, p. 39-62.
Ibid., International Interdependence and Integration, in Green- 
stein, F. and Polsby, N. (eds.), The Handbook of Political 
S c i e n c e . Vol. 8, Reading, fia.: Addison-Uesley, 1975, p. 3(33-414.
Ibid., Power and Interdependence. Uorld Politics in T r a nsition. 
Boston-Toronto: Little, Broun an <T£y., 197?.-----------------------
Morse, E.L., The Politics of Interdependence, International 
Or g a n i z a t i o n . Vol. 23, 1969, p. 311-326.
Nau, H.R., From Integration to Interdependence : Gains, Losses 
and Continuing Gaps, International O r g a n i z a t i o n . Vol. 33-1, 
Uinter 1979, p. 118-1471
Stojonovic, R., Interdependence in International Relations, 
International Social Science Review. Vol. 30-2. 1978. D. 238-
1 5 T .------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Van de Pleerssche, P., Recente Ontuikkelingen in het politiek- 
economisch mundiaal systeem, Economisch en Soclaal Tljdschrift. 
Vol. 32, Nr. 4, Augustus 1978, p. 437-448.
Young, 0., Interdependencies in Uorld Politics, International 
J o u r n a l . Vol. 24, 1969, p. 726-750.
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These structural characteristics of the international system have 
an impact on the way 'small states' perceive their role in the 
system and, more specifically, on their actual behaviour in in­
ternational cooperation. In other words, the international sys­
tem has become more than a mere interaction pattern of big pouers. 
It has grown to a rather complex entity of states of different 
size with conflict as well as cooperation as possible modes of 
action.
As a consequence, scholarly research increased its interest in 
the behaviour of 'small s t a t e s w h i c h  are seen as having their spe­
cific possibilities and problems in the international system. The 
question is then asked to which extent their behaviour pattern 
differs qualitatively from a pattern followed by big countries and 
to which extent deductive conclusions can be drawn from the beha­
viour of 'small states'. In International Economics as well as 
in International Relations the category of 'small states' has been 
subject to theoretical analysis.
Before we turn to a summary and evaluation of the literature 
on 'small states', we briefly want to raise a few questions. A 
first difficult question is that of defining smallness : where 
does smallness begin and where does it end? Should the criteria 
be population, area, density of population resources, or an aggre­
gated combination of all these elements ; or is it not necessary 
to bother about a definition and qualify as small those countries 
which common sense considers small? In other words, is it justi­
fied to look at 'small countries' as a genuine category deserving 
examination, or are the situations so diverse that they have no­
thing in common but a meaningless smallness and therefore, there 
is no useful purpose to study their problems jointly. In short, 
although conceptual problems should be solved satisfactorily, one 
should always keep in mind that the usefulness of a definition 
is a mere function of its problem-solving orientation.
A second problem is connected to the question of uhat kind 
of independence a 'small state' can enjoy, politically and eco­
nomically. If there is such a vague category as small states uith 
a minimum of specific characteristics and problems, hou do they 
fit in the present international picture, uhat kind of relations 
determines their international behaviour, and uhat role can 
they play on the international scene? Is the sole and ultimate 
solution for a small country to integrate politically or e c o n o m i c ­
ally uith other countries? Is the need for international coope­
ration greater for a small country and consequently, uill it act 
differently in international organizations? Finally, uhat are the 
specific patterns of action of 'small states' towards internatio­
nal cooperation?
In general, the problem ue are tackling in this scientific 
study is the follouing one : Ooes a small state-actor, the unit 
of analysis and the unit of comparison in our analysis, act quali­
tatively different in international cooperation than a big state- 
actor and if so, can we draw deductive conclusions from these differ­
ences in international behaviour? Let us now turn to a summary 
and evaluation of the literature on 'small states'.
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A. International Economics' Theory
Ue start this summary with a brief look at the international 
economics theory. The category of 'small states' has been the subject 
of specific treatment in economics. This interest resulted in the 
so-called small-country assumption in international economics. In 
particular, the pure theory of international trade, dealing uith 
the gains from exchange and specialization, indicates the signifi­
cant benefits small countries may derive from the international 
system. It implies, from an economic point of view, the generally 
positive behaviour of 'small states' touards cooperation in the 
international system.
The general argument in the theory of international trade pur­
ports that each country specializes in that commodity in uhose pro­
duction it has a comparative advantage (1). Among roughly equal­
sized countries a country's gains from exchange and specialization 
are larger the more the uorld price ratio differs from that pre­
vailing under autarchy. The whole gain of trade is appropriated 
by country A when the world trade price ratio is exactly equal to 
the pretrade ratio of country B. Thus the uorld price must lie 
between the extremes of the two countries' pretrade price ratio.
Ue now briefly outline the content of the small-country assump­
tion. In the small country case the terms of trade will necessa­
rily coincide with the larger country's pretrade ratio, with the 
gains from trade accruing to the smaller country. This result is 
due to the fact that the change in the relative quantities of the 
two goods offered in the big country after the opening of trade 
is so small that it leads to only a marginal change in the relative 
price, sufficient to bring about the shift along the production 
possibility curve. Since the domestic relative prices of the two 
commodities in the big country are the same before and after trade, 
consumption will remain unchanged. In the small country, however,
(1) For more detailed analysis I refer to any textbook in Interna­
tional Economics.
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the production and consumption pattern uill change with trade.
Figure 11 — 1 shows the production and consumption pattern of
a small country. Under autarchy the small country can reach a
level of welfare indicated by I . Under international trade ando
at given terms of trade, indicated by the slope of line CyPy, the 
small country is able to reach a higher welfare than under autar­
chy, i.e., a welfare level given by (line CyPy is tangent to 
the production possibility curve PP as well as to the consumption 
curve Ij)- As a consequence, its production point moves from P fl 
to Py and its consumptionpoint from P^ to Cy.
Figure 11 — 1 Gains from International Trade 
(Small-Country Case)
Y
P
This total gain from international trade can be subdivided 
into gains from exchange and gains from specialization. The gains 
from exchange allow the small country to change its consumption 
pattern without changing its production. Through international 
trade the small country can shift its consumption to point C, while 
remaining at production point P^. The increase in welfare from Ig 
to 1^ indicates the gains from exchange.
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The small country a l s o’enjoys gains from specialization in 
production. At the terms of trade given by the slope CP^ the 
marginal rate of transformation in production does not equal the 
price ratio between the goods. The small country will benefit 
from international trade by adjusting its production to the ex­
tent the marginal rate of transformation equals the terms of trade. 
In other words, the production pattern of the small country will 
shift along the transformation curve from P^ to Py. The increase 
in welfare from 1^ to Ij indicates the gains from specialization.
The analysis clearly shows that a small country unable to 
affect world prices through its production and consumption deci­
sions can benefit from international trade, reaping benefits from 
an increased exchange as well from an increased specialization in 
production. In International Economics the small state is consi­
dered to be a price-taker, in the sense that it cannot influence 
the terms of trade. Thus from an economic point of view 'small 
countries' have an incentive to cooperate in the international sys­
tem because of the importance of the gains from trade.
However, these potentially large benefits to the small country 
do not come entirely without cost. The small country is dependent 
through trade on the willingness of the rest of the world to con­
tinue trading. At the same time, the rest of the world has a diver­
sified production and is much less dependent on trade than any 
small country. In other words, from the small country-assumption 
follows immediately that small countries are quite vulnerable to 
changes in the international system. This whole discussion is cen­
tered around the model of an open economy and, in particular, on the 
implications of the type and the degree of openness of the national 
economy with respect to the performance of national economic poli­
cies .
The situation that the country is so small relative to the 
outside world that world market prices for all goods are indepen­
dent of the economic actions of the country itself also carries its 
benefits. For instance, if inflation is brought about by interna­
tional price changes, the government in a small country can often
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tie aggregate demand management to unemployment and current 
accounts targets, rather than to the price target. In other 
words, small countries can take a 'free ride' on the anti-infla- 
tionary policies of the big countries - as long as the governments 
in the small countries were willing to accept a deterioration in 
the current account of the balance of payments (1).
Concluding,ue may say that the category of small states has been 
the subject of specific treatment in International Economics.
The introduction of the small-country assumption indicates a pic­
ture of the behaviour of small states towards international coope­
ration. The fact that small states derive significant benefits 
from the international system through the gains from trade^and that 
they are quite vulnerable to changes of this system through the 
relative openness of their national economics are tending to small 
countries towards international cooperation. Ue will now turn our 
interest to what the International Relation's theory has said about 
the category of 'small states'.
(1) Lindbeck, A., Stabilization Policy in Open Economics with
Endogenous Politicians, American Economic R e v i e w . Vol. 66-2, 
1976, p. 1-18.
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8 . International Relations' Theory
1. Summary of the Literature
Although the categorization of states according to size has 
long been a part of International Relations, it has always con­
stituted a point of discussion. In the beginning of the 19th 
century with the emergence of the nation states the formalization 
of the categories of great and small powers found its legitimation 
in the hierarchical principle implicit in the Concert system. The 
Treaty of Chaumont in 1614 signed by England, Prussia, Austria and 
Russia defined a big power as a power which could provide or gua­
rantee 60.000 men in the war against Napoleon. This very simple 
classification in terms of the number of soldiers available clearly 
indicates the functional link with the power pattern of that inter­
national system. The present international system, however, has 
grown to a much more interdependent system in which the relations 
among states have become complex and intricate.
In the following pages we give a concise summary of the state 
of art of the International Relations' theory on 'small s t a t e s’.
The purpose is to present different classification possibilities 
in order to evaluate their relevance with respect to the behaviour 
of 'small states* towards international cooperation. The presen­
tation will indicate that the notion of 'small state' has a rather 
diffuse and ambiguous content, and is much linked to the analysis 
of power in International Relations. Summarizing, it is of not mucti 
help to our own study. Hence, we shall be brief.
According to the criteria used in the literature we find two 
broad groups of categorization. Countries can be classified accor­
ding to differences in a) the objective power sources
b) behavioural tendencies
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a. Objective Pouer Sources
Most of the classification schemes of states according to 
their size are based on the inequality of the pouer sources, i.e., 
factors which constitute the power of a state. These power sour­
ces are related to the surface of the territory, the size of the 
population, the military strength, the dimension of the economic 
production, the availability of certain primary resources, etc...
A complementary significance is often attributed to some elements 
of non-material nature. In this perspective Liska says that "a 
state can partly compensate quantitative inferiority by qualitative 
superiority with respect to location, organization, social cohe­
sion, morale and statesmanship ; it can grow beyond its size due 
to inner equilibrium of the social, ethnic and institutional struc­
ture, and the integration of available economic and other resour­
ces" (1). In a brief tour we indicate the most obvious objective 
power sources.
a.1. Military Capability
The military capability has been the most obvious power source.
The idea that states can be classified according to their real or 
potential military strength has been elaborated by A. l/andenbosch (2).
According to Vandenbosch, the test ofuhether a state is a small 
state o r w hether it is entitled to the rank of big state has been 
military power, both actual and potential. He indicates that after 
every war, and especially after every general war, there is a re- 
evaluation of the relative strength of the larger states. This 
classification remains generally accepted until armament, re-armament, 
or a new demonstration of military power changes the situation. 
Vandenbosch then defines a small state as "a state which is unable 
to contend in war with the great powers on anything like equal 
terms" (3).
(1) Liska, G., International Equi l i b r i u m . Cambridge, Fla.: Harvard 
University Press, 1957, p. 2S-26.
(2) Vandenbosch, A., The Small States in International Politics and 
Organization, Journal of P o l i t i c s , Vol. 26-2, May 1964, p. 293- 
312.
(3) Ibid., o p . c i t . « p. 294.
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Vandenbosch clarifies his standpoint with a brief examination 
of history since the emergence of the nation states. He contends 
that from the Congress of Vienna through the European Directory, 
the two Hague Peace Conferences and the Paris Peace Conference 
till the League of Nations,small states were stakes rather than 
active players in the international system, consumers rather than 
producers of security.
This classification seems rather difficult to handle. It is cei 
t a i n l y n o t  generally applicable to all periods. It does hold for 
the latter part of the 19th century and the period 1939-1970, not 
however, to periods before German and Italian unity and before the 
constitution of colonial empires. In short,the characteristics of 
the present international system have allowed 'small states' to 
grow back to importance. Further, some 'small states' have played 
and do play an important role in the international system (e.g., 
the role of Servia in World War I, the American-Israel relationship, 
the OPEC-countries, ...).
Thus, the emphasis on the military strength as the main power 
source is quite understandable in an international system in which 
military capability and the potential use of this power base was 
considered as an important tool to achieve the objectives of poli­
tical and economic survival. But insofar as the perceived margin 
of security for states or groups of states has widened, goals have 
become more diversified, and consequently, other secondary objec­
tives have come to emerge. It would then be terribly simplistic 
and not very useful to apply an objective power source such as mi­
litary capability as a criterion to classify states in an interna­
tional system.
a.2. Population Size
Another objective power source which has been used as a cri­
terion for classification is the population size of countries.
David Vital uses this power source criterion as basis for classi­
fication in his book 'The Inequality of States', in which he des­
cribes and analyzes the limitations and possibilities of the foreign
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policies of small states (1). He defines the measure of state 
power as "the capacity of a government to induce other states or 
governments to follow lines of conduct of policy which they might 
otherwise not pursue : alternatively it is the capacity to with- 
stand the pressure of other states or governments, which are in­
tent on deflecting it from a course which the national interest 
or the interest of its leaders mould appear to require" (2).
Vital takes the approach of categorizing states into size- 
groups along intuitively acceptable lines without defining the 
categories in conceptually useful terms. He then distinguishes 
three groups, great, middle and small states, drawing the 'rough 
upper limits' for the latter as a) a population of 10-15 million 
people in the case of economically advanced countries ; and b) 
a population of 20-30 million in the case of underdeveloped coun­
tries. Admitting that such a categorization is "frankly subjective, 
if not arbitrary (3)", he defends it by referring to the close re­
lation with the every day experience. Moreover, he concludes that 
"it should, perhaps,be stressed that these definitions are put for­
ward to make clear the identity of the subject of this study, not 
with a view to the creation of a precise concept for manipulative 
analytical purposes" .(^)* Nevertheless, Vital forgets fully to in­
dicate on w h i c h  considerations his criteria are determined, or what 
makes the distinction between developed and underdeveloped countries. 
Furthermore, in which categories do we put countries such as Cuba, 
Israel, Kuwait, ...? To put it briefly, Vital's classification
scheme remains an empty, useless box.
(1) Vital, D., The Inequality of States. A Study of the Small Power 
in International Relations. Oxfords University Press, 1967.
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t .. p. 87.
(3) Ibid., o p .c i t .. p. 8.
(4) Ibid., o p .c i t . , p. 9.
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a.3. Population-Economic Criterion
A further elaboration on the classification of states has been 
presented by 3. Vellut. He proposed a combination of a population 
criterion and an economic criterion (1). His starting point is the 
search for "some simple, empirical means of measuring on a uniform 
basis the actual or potential capacity of the states to bring in­
fluence to bear in international a f f a i r s” (2).
Vellut uses rough indicators as population figures and the gross 
domestic product. He then distinguishes five groups of nations: big 
powers, middle powers, small pourers, smaller pou/ers and mini-powers. 
As to the magnitude of the criteria : middle powers have a population 
of at least 50 million people and/or GDP of at least 10 mia dollars ; 
small pou/ers are nations u/ith no more than 50 million people and no 
less than 10 and/or a GDP situated between 2 and 10 mia dollars ; 
smaller nations have a population betu/een 5 and 10 million people and 
at least a GDP of 1 mia dollars ; mini-states are considered as na­
tions u/ith less than 5 million people and a GDP of less than 1 mia 
dollars. To identify the category of big powers, Vellut introduces 
some additional politico-military criteria. To be considered as a 
big power, a state must satisfy three out of the following conditions!
(
100 million people, a GDP of at least 25 mia dollars, permanent re- j 
presentation in the Security Council and an army of at least 300.000 
men. i
Although Vellut seems less arbitrary in determining his cri- |
[
teria than Vital, his categorization of states looks rather an ab­
surd enterprise. It is a mere search for limiting the object of [
research on doubtful grounds. From an analytical point of view, thisj
i
classification scheme is not helpful at all in finding differences ‘ 
in the behaviour of the different categories of states. The main j
reason is the lack of conceptually significant characteristics which | 
could allow a comparison of behaviour. j
(1) Vellut, 3., Smaller States and the Problems of War and Peace, j
The Journal of Peace R e s e a r c h . 1967-3, p. 254-257. j
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t .. p. 254. |
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a.4. Aggregated Criterion
A last objective pou/er source is a criterion which aggregates 
different power sources. In 'World Power Assessment 1977' R.S.
Cline has elaborated a quantified rankinglist of states (1). Cline 
ranks the countries according to a complex and aggregated perceived 
poiuer weight.
He considers the nation-state still as the decisive political 
unit of action and responsibility. Pou/er is defined by Cline as 
"the ability of the government of one state to cause the government 
of another state to do something tuhich the latter otherwise u/ould 
not choose to do, u/hether by persuasion, coercion, or outright mi­
litary force" (2).
Cline arrives at a perceived power criterion : Pp = (C + E + M) 
x (S + W). It distinguishes between concrete power elements and 
political aspirations and moral concepts. For each of these elements 
a certain weight is attached to a country. The final result is a 
consolidated rankinglist of the countries expressing their perceived 
power in relation to others.
The first three elements make up the concrete power factors.
'C' stands for critical mass, i.e., papulation and territory. *E' 
measures the economic capabilities ; GIMP-based rankings are modified 
or adjusted for specific economic strengths and weaknesses (energy, 
critical non-fuel minerals, industry, food and trade). 'M' stands 
for military capability, the strategic force balance as u/ell as the 
conventional one. Strategy ('S') and national will ('W'), determined 
by the level of national integration, the effective strength of na­
tional leadership and the perceived relevance of national strategy 
to national interest, constitute the final ratings of the formula.
(1) Cline, R.S., World Power Assessment 1977. Colorado: Westview 
Press Boulder, 1977.
(2) Ibid., o p .c i t ., p. 6-7.
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This ranking tries to give a quantified idea of the structure 
and composition of the internatial system. It does not, however, 
imply a certain behaviour for a specific country or specific cate­
gory of countries. Hence it is not very useful for research purposes 
in uhich ue uant to analyze behaviour-attitudes of states, par­
ticularly the 'small states' behaviour towards international coope­
ration.
Conclusion
Rank criteria based on objective pou/er sources to classify 
states seem very common in the literature. However, the use of a 
single objective power source such as area, population, GNP, or even 
a combination of all these aspects to establish the power hierarchy 
in the international system (e.g., economic smallness measured by 
GNP or industrial production ; political smallness by low involve­
ment in international organizations ; or military smallness indica­
ted by the military budget, etc. ...) proves to be too simplistic 
and tends to overlook the complex relations among states of differ­
ent size according to the different issues involved and the dif f e r ­
ent levels of interaction in the international system. Moreover, 
most of these classification schemes lack conceptually significant 
characteristics which allow a comparison of behaviour of states on 
a rigorous basis.
Resuming, classification schemes of states according to abjective 
power sources seem rather emptiless and not very helpful for scien­
tific analysis. Holsti's assertion that "no single and permanent 
hierarchy of states - the great and the small, or the influential 
and the weak - exists " (1) is a merely obvious conclusion from this 
brief summary. Most of the literature is naive and can be reduced 
to tautological discussions without actual use for the explanation 
of policies of countries. Moreover, all these schemes are dealing 
with power relations among states in the international system. Here,
(1) Holsti, K.J., International Politics : A Framework for Analysis, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.
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u/e are only interested in the behaviour of states towards coopera­
tion. Power analysis, still an important domain of International 
Relations' theory, does not constitute part of our study. As a 
consequence, classification of states related to this analysis is 
of no help to our ou/n study.
b. Behavioural Tendencies
As far as I know, there has been little attempt to define 
small power status using a nation's behavioural tendencies as a 
basis. It is another way of classifying states and therefore, 
worthy of some consideration in this summary of the literature.
Robert Rothstein analyzes differences in security perceptions among 
states in order to extract differences in behaviour.
b.1. Security Perceptions
Rothstein has sharply criticized a categorization of states 
based on objective pouter sources. The central proposition of his 
book 'Alliances and Small Powers' (1) is the idea that "small powers 
are something more than or different from great powers writ small"
(2). However, his ensuing generalizations refer only to these small 
powers "which are within an area of great power confrontation or 
which fear that confrontation will affect their interests signifi­
cantly" (3).
This general idea leads him to reject a definition of small 
power based purely on objective criteria, since such a definition 
"ends by aligning states along an extended power spectrum so that 
it can only be said that B is stronger than A but weaker than C.
The result is that the significance of the categories Great and Small 
is effectually denied" (A).
(1) Rothstein, R.L., Alliances and Small P o w e r s « New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1968.
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t . . p. 1.
(3) Ibid., o p . c i t . . p. 8.
(4) Ibid., o p . c i t .. p. 23.
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Rothstein continues'his argumentation by stating that "the 
categories Great Power and Small Power have a significance beyond 
relative pou/er ratios ; that both groups of states develop beha­
vioural patterns u/hich decisively separate them from non-group mem­
bers and therefore, it does make sense to talk of the behaviour of 
small powers in general or of great powers in general" (1).
Rothstein illustrates the distinction he is drawing by con­
trasting the situation of great powers and small powers in other­
wise similar situations of threat. In this comparison he points to 
three unique aspects of the small powers' situation i 1) the necessi­
ty of outside help every time the small state is faced with a 'secu- 
rity-dilemma' ; 2) the state has a narrow margin of safety with 
little time for correcting mistakes and 3) the state's leaders per­
ceive its weakness as essentially unalterable. Consequently, these 
characteristics result in a divergent reaction of big states and 
small states towards the perception of their security. A wholly differ­
ent , but nevertheless rationally-based, range of policy options is 
open to small states (e.g., neutrality, isolation, non-alignment, 
alliance policy, ...).
In order to reflect his argument in a definition, Rothstein 
stresses the point that any new definition of small states ought to 
indicate the idea of psychological as well as material dimension to 
the distinction between big states and small ones. It is thus clear­
ly inadequate, according to Rothstein, to describe small states 
merely in terms of being less powerful, because they also realize 
the implication of their weakness in the international system. Hence­
forth, Rothstein develops the following definition s "A small power 
is a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security prima­
rily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely funda­
mentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or de­
velopments to do so ; the small power's belief in its inability to
(1) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p. 23-24.
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re ly on its ou/n means must also be recognized by the other states 
involved in international politics" (1).
Although Rothstein says his description is acceptable for any 
international system, he does not specify which states in the con­
temporary world would not be small powers under his definition. It 
would seem that only the United States, the Soviet Union and China 
would possibly classify. All other countries rely with different 
degrees on outside protection for their security and therefore, are 
to be considered, undifferentiatingly, small. His definition becomes 
thus rather useless for analysis in the present international sys­
tem, «hen only two or three states qualify for great power status 
with all the rest categorized as small.
In this respect Keohane writes that "in a nuclear age in which 
defense is impossible for all states and effective deterrence possi­
ble only for a few, a definition based on capacity to obtain secu­
rity must collapse. When insecurity is constant and all-pervasive, 
it can not serve as a significant distinguishing variable" (2). The 
characteristics of the international system seem to confirm Keohane's 
remark. We should, however, add that since the late seventies 
changes within the international system have brought the military 
security issues back to the foreground.
In the further analysis Rothstein is concentrating on small 
states behaviour towards international organizations, especially on 
the alliance policy of small states. According to Rothstein the only 
realistic security policy for small powers is alliance commitment.
The stress on security perception as a small power motivation seems 
to be clear. He mentions three reasons for their attachment to in­
ternational organizations : 1) the formal equality in those organi­
zations ; 2) the potential security of membership and 3) the possible 
capacity of the organization to restrain great powers. He tries to
(1) Ibid., oo.c i t . . p. 29.
(2) Keohane, R.O., Lilliputians* Dilemmas : Small States in Inter­
national Politics, International Organization. Vol. 23, Spring
1969, p. 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 .
uerify his conclusion by mentioning some miscellaneous historial 
events. However, Singer and Small's study on formal alliances in 
the period 1816-1965 hardly supports Rothstein's tentative conclu­
sion (1). At the end of his book Rothstein modifies his own con­
clusion arguing that "the defects of collective security have sub­
merged its virtues" (2). Finally, ue are left with an ambiguous 
judgement that small states' support for international organizations 
has often been misguided.
b.2. Other Behavioural Tendencies
If we break away from the military security context to u/hich 
Rothstein has related his classification scheme of states, we still 
can point to some other behavioural tendencies. Another characteris­
tic sometimes attached to small states is their alleged peaceful and 
accomodative foreign policy orientations. Holsti formulated this 
conception in the following u/ay : "Small powers frequently offer m e ­
diation or peace-keeping services in conflict situations because of 
their lack of direct involvement in crisis areas. Their lower status 
and level of international involvement may allow them to undertake 
certain tasks that would be denied by the contestants to major po­
wers" (3).
Quite a few empirical studies found positive correlations between 
the rank of the country and the number of transactions in the inter­
national system, the export-orientation of the economy, the degree 
of activity in U.N. debates, the extensive participation of small 
countries in U.N. peace-keeping activities, etc. ... However, it 
might be doubtful whether these results can be generalized to in­
clude all small countries.
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(1) Singer, D., and Small, M., Formal Alliances 1816-1965 : An Ex­
tension of the Basic Data, Journal of Peace R e s e a r c h . 1969-3, 
p. 257-282.
(2) Rothstein, R.L., o p .c i t .. p. 44-45*
(3) Holsti, K.3., National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign 
Policy, International Studies Q u a r t e r l y , Vol. 14, Nr. 3, 1970, 
p. 242.
Another behavioural characteristic connected with the small 
state definition is geographical restriction, or regional orienta­
tion, in the behaviour of small states in the international system. 
The corresponding orientation is clearly more global in the case 
of big states (1). This defining characteristic is, however, hard­
ly an independent variable because it is linked to the rank of the 
interacting country.
Conclusion
Although impressions gained from a categorization of states 
according to behavioural tendencies seem to indicate a certain 
relationship between rank and international activity, this relation­
ship is by no means self-evident. Moreover, Rothstein concentrates 
his analysis on the behaviour of states with respect to the security 
issue. I find this a rather narrow framework which does not take 
into account the changing structure of the international system.
Also the other behavioural tendencies seem to concentrate on one 
particular pattern of behaviour whose specificness is not always 
self-evident. Briefly, this type of classification remains rather 
vague, if not tautological, and does not provide an apt framework 
for the analysis of small states' behaviour towards international 
c o o p e r a t i o n .
2. Analytical Framework for Foreign Policy Behaviour
Pointing at some of the weaknesses of the present small states' 
literature, Rosenau provides us with a more general framework of 
analysis in his 'Scientific Study for Foreign Policy* (2). He dis-
(1) See e.g., Bernstein, R., and Weldon, P., A Structural Approach 
to the Analysis of International Relations, The Journal of Con­
flict Resolution. 1968, Nr. 2, p. 159—1B 1 ; and Vayrynen, R., 
Stratification in the System of International Organizations, 
Journal of Peace Resea r c h , 1970, Nr. 4, p. 371-389.
(2) Rosenau, J., The Scientific Study of Foreign P o l i c y . New York: 
Free Press, 1971, Chapter 5.
Ibid., World P o l i t i c s . London; Collier McMillan Publishers,
1976, Chapter 2.
-59-
60-
cusses the clusters of potentially relev/ant sources of foreign 
policy which are considered most important for explaining u/hy na­
tions do what they do in u>orld politics. In Table 11 — 1 , Rosenau 
categorizes the potentially relevant sources which are assumed to 
exert influence on foreign policy orientations and on general in­
ternational activities of states. This analytical framework of ana­
lysis puts our own study in its proper place.
Table II-1 Major Sources of Foreign Policy
Systemic aggregation continuum Time continuum
Sources that tend Sources that tend to 
to change slowly undergo a rapid change
Systemic sources 
Societal sources
Governmental sources 
Idiosyncratic sources
Size Great Power Structure Situational Tactors
(external)
Geography Alliances 
Technology
Economic Development Situetional factors
(internal)
Culture and Social Structure 
History Moods of Opinion
Political Accountability 
Governmental Structure
Valuea, Talents, 
Experiences end 
Pereonalities of 
Leadera
Sonrce < Rosenau, 3., World Politics. London: Collier McMillan Publishers, 1976, p. 10.
Rosenau considers the 'size' factor as an important systemic 
source of foreign policy. In other words, the systemic role the 
small states see themselves playing in the international system, is 
assumed to be an important source in understanding their activities 
in international relations. Significant differences can be seen 
between large and small states as to the perception of the importance 
of various issues in world politics and the consequent actions of 
states. He argues that the size of a state partly determines its 
operational or salient international environment.
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It is said that issues in international economics and politics 
which are of little or no interest to the small state u/ill proba­
bly only form part of a general foreign policy position without 
any precise viewpoints on them. On the other hand, for those issues 
which are of direct importance to the small state, foreign policy 
uiill be very active. In short,small states, Rosenau argues, tend to 
be interested in a narrower range of foreign policy issues than 
larger countries, and primarily concerned with economic issues.
Their operational international environment is said to be regional 
in scope. The interests of the big countries, on the other hand, 
are often global and their policy pursuits tend to consider the 
small countries u/ithin the context of their global commitments and 
interests. Keohane qualified this distinction, arguing that weakness 
may also create some bargaining assets for a small state (1). Its 
weakness can become a source of bargaining power if a big country 
perceives the territory of a small state or its position on an in­
ternational issue of strategic importance. Constructive cooperation 
between states of different size may then be a better way to attain 
one's objectives. In other words, small states should understand 
their place in the international political and economic situation 
at any time and adapt themselves to it, while trying to maintain a 
maximum freedom of action. To take benefits from the systemic con­
ditions of a system a country is subjected to and to act according 
to a given set of circumstances, implies an internationally oriented 
perspective.
In this context, Rosenau has advanced the thesis that the foreign 
policies of states should be viewed as 'adaptive behaviour' (2).
(1) Keohane, R.O., The Big Influence of Small Allies, Foreign P o l i c y , 
Spring 1971-1, p. 161-182.
(2) Rosenau, 3., Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behaviour, Comparative 
P o l i t i c s , Vol.II,Nr.3 , April 1970, p. 365-387.
The basic premise of the 'adaptive' foreign policy framework is 
that nations are seen as adapting entities which try to cope 
with internal and external changes and demands in order to keep 
the resulting fluctuations in the state's economic, political 
and physical structures within acceptable limits.
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Other authors have elaborated on this particular path of analysis 
(1). Here, we only mention the link with our own study. This adap­
tive foreign policy framework stresses the importance of the orga­
nization and provision of international cooperation devices for small 
states. It is said that a small country may overcome some disad­
vantages of smallness by an active participation in the international 
system. We assert that the need for international interaction 
through cooperation among states is an important premise for our own 
analysis. It is along these lines that classification schemes of 
states should be interpreted. In the last section ue discuss K e o h a n e 's 
systemic role classification of states as the most interesting one.
3. Keohane's Systemic Role Classification
a. Definition
Keohane has introduced a set of criteria for grouping states by 
size, which replaces the small-great dichotomy with a fourfold di­
vision. Instead of focussing on objective power sources or behavioural 
tendencies, Keohane stresses the systemic role states' leaders see 
their countries play in the international system (2).
From the perspective that systems can be classified as ’system- 
dominant' or 'subsystem-dominant', depending on the extent to which 
the system determines state behaviour, the author distinguishes four 
types of states. First, there are the 'system-determining' states. 
These states play a critical role in shaping the system (3). The 
imperical power in a unipolar system and the two great powers in the 
bipolar system are given as examples of this category.
(1) McGowan, P. and Gottwald, K., Small State Foreign Policies, Inter­
national Studies Q u a r t e r l y . Vol. 19, Dec. 1975, p. 469-495 ; 
Hansen, P., Adaptive Behaviour of Small States, in Saoe Interna­
tional Yearbook of Foreign P o l i c y , Vol. 2, 1974, Chapter 4.
(2) Keohane, R.O., Lilliputians' Dilemmas : Small States in Interna­
tional Politics, International O r g a n i z a t i o n , Vol. XXIII, Spring 
1969, p. 291-310.
(3) Ibid., o p . c i t .. p. 295.
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Secondly, there are the 'system-influencing' states. These are 
states "which cannot expect individually to dominate a system, but 
may nevertheless be able significantly to influence its nature 
through unilateral as well as multilateral action" (1).
The third category consists of 'system-affecting' countries.
These states "cannot hope to affect the system acting alone, but 
may nevertheless exert significant impact on the system by working 
through small groups or alliances of through universal or regional 
international organizations" (2).
Finally, Keohane refers to the fourth category of states as 
system-ineffectual states. They "can do little to influence the sys­
tem-wide forces that affect them, except in groups which are so 
large that each state has.minimal influence and which may themselves 
be dominated by larger powers" (3). Their foreign policy is defined 
as mere adjustment to reality.
Keohane's four types correspond with the traditional distinction 
between great, secondary, middle and small powers. The United States 
and the Soviet Union are considered system-determining states ; the 
United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Japan, China and perhaps India 
system-influencing ; Canada, Sweden, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and 
comparable states system-affecting and a series of other states as 
system-ineffectual.
With Rothstein, Keohane agrees that the mere use of objective 
classification criteria is not sufficient. Because "objective reali­
ty does not determine statesmen's behaviour directly" (4), he adds 
a psychological dimension to his definition. He, therefore, proposes 
the following definitions : "A great power is a state whose leaders
(1) Ibid., o p . c i t .. p. 295.
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t .« p. 295.
(3) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p. 296.
(4) Ibid., o p . c i t .. p. 296.
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consider it can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps decisive impact 
on the international system : a secondary power is a state whose 
leaders consider that alone it can exercise some impact, although 
never in itself decisive, on that system ; a middle power is a 
state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, 
but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or 
through an international institution ; a small power is a state 
whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a 
small group, make a significant impact on the system" (1).
There can be discussion about the factual distinction of the 
definitions. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the perception of the 
systemic role as the criterion to classify states is quite a new 
and most promising element in the literature on small states. We 
will now briefly evaluate K e o h a n e’s classification scheme.
b. Evaluation
K e o h a n e’s classification contains interesting elements. It 
certainly helps to explain the behaviour of small states towards 
international cooperation. The author draws our attention to the 
fact that small states may promote rationally international inter­
action without believing that international organizations increase 
their security in specific ways or restrain big countries from par­
ticular actions. The leaders of small and middle states, Keohane 
argues, have realized that in many instances, although they may be 
able to do little together, they can do virtually nothing separate­
ly. Within a context of international cooperation, they can 
attempt to develop an international political and economic environ­
ment favourable to their objectives (2). In other words, Keohane 
correctly argues that many small and middle states perceive inter­
national organizations as a means to develop international atti­
tudes and codes of proper behaviour. "Perception of its systemic 
role, more than the perception of the need for external aid in
(1) Ibid., o p . c i t . . p. 296.
(2) Ibid., op.c i t . , p. 296.
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security, seems to shape small powers* distinctive attitudes to­
wards international organizations" (1).
Keohane's analysis is also extremely interesting and convincing 
in the light of Mancur Olson's application of the theory of collec­
tive action to the field of International Relations. We will re­
turn in great depth and length to Olson's approach in the next chap­
ter* By linking the systemic role definition and the discrepancy 
in contributions betu/een small and big states to a military alliance 
Keohane touches upon the cooperative game among states uiithin the 
framework of a military alliance and consequently, upon Olson's 
analysis. In their ’Economic Theory of Alliances' (2), Olson and 
Zeckhauser showed that this discrepancy may work to the benefit of 
the small states.
Compared with classification schemes based on objective power 
sources or on differences in security capability, Keohane has 
differentiated more clearly between states as to their behaviour in 
the international system. His systemic role classification adds 
some more explanatory power to an analysis of the behaviour of small 
states in the international system. In sh o r t ,Keohane does not con­
tent himself with a mere descriptive pattern of power relations among 
states as most classification schemes have done.
However, the systemic role definition tends to neglect the dyna­
mic and very flexible element in all international interaction and 
does not integrate sufficiently the consequences of changes of the 
system in its application field. It seems to consider the interna­
tional system too much as a static and global framework in which 
states follow certain pre-determined automatisms. This lack of dy­
namic elements has been corrected to some extent in 'Power and Inter­
dependence' (1977) in which declining leadership has been analyzed 
in different systems and subsystems.
(1) Ibid., o p . c i t . . p. 297.
(2) Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R., An Economic Theory of Alliances, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, August 1966,
p. 266-279.
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In the light of our own research Keohane's taxonomy is 
considered the most interesting classification scheme. It 
provides us with a useful framework to analyze the behaviour 
of small states towards international cooperation. The 
operational definition makes it possible to understand the 
reasoning of many policies that countries pursue in the 
international system. In our further study, Keohane's sys­
temic role definition of small states as 'sy s t e m - t a k e r s ' 
will be used.
Conclusion
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The primary purpose of this chapter uas not a thorough dis­
cussion of the literature on small states, but a brief summary of 
the attempts to identify 'small- states' in International Relations.
Ue hoped to find a useful framework in which the behaviour of 
'small states' towards cooperation could be analyzed.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this summery. Most 
of the literature seems rather naive and does not provide useful 
analytical tools to study the behaviour of states towards inter­
national cooperation. Most classification schemes are related to 
a domain of International Relations, i.e., the analysis of power 
relations among countries, which does not form part of our own 
study. Here, we are only interested in a subset of International 
Relations, i.e., an analysis of the behaviour of states towards 
international cooperation.
Plany concepts in International Relations have a rather diffuse 
content. The notion of 'small state' is no exception'. The summary 
clearly indicates the difficulty of classifying countries in 
operational categories. An obvious difficulty is that 'small' and 
'large' are relative concepts subject to great differences in inter­
pretation.
In fact, what would be needed is a theoretical term 'small 
state', depending on the problem at stake. The literature considered 
is proceeding by a method of abstraction or generalization instead 
of defining its terms in a theoretical way. In the International 
Economics' theory, particularly in the theory of international trade, 
the category of 'small states' has been studied with the use of the 
small-country assumption. The reasoning goes that small countries 
have an economic incentive to cooperate in the international system. 
The economic concept of a 'small state' is well defined, i.e., a 
price-taker on the international markets. Keohane's theoretical 
discussion of the systemic role definition of a 'small state' as a
system-taker, i.e., a state which is not capable of influencing 
matters in the international system, seems quite analogous to 
the economic concept of 'small state'. Therefore, Keohane's 
classification scheme is taken as the framework for our 
analysis.
To sum up, although the term 'small state' may be a vague 
analytical concept, there is still reason to be interested in 
the category of 'small states' (1). In the further course of 
the study, the size of a country will thus be considered as a 
datum which is assumed to exert influence on the behaviour of 
states towards international cooperation. Both concepts of a 
small state, i.e., a price-taker and a system-taker, indicate 
the logic for collective action towards international cooperation.
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(1) Baehr, P.R., Small States : A Tool for Analysis?, World Politics, 
Vol. 27, 1974-1975, p. 56-466.
The problems of operational concepts in social sciences are very 
uiell expressed by Machlup, F., Operationalism and Pure Theory in 
Economics, in Krupp, S.R., The Structure of Economic S c i e n c e . 
Englewood Cliffs, Neu» York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966, p. 56 :
"It is one of the commandments of operationalism that the pro­
positions which form a theory should be composed of operational 
concepts. Unfortunately, 'theories' made of such material are 
only what some philosophers have called 'low-level generaliza­
tions', or 'statements of empirical uniformities and regulari­
ties'. The 'general theories', the 'high-level generalizations 
of a theoretical system', from which any number of propositions 
about all sorts of relationships can be deduced are made of 
different stuff".
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CHAPTER III THE PUBLIC GOODS THEORY OF MANCUR OLSON : 
CONTENTS,DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATIONS
Introduction
The thi rd chapter expl ores the problem of coll ective action
th rough an ana lytical pers pecti ve derived from the theory of cal-
le cti ve goo d s . The collec ti ve goo ds theory deals with the conditions
un der wh ich in dividuals or orou ps, often joined in volun ta ry orga-
ni zation s, can coordinate their ac tions to achieve common benefi t s .
Th e theo ry is most relevan t in sy s terns characteriz ed by a low level
of organ iza tion in which n o coe rci on or exclusion is possi ble.
We may briefly say u/hat is meant by a public (or collective) 
good (1). According to the standard distinctions, collective goods 
are defined by tuio properties, one of which is n o n -rivalness, meaning 
that each i n d ividual’s consumption does not diminish the supply a- 
vailable to others. The other property is called non-exclusion, i.e., 
once a good is provided, it is not economically feasible to prevent 
individuals from enjoying the benefits of the good. We refer to the 
next chapter for a discussion of these definitions and subsequent 
problems.
(1) The relevant literature on this subject dates back many years. 
Nonetheless, economic analysis of the collective goods took an 
important turn u/hen Samuelson, P., published ’The Pure Theory of 
Public E x p e n d i t u r e 1, Review of Economics and Sta t i s t i c s . Vol. 36, 
November 1954, p. 3B7-3B9. He gave a graphical presentation of 
the collective goods problem in 'Diagrammatic Exposition of a 
Theory of Public Expenditure', Review of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s . 
Vol. 38, November 1955, p. 350-356.
Additional work has since been done on several aspects of the 
concept. In this context we mention especially the excellent 
article by Head, 3., Public Goods and Public Policy, Public Fi­
nance . Vol. 17-3, 1962. See also Buchanan, 3., The Demand and 
Supply of Public G o o d s . Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968.
The theory of collective goods, developed in detail by economists, 
has also made some interesting contributions to specific areas of po­
litical analysis (1). Interest in the theory of collective goods has 
been increasing among political scientists since the publication of 
Olson's 'The Logic of Collective Action' (2). Drau/ing on developments 
in the theory of collective goods by Samuelson and others, Olson shows 
how his theory can be used to analyze the formation of voluntary asso­
ciations in both domestic and international politics. Olson and other 
scholars have applied the theory of public goods to political topics 
such as interest groups, alliances and the organization of local 
governments.
In the application of the collective goods theory to International 
Relations, the focus is on the problems of collective action tuhich the 
collective goods may create at the international level. "In economic 
terms, when (nation-states) are unable to 'purchase' a desired capa­
bility, such as an effective deterrent in the international market­
place, they are forced to seek an alternative arrangement to generate 
that resource. This predicament presents states uiith a political prob­
lem. Houj  can a situation best be structured to facilitate optimal
production of the desired good at lowest cost? What strategies can be 
employed to ensure maximum participation with the lowest potential 
for conflict?" (3)
In this introductury section ue briefly mention some of the 
appealing characteristics that a public good perspective to the analy­
sis of political phenomena may generate. A first indicative point of 
such an approach is that the defining characteristics of public goods 
highlight existing political, social and economic relationships. Colie 
tive goods concepts have become useful to the extent that they identify
the nature and the consequences of collective goods situations. In
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(1) Hanson, R.A., Toward an Understanding of Politics through Public 
Goods Theory : A Review Essay, in Loehr, W. and Sandler, T.,
Public Goods and Public P o l i c y . Beverly Hills, Ca.,s Sage Publi­
cations, 1978, p. 67-95.
(2) Olson, M., The Logic of Collective Action : Public Goods and the 
Theory of G r o u p s . Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
(3) Russett, 8.M. and Sullivan, 3., Collective Coads and International 
Organization, International O r g a n i z a t i o n . Vol. 25, Autumn 1971,
sum, the concept of public .good has drawn the attention to certain 
features of political variables that simply were not considered pre­
viously. As a consequence, the concept appears to be a tool to shed 
light on some traditional political concerns and to uncover some 
new problems (1).
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(1) The potential significance of the concept is revealed by the ac­
tivities to which the term refers. Historically, many studies 
have concentrated on -an analysis of 'defence* as a public good : 
9eer, F ., The Political Economy of Alliances : Benefits, Costs 
and Institutions in N A T O , Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 
1972 ; Burgess, P.M. and Robinson, J.R., Alliances and the Theory 
of Collective Action, The Midwest Journal of Political Science.
Vol. 13, May 1969, p. 194-218 ; Olson, M . and Zeckhauser, R . ,
An Economic Theory of Alliances, Review of Economics and Statis­
tics t Vol. 38, August 1966, p. 266-279 ; Russett, B.M., What Price 
Vigilance? . New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970 ; Sandler, T., 
The Economic Theory of Alliances : Realigned, in Liske, C., Loehr, 
W. and McCamont, J. (eds. ), Comparative Public Policy : Issues« 
Theories and M e t h o d s . Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1975, 
Chapter 9 ; Ibid., Impurity of Defense : An Application to the 
Economics of Alliances, K y k l o s , Vol. 30, 1977, p. 443-460 ; Sand­
ler, T. and Cawley, J., On the Economic Theory of Alliances, The 
Journal of Conflict R e s olution. Vol. 19, June 1975, p. 330-356 ; 
Starr, H., A Collective Goods Analysis of the Warsaw Pact after 
Czechoslovakia, International O r g a n i z a t i o n . Vol. 27, 1974, p. 521- 
532 ; Van Ypersele de Strihou, J.M., Sharing the Defense Burden 
Among Western Allies, Yale Economic E s s a y s . Vol. 8, Spring 1968, 
p. 261-320 ; Vayrynen, R., The Theory of Collective Goods, Mili­
tary Alliances and International Security, International Social 
Science Journal, Vol. 20-2, 1976, p. 288-305 ; Wagner, H.R., Na­
tional Defense as a Collective Good, in Liske, C. and other (eds.), 
Comparative Public Policy : Issues. Theory and M e t h o d s . Beverly 
Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1975, Chapter 8.
We only mention a few other recent applications as examples : 
Baumol, W.J. and Oates, W., The Theory of Environmental P o l i c y . 
Englewood Cliffs, N.Y.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1975 ; Bobrow, D.B. 
and Kudrle, R.T., Energy R&D : in tepid pursuit of collective 
goods, International O r g anization. Vol. 33-2, Spring 1979, p. 149- 
175 ; Bucnanan, J., The Limits of Liberty : Between Anarchy,and 
L e v i a t h a n . Chicago, London: Chicago University Press, 1975 ;
Cohen, B.J., Organizing the W o r l d’s Money : the Political Economy 
of International Monetary Relations. London: The McMillan Press, 
1977 ; See the different writings of Hamada, for e.g., Hamada, K., 
On the Political Economy of Monetary Integration, in Aliber, R.Z. 
(ed.), The Political Economy of Monetary R e f o r m . Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1977 ; Hirsch, F. and Doyle, M. and Morse, E., 
Alternatives to Monetary Disorder, Neu York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.
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A second striking feature of the public good theory is that it 
promises to be an explanation of some political problems superior 
to previous theories . Tuo notable applications that have serious­
ly questioned established theories, are Olson's analysis of groups 
and Ostrom's account of the organization of local governments. 
Concerning the question of whether or not individuals u/ill join 
groups in order to supply themselves with a collective good, Olson 
questiones the traditional argument that rational individuals will 
seek to further their individual interests by joining a group that 
seeks to promote the common interests of all individuals. Instead, 
Olson advances the counter assertion that as long as a potential 
group member can receive the benefits of a good without contribu­
ting to its supply, he has an incentive to withhold his contribu­
tion. Emphasis is put on the difficulties arising from the free­
rider problem and tendencies for the supply of the goods to be sub- 
optimal. A key distinction is made between large groups and small 
groups. The argument leads to the conclusion that the provision 
of collective goods to large groups is a major political problem.
In the next section we will explain the content of Olson's theory
of collective goods.
Concerning the organization of local governments, V. Ostrom and 
others (1) challenge the conventional wisdom that seeks to change 
the structure of multiple units of government to greater centrali­
zation of policy-making authority to increase policy effectiveness 
and efficiency. They argue that the configuration of local units 
of government actually reflects the preferences of citizens for pub­
lic goods and that it is efficient for those units to contract for
(1) Among the many contributions to this field of analysis, we men­
tion a few works : Bish, R.L., The Public Economy of Metropoli­
tan A r e a s . Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971 ; Bish, R.L. and Ostrom, 
V/., Understanding Urban G o v e r n m e n t . Washington D.C.: American 
Enterprise, 1973 ; Ostrom, V., Tibout, C.M. and Warren, R., The 
Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, American Poli­
tical R e v i e w . Vol. 55, December 1962, p. 831-842 ; Ostrom, V. 
and Ostrom, E., Public Choice in Public A g e ncies. Indiana: India 
na University Press, 1976.
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the supply of public goods 'with competitive producers. We refer 
to the specialized literature on this subject.
Another appealing quality of the public goods theory is that it 
may be applied to a variety of political decision-making problems.
As a result, it can lead to the development of neu/ theories rather 
than being limited to refuting ■ political theories. Analyses u/hich 
are concerned u/ith the supply of collective goods instead of with 
the interactions among prospective consumers of any given public 
good, indicate this new direction. The whole discussion of leader­
ship models from the public goods perspective seems a promising 
path of analysis (1).
To sum up, the theory of public goods is appealing to the extent 
that some political variables can be treated as public goods, that 
a number of political problems involve questions of the demand and 
supply of public goods, and that some political processes and out­
comes can be explained by abstract models that generate principles
(1) Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, 3.A. and Young, O.R., Political 
Leadership and Collective G o o d s . Princeton: Princeton Universi­
ty Press, 1971. They propose an 'entrepreneurial1 theory in 
which political leaders supply collective goods in order to 
maximize their leaders' surplus.
Prior to the work of Frohlich and others, there were made two 
efforts to extend Olson's theory by adding the component of 
leader (or entrepreneur): Salisbury, R.H., An Exchange Theory 
of Interest Groups, Midwest 3ournal of Political S c i e n c e . Vol. 
13, February 1969, p. 1-32 ; and Wagner, R.E., Pressure Groups 
and Political E n trepreneurs. Papers on Non-Market Decision- 
Making, Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia, 1966, 
p. 161-170.
K i ndleberger, C.P., Systems of International Organization, in 
Calleo, D.P. (ed.), Money and the Coming World O r d e r . New York: 
New York University Press (The Lehrman Institute), 1976 ; 
Kindleberger, C.P., Dominance and Leadership in the Internation­
al Economy : Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides, in 
Hommaqe h Francois P e r r o u x . Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de 
Grenoble, 1978.
An interesting and promising attempt in this respect is also 
Salmon, P., Exchange Models of L e a d e r s h i p , unpublished paper, 
Firenze: European University Institute, March 1979.
of behaviour. The descriptive and analytical utility of a collec 
tive goods approach may thus lead to a clearer idea of the policy 
intervention possibilities that exist in any problem. The many 
applications of the collective goods theory to different areas 
shows a growing importance. We now turn to an exposition of Olso 
initial analysis, further developments and applications of the 
theory of collective goods.
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A. The Collective Goods Theory of Olson : Contents
1. Theory Construction
The previous section contained some of the reasons uihy the 
concept of public good looks appealing for further application. 
These applications, u/hich can best be arranged according to the 
areas of theory-building and theory-testing, are devoted to differ­
ent substantive issues, e.g., special interest groups, leadership 
and local government organization.
Drawing on the economic theory of public goods, Olson developed 
a theory of collective action, designed to explain hou/ groups and 
organizations operate. This theory of collective action that 
applies most generically to voluntary associations is also appli­
cable to international organizations. In voluntary associations 
as u»ell as in international organizations, there is no overarching 
institution uiith taxing capacity to compel potential users to 
support the production of the collective benefits. In other u/ords, 
there is no coercion and no exclusion possible. Because of this 
similarity betu/een international organizations and special interest 
groups, attention u/ill be concentrated on Olson's theory of collec­
tive action. In this chapter u/e u/ill explicate this theory, its 
further developments and its criticisms.
a. The Relationship betu/een Groups and the Collective Good
A fundamental problem confronting individuals (or countries), 
is the decision whether or not to join a group that seeks to a- 
chieve the common interests of the group members. Considerable 
importance has been attached to the role of groups in both domestic 
and international politics. In domestic systems, special interest 
groups such as labour unions or farm organizations serve as mouth­
piece of the demands of their members. And in the international
system, countries may promote their joint interests, e.g., defence, 
through alliance formation. Despite this critical role of groups, 
the application of the concept of public good indicates that indi­
viduals (or countries) will not necessarily act to further their 
mutual concern.
Olson defines collective goods in the following manner :
"A common, collective, or public good is here defined as any good 
such that, if any person in a group X ^ , X ^ f ..., X^. con­
sumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that 
group" (1). A direct consequence of this definition of a collective 
good is the ’free-rider* problem. "To the extent that the good is 
collective in nature, it is possible for individuals to receive it, 
even if they do not contribute towards its supply. Consequently, 
individuals acting in a self-interested fashion, will experience 
incentives to withhold their own contributions, hoping that the 
efforts of others will be sufficient to provide the good for the 
whole group" (2).
In his book, Olson states that the "characteristic and primary 
function of organizations is to advance the common interests of 
groups and individuals" (3), e.g., some collective good is afforded 
to a special group of actors. That implies that if the achievement 
of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means 
that a public good has been provided for that group, then the fac­
tors that work against the supply of public goods, apply to the 
formation of voluntary groups. In other words, the very fact that 
a goal or purpose is common to a group does not mean that a collec­
(1) Olson, M ., The Logic of Collective Action t Public Goods and the 
Theory of G r o u p s , Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1965,p.
(2) Frohlich, N. and others, Political Leadership and Collective 
G o o d s , Princetoni Princeton University Press, 1971, p, 13,
A more formal treatment of this problem is set forth in F ro h l i c h  
N. and Oppenheimer, J.A., I Get By With a Little Help from my 
Friend, World P o l i t i c s . Vol. 23, October 1970, p. 104-120.
(3) Olson, M ., o p .c i t ., p. 10.
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tive good mill be provided, it only says that once a group is or­
ganized on a common interest, no one in the group is excluded from 
the benefit or satisfaction brought about by its achievement. From 
this it follows that the provision of public goods, together with 
the provision of economics of scale and of information, may be con­
sidered a fundamental function of groups and organizations. Hence, 
the traditional political problem of whether or not an individual 
(or a country) uiill either join or not join a group or organization, 
can be rephrased to the question t will an individual (or a country) 
voluntarily contribute to the supply of a public good.
b. Olson's Model of Groups or Organizations
b.1. General
In the application of the public goods theory to this question, 
Olson argues that "unless the number of the individuals in a group 
is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special 
device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational,
self-interested individuals uiill not act to achieve their common
/ \ *
or group interests" (1). He goes beyond this conclusion and formu­
lates a mathematical model of nonexcludable goods in which group 
size plays an important role.
Olson's model includes the following variables :
C = the cost of the collective goods to individual i
Sg s the size of the group
T = the amount of the collective goods that is supplied
Vg = SgT = the value or benefit of the good to the group
Vi s the gain of the good to individual i
Fi * s the proportion (fractional share) of the group 
Vg
benefit, consumed by individual i 
Ai t Vi • C : the advantage of individual i
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(1) Olson, M., o p . c i t . . p. 2
The crucial assumptions in Olson's model are : 1) Every indi­
vidual attempts to maximize his advantage, i.e., the difference 
between the benefit of the good to him and the total cost. This 
means that the individual believes that no one else will contribute 
to the supply of the good, that he will have to pay the full cost. 
There is no 'cost-sharing' arrangement. 2) The cost and benefit 
curves are continuous and well-behaved, i.e., they produce a unique 
maximum advantage. 3) The value of the good to the group is the 
product of the size of the group and the amount supplied.
Using these assumptions, Olson demonstrates that 1) if the good 
is supplied at all, it will be supplied at a suboptimal level ;
2 ) the degree of suboptimality of supply is a function of the size 
of the group ; and 3) in small-sized groups, the individuals who 
receive a greater fractional share of the value of the good, will 
bear a disproportionate share of the burden supplying the good.
b.2. Specifics
b.2.a. The Relationship between Group Size and the Provision of 
Collective Goods
How does Olson obtain these results (1)? Because of the assump­
tions about the continuity and shape of the cost and value functions, 
he is able to identify the condition under which an individual maxi­
mizes his net utility by purchasing some amount of the public good.
. .... . . . d(fli) d(Vi-C) „ dVi dC
That condition exists when = 0 or g y -  » , i.e.,
the amount of the good supplied by the individual i will be at that 
point where the marginal cost equals tha marginal value for indivi­
dual i. The Pareto optimal level, however, will occur at that point 
where the marginal cost equals the marginal value for the group 
( ) »  But since the individual value is a constant fraction of the
(1) For an interesting examination of Olson's theory of collective 
action, see Hart, 3.A. and Cowhey, P.F., Theories of Collective 
Goods Reexamined, Western Political Q u a rterly« Vol. 30-3, 
p. 351-362.
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collective value (Fi n , the amount supplied by any individual 
utill always be suboptimal.
Olson further argues that because Fi decreases as the size of 
the group increases, the supply of the collective good becomes 
smaller and more suboptimal. He asserts that "the larger a group 
is, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal supply 
of any collective good, and the less likely that it mill act to 
obtain even a minimal amount of such a good. In short, the larger 
the group, the less it mill further its common interests (1)".
His conclusions concerning the effects of group size relate 
to both the absolute and the relative amount of the collective 
good that is provided. They are as follows : 1) As the size of the 
group increases, the actual amount of the public good supplies de­
creases. 2) As the size of the group increases, the amount of the 
good supplied becomes more suboptimal. These conclusions assert that, 
other things being equal, small groups urill fare better than large 
groups in both actual and relative performance in providing collec­
tive goods (2).
In the context of this relationship between the size of the 
group and the provision of the public good, Olson distinguishes 
three kinds of groups (3) : 1) A 'privileged' group is a group in 
which a member gets such a large fraction of the total benefit that 
he has an incentive to see that the collective good is provided, 
even if he has to bear the full burden of providing it himself.
The collective good is presumed to be obtained. 2) An 'intermediate1 
group is a group in which no single member gets such a large benefit
-79-
(1) Olson, M ., o p . c l t . . p. 36.
(2) The arguments are well explained in Olson, M., A Theory of 
Groups and Organizations, in Russett, B.M., Economic Theories 
of International P o l i t i c s . Chicagot Markham Publishing Company, 
1968, p. 139-147.
(3) Olson, M., The Loqic of Collective Action : Public Goods and 
the Theory of G r o u p s , Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 
1965, p. 44.
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froro the collective good that he has an incentive to provide the 
good himself, but in which the individual is still so important 
in the group that his contribution to the group objective has a 
noticeable effect on the costs or benefits of others in the group. 
The result is indeterminate so that provision of the collective 
good mill depend on coordination among the interested actors.
3) The 'latent' group is a large group in which no single indivi­
dual's contribution makes a perceptible difference in securing the 
collective benefit to the group. That is, each member mill feel 
personally inefficacious because he concludes that the impact of 
his contribution mill be insignificant. Accordingly, all members 
of the group mill decide that it is irrational for them to contri­
bute to the supply of the public good and the group mill fail to 
supply itself with the good.
Marginal cost-sharing arrangements mere suggested to overcome 
a suboptimality of supply (1). When there is such a marginal cost- 
sharing scheme, there need be no tendency towards disproportionality 
in the sharing of burdens. According to Olson, voluntary cost- 
sharing is most likely in groups in which there is 'a perceptible 
interdependence'. In the absence of such an interdependence coer­
cion or 'selective incentives' may be necessary to get individuals 
to contribute to the supply of the good. He asserts that most 
large groups offer private goods or selective incentives to obtain 
sufficient levels of participation in collective efforts. However, 
the idea of marginal cost-sharing arrangements is not stressed in 
Olson's analysis. His main interest is in the calculus of the in­
dividual decision-maker to determine his contribution to the pro­
vision of the public good.
(1) The marginal cost-sharing arrangement is introduced as a de­
vice for overcoming suboptimality of supply in Olson, M. and 
Zeckhauser, R., o p . c i t .» p. 270 ; and Olson, M., Increasing 
the Incentives for International Cooperation, International 
O r ganization. Vol. 25, Autumn 1 9 7 1 f p. 866-874.
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b.2.b. Cast-sharing within Small-sized Groups
One of the conclusions of Olson's theory concerns the small­
sized group. Apart from the basic claim about groups, i.e., the 
amount of a public good that is provided voluntarily u/ill be sub- 
optimal, Olson also advances a proposition about the sharing of 
costs and benefits u/ithin small-sized groups. If the good is not 
a superior good, the distribution of the costs of supplying a pu­
blic good will not be proportional to the distribution of the bene­
fits of the good. Olson u/rites : "The suboptimality or inefficien­
cy mill be somewhat less serious in groups composed of members of 
greatly different size or interest in the collective good. In such 
unequal groups, on the other hand, there is a tendency toward an 
arbitrary sharing of the burden of providing the collective good.
The largest member, the member who alone uould provide the 
largest amount of the collective good, bears a disproportionate 
share of the burden of providing the collective good. The smaller 
member by definition gets a smaller fraction of the benefit of any 
amount of the collective good he provides than a larger member, 
and therefore has less incentive to provide additional amounts of 
the good. Once a smaller member has the amount of the collective 
good he gets free from the largest member, he has more than he 
would have purchased for himself, and has no incentive to obtain 
any of the collective good at his own expense. In small groups 
with common interests there is accordingly a surprising tendency for 
"exploitation of the great by the small (1)".
(1) Olson, M., The Looic of Collective Action : Public Goods and
the Theory of G r o u p s . Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 
1965, p. 35.
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2. Theory Testing
Olson and Zeckhauser have tested the theory of collective 
action in international relations. In their ’Economic Theory of 
Alliances' the exploitation hypothesis was verified for the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the transposition of the 
analytical framework of the theory of groups and organizations to 
the level of international relations, they aimed at explaining the 
workings of any international organization.
They argued that almost every sort of international organization 
provides collective goods, for they all have the purpose of serv­
ing the common interests of member states. As those goods and 
services which are provided in the common interest of the members 
of the group are usually called public goods, the analogy with an 
international organization is obvious. For instance, an organiza­
tion of states allied for defence similarly produces a collective 
good. In the case of NATO, the proclaimed purpose of the alliance 
is to protect the member nations from aggression by a common ennemy. 
Deterring aggression against any one of the members is supposed to 
be in the interest of all.
The arguments developed in 'The Logic of Collective Action', 
make them also assert that, whan the membership of an international 
organization is relatively small, the individual members may have 
an incentive to make significant sacrifies to obtain the collective 
good, but still only suboptimal amounts of the good. There will 
also be a tendency for the larger members - those that place a 
higher absolute value on the public good - to bear a disproprtio- 
nate share of the burden. In fact, Olson assumes that the absolute 
value for the public good is directly proportional to the size of 
the member.
Olson has shown graphically the disproportionality of the 
sharing of burdens in the figure that we have drawn below (Figure 
III-1). The figure depicts the support of two nations for alliance 
forces through independent contributions. Income-effects, i.e.,
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the influence that the amount of non-defence goods a nation has 
already forgone in its desire to provide additional units of de­
fence, are not taken into account by the authors.
Figure III-1 Evaluation Curves
(Small Country-Big Country)
X' X. Defence
Source s Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R., o p . c i t . , p. 269.
The vertical axis measures benefits and costs in a common
matric such as dollars. The horizontal axis of the figure measures
the quantity of the collective good that the alliance provides.
The C curve denotes the total cost of providing defence capability
B
to each nation. The curve denotes the value of the collective
2
good to the state that values it more highly and the V^ curve gives 
the same information for the state that puts the lower absolute 
value on the collective good. The larger nation has a steeper curve 
because it places a higher absolute value on defence.
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In isolation, the larger nation twill provide Xg of defence 
and the smaller nation X^, for at these points their respective 
valuation curves are parallel to the cost function. If the two 
member states independently determine what contribution they mill 
make to the alliance, the only equilibrium with independent deter­
mination is for the large country to provide Xg of the collective 
good and for the smaller country none at all. Clearly the large 
country maximizes the excess of benefits over costs by choosing to 
provide Xg of the collective good. But since the good is collec­
tive, it follows that this amount is also available to the small 
country. The benefit the small country would get from an extra 
unit of the collective good is less than the cost of a unit of the 
good. So it is not in the small country's interest to supply any 
defence whatever. Hence, Olson and Zeckhauser expect to find that 
the alliance members that place greater valuation on the defence 
objective, mill bear a disproportionate share of the alliance's 
costs. There is thus a disproportionality in burden sharing that 
works against big countries.
To operationalize this model to the NATO context, the authors 
assume that the larger the nation is, the larger its proportion 
of resources devoted to defence expenditures will be. With GNP and 
defence expenditures as the indicators of size and effort, the model 
holds that the greater a nation's GNP, then the greater mill be 
that percentage of GNP spent on defence. This relationship is 
verified in a test of five related hypotheses (1). According to 
Olson and Zeckhauser "all of the empirical evidence tended to con­
firm the model* (2).
(1) Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R., o p .c i t .. p. 274-277.
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t . . p. 278.
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Further empirical studies supported Olson's theory (1). They 
all tested the proposition according to which there is a tendency 
for the large countries to bear a disproportionate share of the 
burden. All found positive, statistically significant correlations 
between GNP(size) and the proportionate military expenditures 
(D/GNP) for a variety of time periods and data sources. Finally, 
all these studies have demonstrated that as an organization pro­
vides a collective good, members do indeed behave in ways indicated 
by Olson's theory of collective action.
(1) Empirical studies which confirm Olson's thesis are : Pryor, F., 
Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist N a t i o n s , Home­
ward, Illinois: Irwin Press, 1969, p. 96-98 ; Russett, B.M. and 
Starr, H., Alliances and the Price of Primacy, in Russett, B.M., 
What Price Viqilance?. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 1970, p. 91-126 ; Starr, H., A Collective Goods Analysis 
of the Warsaw Pact after Czechoslovakia, International Organiza­
t i o n , Vol. 27, 1974, p. 521-532 ; Van Ypersele de Strihou, 3.M., 
Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies, The Review of 
Economics and Sta t i s t i c s . Vol. 49, November 1967, p. 527-536.
Also Beer, F., tested Olson's model. He found it to be defi­
cient in a number of respects : Beer, F., The Political Economy 
of Alliances : Benefits, Costs and Institutions in N A T O , Beverly 
Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1972.
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B. The Collective Goods Theory of Olson : Critiques and Developments
1. Critiques of O l s o n’s Theory of Groups and Organizations
While Olson is generally cited as having raised the question 
of how and u/hy the size of a group affects the supply of a public 
good, the ansuter he provides us with in his theory of groups or 
organizations, is not universally accepted and often criticized in 
general and specific points. In fact, there is considerable dis­
harmony in the answers that other scholars provide to the problem 
of the relationship between size and the supply of public goods.
Some brief references to leading works in the field will serve to 
illustrate the widespread disagreement. Some of the conceptual 
and analytical problems related to the theory and its application 
to the field of International Relations are discussed at some length 
in the next chapter.
First, John Chamberlin (1) argues that even though large groups 
may experience a greater suboptimality of supply than smaller 
groups, the absolute level of supply may be greater, i.e., increases 
in group-size may positively affect the absolute level of public 
good. Chamberlin explicitly distinguishes two types of public 
goods in a manner originally set forth by Olson, who classified 
groups according to the types of collective benefits they generate 
for the members of the group (2).
An 'inclusive' public good is one that is perfectly indivisible,
i.e., an individual's valuation of the good is not affected by 
the number of persons who consume the good (e.g., a decrease in the 
corporate income tax). An 'exclusive' good is one which is divi-
(1) Chamberlin, 3., Provision of Collective Goods as a Function 
of Croup Size, American Political Science R e v i e w . Vol. 68,
June 1974, p. 707-716.
(2) Olson, M., o p .c i t .. p. 36-42.
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sible, but there is non-excludability. Here the satisfaction that 
any single individual receives from the good decreases as the 
number of persons consuming the good increases, and it is not 
feasible to restrict persons from enjoying the benefits (e.g., a 
price increase brought about in an industry through output res­
triction) .
He concludes that in the case of 'inclusive' collective goods 
which are not inferior goods, the amount of the good provided does 
not increase but decreases as the size of the group gets larger. The 
relationship between groupsize and the amount of the good provided 
is in this case the opposite of Olson's prediction. According to 
Chamberlin, the differentiation between inclusive and exclusive 
collection goods has an important impact on the use of the 'fraction 
of the total benefit's concept' and consequently, on the explana­
tions of actions by large groups (1).
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (2) reject dlson's overall conclusion 
that group-sizepredicts the amount of the good that will be supplied 
voluntarily. They argue that rational self-interested behaviour 
on the part of individuals does not suffice to provide increasing 
free-rider problems with increasing size. In other words, the re­
lationship between group-sizeand the occurence of the free-rider 
problem is not seen as a logical consequence of rational, self-in­
terested behaviour. This was shown by abstracting each individual 
from the set of the group and examining his decision process. They 
assume that people are able to make subjective estimates of the 
probabilities associated with varying levels of contribution from 
other people and decide whether to contribute accordingly. The
(1) Chamberlin, 3., o p . c i t .. p. 715.
(2) Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, 3.A., I Get by With a Little Help 
from my Friends, World P o l i t i c s . Vol. 23, October 1970, p. 104- 
1 2 0.
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ability of self-interested, rational individuals to supply themselves 
with a public good depends on some sort of mechanism to coordinate 
their expectations regarding the probable actions of others to con­
tribute. In the absence of such a mechanism, they conclude that 
the difference between small and large groups do not produce differ­
ent levels of public goods. Frohlich and O p p e n h e i m e r 's rejection 
of Olson's theory resulted in a model of leadership which we will 
discuss in the next section.
Olson's conclusion that the size of the group affects the degree 
of suboptimality, is challenged by Riker and Ordeshook (1). They 
assert that this conclusion does not follow from the explicit com­
ponents of the model. Contrary to Olson's arguments, Riker and 
Ordeshook argue that in the case of a pure public good the relation­
ship between an individual's marginal benefit and marginal cost is 
unaffected by groupsize.
To sum up, the conflicting nature of the different conclusions 
concerning the effects of group-size sn the provision of a collective 
good presumably results from a broad range of variable conditions 
and concepts. In other words, different assumptions are often used 
in the respective theories of group formation. Given the basic 
variable conditions, it is not surprising that Olson, Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer, Chamberlin, and Riker and Ordeshook reach different 
conclusions concerning the effects of group-size.
2. Further Developments of Olson's Theory of Groups or Organizations
a. A Deductive Clodel of Leadership
Out of Frohlich and O p p e n h e i m e r 's criticism on Olson's treat­
ment of groups and organizations Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young 
developed a model in which they introduce the concept of 'political 
leadership' or 'political entrepreneurship' (2). They argue that,
(1) Riker, U.N. and Ordeshook, P.C., An Introduction to Positive
Political T h e o r y . Englewood Cliffs, New jersey: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 19^3, p. 72-74.
(2) Frohlich, N. and others, o p . cit.. p. 18-25.
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if individuals are rational 'and self-interested and the provision 
of a collective good requires an organization, collective goods 
can be supplied even in large groups by someone uho finds it pro­
fitable to set up an organization, collect resources, and supply the 
goods.
A political leader or entrepreneur is then defined as "an indi­
vidual uho acts to supply a collective good without providing all 
of the resources himself ... Such an individual will find this role 
valuable when the total resources he can collect as a leader exceed 
his costs, thereby producing a leader's surplus" (l).
Frohlich and others criticized Olson for suggesting that private 
good incentives or coercion can be used to provide a collective good 
or to increase the level of the supply of the good. They counter- 
asserted that political leaders may supply public goods in order to 
maximize their leader's surplus. In other uords, these political 
leaders control production units and provide consumption units for 
their clients in exchange for donations and taxes. Political compe­
tition provides a check against exploitation by leaders. This re­
formulation of the collective goods problem leads them directly to 
an analysis of political organizations. They have formalized their 
model (2). It basically consists of tuo expected utility equations, 
one applies to the individual citizen and the other to the leader.
However, this deductive leadership model does not challenge the 
basic assumptions of Olson's theory. Frohlich and others misinter­
preted Olson's model of collective action. Olson's model assumes 
no overarching capacity to compel people to support the production 
of the collective good. Frohlich and others, on the other hand, 
implicitly assume coercion or an institutionalized framework for 
the provision of collective goods. In other words, we do not have 
to be concerned with their criticisms of Olson's theory. As a con­
cluding remark, ue may even add that so far criticisms along those 
lines have not really damaged Olson's model. In the next chapter
(1) Frohlich, N. and others, op. c i t ., p. 6.
(2) For a mathematical form of the model, see Frohlich, N. and others, 
o p . c i t . , p. 26-44.
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ue uill see that the main problems for Olson's theory come from 
the notion of public good, i.e., the cases of mixed public goods 
uhere exclusion is possible.
b. Elaborations of Olson's Collective Goods Theory in International 
Relations
A number of theorists have accepted the logic of the formulation 
of Olson's theory of groups and organizations as the basis for ela­
boration of the theory in the field of International Relations. 
Russett and Sullivan have explored the problem of collective action 
through an analytical perspective derived largely from this 
theory of collective goods (1). Using Olson's discussion as a point 
of departure, they analyze a number of implications of the collective 
good principle in international relations. They are primarily con­
cerned with a discussion of the conditions for the achievement of 
collective goods, and propose various strategies that can be employed 
by states in deliberate attempts to generate a collective good (2).
A rapid tour of these conditions may indicate the way Russett and 
Sullivan have interpreted Olson's arguments.
Russett and Sullivan's first condition is that of 'coercion' 
of group members to make them pay their share of the costs. Other 
conditions relying on some sort of coercion include number four, 
uhere the small size of a group makes a member's contribution more 
visible, number six, uhere social pressure is seen as a means to 
'encourage' members to c o n t r i b u t e ,and condition number nine, uhere 
the collective good may be provided as a result of education or pro­
paganda.
Emphasis on the more positive incentives to provide public goods 
is put in the other strategies. Rewards are explicitly discussed 
in condition number five, suggesting the "provision of private goods 
to members as an inducement to states to join and to bear their 
share of the burden in achieving collective goods" (3) ; and in
(1) Russett, B.N. and Sullivan, 3.0., Collective Goods and Inter­
national Organization. International Oroanization. Vol. 25. 
Autumn 1971, p. 845-865*1 -----------
(2) Ibid., op.c i t . . p. 850-859.
(3) Ibid., op.cit.. p. 855.
number seven, where the collective good is provided as a 'by-pro- 
duct' of members' activities to obtain private goods. Other posi­
tive strategies for changing preferences include condition number 
tuo, which calls for a widening of the individual's perceived self- 
interest and number three, where the collective good is provided 
by Olson's privileged group. Condition ten involves the possibi­
lity of a 'prominent solution' of fair contributions such as, for 
instance, the scale of assessments which is employed to determine 
the contributions of members in international organizations. Fi­
nally, condition number eight suggests a federated structure of small 
groups. This last condition is a structural one, containing elements 
of both coercion and positive incentives.
Finally, in their application of the collective goods principle 
to international relations, Russett and Sullivan only focus on the 
creation of incentives and disincentives which stimulate the provi­
sion of collective goods through collective action, and not to the 
question how patterns of international organization and cooperation 
that could help to improve the working of the international system 
could be in practice attained. In other words, they were looking 
for means of mobilizing the 'latent' group. That is why they stress 
in the conclusion that more attention should be paid to ways in 
which the rewards for cooperative behaviour in international rela­
tions can be made stronger and more apparent (1).
A similar argument has been developed by Hardin and Baden 
throughout a recent collection of articles, 'Managing the Commons'
(2). The 'tragedy' of the commons, stemming from individuals exer­
cising rights unmatched by corresponding responsibilities , leads
0 )  A good example is Hirsch, F., Doyle, M. and Morse, E., Alter­
natives to Monetary D i s o r d e r , New YorkîMcGraw Hill, 1977.
(2) Hardin, G. and Baden, 3. (eds.), Managing the C o m m o n s , San 
Francisco: U.H. Freeman, 1977.
See also Hardin, G., The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, Vol. 
162, December 1968, p. 1243-1248 ; and Morse, E.L., The Global 
Commons, Journal of International Affairs, Uol. 31-1, Spring- 
Summer 1971.
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to irresponsible behaviour and ultimately to the destruction of the 
commons. Hardin's response to the traditional tragedy of the common's 
irresponsibility is the 'enclosure' process. Responsible behaviour 
can be reintroduced, Hardin argues, by breaking up the commons into 
smaller pieces. The various global common pool resources can still 
be protected by international organizations vested uith some coercive 
pouer. In other uords, the 'enclosure' process means a suppressing 
of externalities by internalization so that the collective good dis­
appears.
In a comment to Russett and Sullivan's article, Olson elaborates 
on the question of suboptimality of the provision of collective goods 
within international organizations (1). He focusses his attention more 
directly on conditions which enable the organized or cooperative effort 
in international organizations to approach an optimal level of activity
i.e., uhat are the conditions under which independent countries will 
do uhat is needed to carry formal organization to a more nearly opti­
mal amount of the collective good.
Olson discusses two polar cases of how international cooperation 
can take place. First, international cooperation can take place 
through 'independent c o ntributions’. In this case states agree in 
principle to cooperate for some specified purpose or purposes and then 
individually determine the extent of that cooperation. In 'The Logic 
of Collective Action' and in the articles on alliances written by 
R. Zeckhauser and 1*1. Olson, it has been set out that an organization 
supported through independent contributions, will not provide an opti­
mal level of the collective good for which it is expected to be respon­
sible, and that the organization will increasingly fall short of that 
amount as the number of members increases. The other striking point 
in their analysis is uhat Olson has called 'the exploitation of the 
great by the small', the disproportionality in burden-sharing that 
works against the big countries.
(1) Olson, 1*1., Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation, 
International O r g a n i z a t i o n , Vol. 25, Autumn 1971, p. 866-874.
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The other polar case is that of 'marginal cost-sharing', which 
is defined as "a system whereby the members of an international or­
ganization share the sacrifices needed to provide at least marginal 
units of a collective good in the same proportion in which they share 
the benefits of the additional units,while simultaneously working out 
the level of provision and each member's contribution" (1).
Such a voluntary marginal cost-sharing arrangement is difficult 
to attain for large groups. It becomes feasible when the number of 
the members of the organization is limited. Olson and Zeckhauser 
mentioned the case of infrastructure expenditures for NATO. Also the 
scale of assessments applied in the United Nations and some other in­
ternational organizations to determine the contributions of the members 
faintly approximates this marginal cost-sharing approach. Olson intro­
duced this marginal cost-sharing arrangement as a possible way of 
getting a more nearly optimal level of provision of a collective good.
However, the main focus of Olson's theory of collective action 
centers on the case of 'independent c o ntributions’. The real issue of 
his model is an independent provision of the public good in a situation 
of no organizational framework, i.e., the calculus of the individual 
decision-maker to decide his contribution to the provision of the p u b ­
lic good. To increase the level of provision of the public good in
a situation of 'independent contributions', Olson argues, one has to
increase the incentives for international cooperation. "Only arrange­
ments designed to give individual states an incentive to act in their 
common interest, can bring a collectively sane result" (2). In other 
uords, if collective goods are considered of importance in inte r n a t i o n ­
al relations, it might be feasible to increase the incentives for 
collectively rational behaviour.
In 'Collective Goods and International Cooperation', Uilliam Loehr 
criticized the public goods approach to the analysis of the behaviour 
of international organizations (3). He proposed a different model
(1) Ibid., o p . c i t . . p. 871.
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p. 873.
(3) Loehr, U., Collective Goods and International Cooperation : Comments,
International Organ i z a t i o n , Uol. 27, 1973, p. 421—430.
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and suggested that the theory of private goods could provide a prac­
tical means to obtain collective goods.
The model differs from that employed by Olson on several points. 
First, it can include income effects. Secondly, the model includes 
reference to private goods so that opportunity costs can be taken in­
to account. Finally, Loehr does not assume equal tastes nor equal 
production costs of the goods. Conceptual and analytical ambiguity 
within his own reasoning makes him conclude that an optimal balance of 
public goods can be reached through international trade. According to 
Loehr, a country with the comparative advantage in the production of 
the public good, will become increasingly specialized in the produc­
tion of that good and will be compensated in the form of private 
goods from its trading partner. A Pareto optimal balance of private 
and public goods is thus examined within a trading situation. He then 
concludes that international organizations are only necessary to ensure 
that the collective good is supplied in optimal amounts. At this point 
Loehr refers to and criticizes the conclusions of Russett and Sullivan, 
and Olson concerning the actual and relative amount of the provision 
of the public good.
It is rather difficult to compare both models when they use dif f e r ­
ent basic assumptions in their reasoning. Moreover, Loehr's criticism 
of O l s o n’s model can be questioned from an analytical and conceptual 
viewpoint. Here we only conclude that Loehr's criticisms have not 
damaged Olson's theory at all.
An author who has elaborated on the basis of Olson's theory, is 
Todd Sandler. In his realigned economic theory of alliances, Sandler 
discusses the question of suboptimality of the provision of the de­
fence good (1). In his elaborative model, Sandler assumes a framework 
of exclusion, moving him away from Olson's basic model. He introduces 
taxing schemes for the purpose of inducing Pareto optimal resource 
movements within alliances. Taxation is seen to promote stability by
(1) Sandler, T., The Economic Theory of Alliances : Realigned, in
Liske, C., Loehr, U. and McCamant, 3. (eds.), Comparative Public 
Policy : Issues, Theories and M e t h o d s . Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage 
Publications, 19^5, p. 223-23^.
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allowing all allies to gain from the alliance, whereas prior to taxa­
tion only smaller nations gained in many instances. He has thus exa­
mined the stability of alliances with respect to the level of econo­
mic welfare of the participant. In absence of a taxing scheme, 
Sandler's model indicates that the stability of an alliance may depend 
on the relative sizes of the allies confirming Olson's conclusions.
With the introduction of a taxing scheme the stability of the alliance 
may be increased. To resume,Todd Sandler's realigned economic theory 
of alliances does indicate that the relative sizes of allies are in­
strumental in determining alliance stability, but also introduces the 
coercive means of taxing to provide and increase the collective good 
of deterrence within the alliance.
Sandler has also discussed the use of the pure public good con­
cept to the study of alliances. Traditionally, defence has been used 
to exemplify a pure public good exhibiting non-rivalness and non­
exclusion properties. This is, however, a polar case. Sandler has 
attempted to remedy that by investigating the implications of an impure 
public good paradigm of an alliance structure (1). The impure public 
good aspects of defence are analyzed by distinguishing defernce goods 
according to their deterrent and protective content.
Sandler introduces two formal models of a military alliance based 
upon the sharing of an impurely public defence good. Model I examines 
defence as an impure public good and is applicable to an alliance that 
relies on conventional weapons of protection. In Model II, the joint 
product model, Sandler includes private defence benefits and produces 
conclusions regarding optimal alliance size, financing, stability and 
burden-sharing that significantly differ from the conclusions of the 
pure public good model.To. sum up,Sandler, taking Olson's 'Economic 
Theory of Alliances' as a starting point, has tried to elaborate more 
realistic' models in which international organizations that share pub­
lic and private goods, can be examined.
(1) Sandler, T., Impurity of Defense : An Application to the Economics 
of Alliances, K y k l o s . Vol. 30, 1977, p. 443-460.
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Conclusion
In this third chapter we have explored the problems of collective 
action from the perspective of Olson's theory of groups and organiza­
tions. Because of the similarity .between the special interest groups 
and international organizations, this theory of collective action has 
been applied to international relations.
The main focus of Olson's model is on the calculus of the indivi­
dual decision- maker to determine his contribution to the provision 
of the public good, i.e., there is an independent provision of the 
public good in a framework of no coercion. It is this basic model of 
Olson that is assumed in our own analysis.
In a discussion of some of the critiques and elaborations of 
Olson's model, it became clear that the basics of his theory were not 
damaged by the criticisms. They all assumed in one way or another 
coercion, a taxing scheme, or an overarching capacity. In other words 
they used different theoretical frameworks.
In the next chapter we will assess some elements of Olson's public 
goods approach to international relations.
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CHAPTER IV AN ASSESSMENT OF SOME ELEMENTS OF OLSON'S PUBLIC 
GOODS APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Introduction
The modern theory of public goods (1), associated with Professors 
Samuelson and Musgrave, has not yet attained the status of rigid or­
thodoxy. Therefore, it is not surprising that important issues re­
main unresolved. Still, a substantial body of principles has been 
developed in recent years that has proven to be of interest to eco­
nomists and others concerned uith the analysis of public policy.
In the previous chapter ue presented the content, developments 
and applications of flaneur Olson's collective goods theory. In this 
chapter ue intend to explain, assess and elaborate some elements of 
this collective goods approach. First, an attempt is made to cla r i ­
fy the public good concept and its relation uith similar concepts. 
Second, ue assess the model of independent adjustment group beha­
viour on which our own analysis of public good in international re­
lations is based. Finally, ue discuss the usefulness of the public 
good concept for international relations and, in particular, the re­
lationship betueen international organization and the provision of 
public goods.
(1) A good presentation of public goods theory can be found in
Buchanan, 3., The Demand and Supply of Public G o o d s . Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1968 ; Burkhead, 3. and Miner« 3.« Public Expen- 
diture, New York: Aldine, 1971, Chapter 1 and 3 ; Hanson, R., 
Toward an Understanding of Politics through Public Goods Theory : 
A Revieu Essay, in Loehr, U. and Sandler, T., Public Goods and 
Public P o l i c y . Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage P u b lications, 19"l?8, 
p. ¿"?-95 ; Flusgrave, R., The Theory of Public F i n a n c e . New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1959.
A. An Assessment of the Public Good Concept
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1. The Concept of Public Good
a. Samuelson's Original Definition
In his now classic series of articles, Samuelson made an ad­
mittedly polar distinction between public and private goods. In 
his original mathematical exposition Samuelson provides a definitior 
of the public good concept :
"I explicitly assume two categories of goods : ordinary 
private consumption goods (X^, ... Xn ) which can be parcelled 
out among different individuals (1, 2, ... i, ... s) according
to the relations X. X^ . . and collective consumption goods
J i J »
•••» ) which all enjoy in common in the sense thatn + 1  ' n+m
each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no sub­
traction from any other individual's consumption of that good,
so that X . * X* . simultaneously for each-and every i th in- 
n+j n+j
dividual and each collective consumption good” (1).
From this difference it follows that the conditions for optimal 
supply of the two types of goods must also differ. In the case of 
private goods, a given quantity is optimally allocated among indivi­
duals when the marginal rates of substitution of one good for an­
other are equal to each other ; and the total quantity is optimal
when these marginal rates of substitution are equal to marginal cost 
1 2
(FIRS « HRS = ... = P1RT). In the case of collective goods, how­
ever, the quantity supplied, is optimal only when the sum of the in­
dividuals' marginal rates of substitution equals marginal cost. The 
Pereto optimal condition does no longer hold for a public good
( M R S 1 - A R T ) .
j«1
(1) Samuelson, P.A., The Pure Theory of Public Expendi ture, Review 
of Economica and Statistics, V/ol. 36, November 1954, p. 3 Ó 7 .
Turning nou to a detailed consideration of the public good con­
cept, on which Samuelson has based his theory of public expenditure 
and on which further developments have been made, two main characte­
ristics of the public good stand out, i.e., jointness of supply or 
indivisibility or non-rivalness of consumption on the one hand, and 
non-appropriability or non-exclusion on the other hand (1). Because 
this chapter deals partly with the exposition of the concept of the 
public good, I shall first examine a little further the exact meaning 
and implications of the concept.
b. The Characteristics of a Public Good
b.1. Non-Rivalness
We define non-rivalness as the condition where, given a level of 
physical production, consumption by one person does not thereby di­
minish the supply of the good potential available for consumption by 
others. In other words, where units of the good are made available 
to one actor, these X^ units can simultaneously be consumed by others. 
This implies that one can differentiate among non-rival goods accor­
ding to whether or not an actor is able to choose the amount he con­
sumes. It says that there is a difference between the availability 
of a good and the consumption of it (2).
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(1) A paper which explores the characteristics of a public good on 
an extended theoretical level is Snidal, D., Public Goods. Pro­
perty Rights and Political Organiz a t i o n s , unpublished paper, pre­
sented at the meetings of the International Studies Association 
held in Washington D.C., February 1978,
(2) This difference is related to the discussion of the formal and 
verbal definition of Samuelson*s public good. After the publi­
cation of his first article on this subject, ha was criticized
by scholars such as Enke, S., More on the Misuse of Mathematics in 
Economics : A Rejoinder, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 
37-2, Way 1955, p. 131-133 ; and Margolis, 3., A ¿omment on the 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, Review of Economics and Sta­
t i s tics. Vol. 37-4, November 1955, p. 347-349.
There are other scholars who have pointed out this difference be­
tween the availability of a good and the consumption such as, 
for instance, Riker, U.H., and Ordeshook, P.C., An Introduction 
to Positive Political T h e o r y , Englewood Cliffs, New 3ersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19^i, p. 259-261 ; and Goldin, K.O., Equal 
Access * A Critique of Public .Good# Theory, Public C h o i c e ,
Vol. 29, Spring 1977, p. 53-71.
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Consider, for example, a free public road. It exhibits non- 
rivalness in the sense that, once facilities are made available 
to the community, a person can consume the amount of road facility 
that is being consumed simultaneously by others. However, people 
are able to choose alternative routes or modes of transportation. 
Briefly, people are not required to consume the same amount of ros 
facilities, recreation or public education. Consumption of these 
non-rival goods do not conform to Samuelson's formal expression.
Ue have then at least two types of jointly supplied goods : those 
for uhich an actor can choose the amount he consumes and those for 
which he cannot. A typology of jointly supplied goods, inspired 
by Riker and Ordeshook, is shown in Table IV/—1.
Table II/-1 Typology of Public Goods (non-rivalness)
actor is able to choose the 
amount of consumption
actor is unable to choose 
the amount of consumption
recreation area, roads, fire departments, civil liber
ports, lighthouses, tie3, public order, national
socialized medicine, defence, pollution control,
knowledge, polluted corporate income tax,
beaches, scientific inflationary fiscal policies,
research and develop­ military deterrence, fisherie
ment, public education, conservation, enforcement of
etc* . . . laws, embargoes, clean air,
etc. ...
Apart from this difference between the availability of a good 
and the actual consumption of it, very feu examples seem to satisfy 
the equal consumption requirement and many goods seem to lie along 
the indivisibility spectrum instead of fitting the polar cases.
Public goods may be less than perfectly indivisible because of two 
influences, i.e., accessibility and/or crowding.
Partial indivisibility may result from limited accessibility, 
owing to the location of the public good with regard to the individuals. 
If accessibility is unequal between participants, then many indivi­
duals will consume less than the total public good supplied. Even 
the traditional example of defence is an approximation of a public 
good. Although U.S. defence policy seeks to protect every city in 
the U.S. equally from attack, there is a radar warning network 
across Canada but not across Mexico. Consequently, the southern 
half of the U.S. is probably less well protected from an air attack 
than the northern half. Other examples, such as public recreation 
areas or road facilities, are certainly not purely jointly supplied, 
because not everyone may be able to consume them freely once they are 
supplied to one person, i.e., not everyone has equal access to a re­
creation area or to a road. If a recreation park is situated in the 
countryside, those families who do not have a car, are not in the 
same consumption position as people having a car. If a factory 
dirties a nearby stream and pours smoke from its chimneys, those who 
live along the stream and near the factory, suffer more from the 
pollution than families who live farther away. Thus, the factory's 
externality has only a localized effect. The same can be said for 
aircraft noise. In all these cases, the amount of the good or bad 
consumed is a function of the geographical location of the production 
source. One may call it a local public good.
Even if the ability to consume were uniformly distributed, public 
goods are often subject to capacity constraints. Although true pu­
blic goods do not have capacity constraints, i.e., once produced, 
there are no costs in extending consumption to others •: even common 
examples of public goods only approximate this ideal condition (1).
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(1) Oakland, U . , Congestion, Public Goods, and Welfare, Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 1, November 1972, p. 446-450.
In the case of crowding, 'increased utilization of a public 
good creates congestion costs which detract from the satisfaction 
derived from the good. A public swimming pool and a public park are 
subject to a saturation of facilities so that, as additional people 
are admitted to the pool or the park, the enjoyment of those already 
admitted diminishes. Similarly,, the traffic jam minimizes the usefu. 
ness of a road. Thus, recreation areas and roads are examples of 
jointly supplied goods which nonetheless exhibit some of the proper­
ties of private goods. These instances of imperfect jointly suppliei 
goods suggest that the amount a person consumes, can be some functior 
of the number of people who also consume the good. Congestion costs 
have been dealt with extensively in what has come to be known as the 
'Theory of Clubs' (1). Clubs are said to be organized so that only
members enjoy public goods provided by the membership.
b.2. Non-exclusion
The second standard property of public goods is that of non­
exclusion : if the good is available to one person, then it is auto­
matically available to all others. This second dimension of the pub­
lic good allows to distinguish goods according to whether it is 
possible or not to exclude others from consuming the good. The 
use of schools or roads, for instance, is not always free. People 
can be excluded from consuming these goods by a price mechanism 
and by the legal system that legitimizes this price (e.g., tuition, 
tolls, etc. ...). It implies that for a certain category of goods
it is possible to exclude others from sharing the good or to charge
them the full costs of sharing the benefits of the goods. In other 
words, if the benefits of a good are appropriable, then the provider 
can fully control whoever receives the benefit associated with the 
good. In contrast, when a good is nonap p r o p r i a b l e , then the providei 
is unable to influence whoever receives the benefits. In the 
examples of national defence and lighthouses, for instance, no one
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(1) Buchanan, 3., An Economic Theory of Clubs, E c o n o m i c a « Vol. 32,
February 1965, p. 14 ; and Ng, Y., The Economic Theory of Clubs : 
Pareto Optimality Conditions, E c o n o m i c a . Vol. 40, August 1974, 
p. 308-321.
can be excluded from consuming these goods, although individual 
shares in financing and maintaining them, might differ.
Appropriability is one of the essential factors determining the 
feasibility of a market allocation (l). Gains from trade can be 
realized when appropriability is possible insofar a demander, whether 
an individual or a nation, reveals a preference in the form of a 
payment ; otherwise the good can be withheld by the supplier.
In contrast, non-appropriability renders an economic rationale 
on behalf of the demander to hide true preferences in order to pay 
a reduced price. At the limit, a demander may reveal no preference 
fora non-appropriable good in the hope of receiving a free ride once 
the good is produced. This problem is especially acute for pure pu­
blic goods, since the indivisible nature of the good can give rise 
to significant ranges of spillover. A differentiation among goods 
according to whether or not an actor can easily be excluded from 
consuming the good, is shown in Table IV—2.
Table IV-2 Typology of Public Goods (non-exclusion)
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an acter can easily be ex­
cluded from consumption
an actor cannot easily be ex­
cluded from consumption
recreation area, roads, 
bridges, joint production 
projects, cinema, game re­
serves, zoos, musea, etc. ...
lighthouses, socialized medi­
cine, knowledge, public order, 
national defence, exploitation 
of the seabed, problems of in­
ternational commons, global 
environmental protection, en­
forcement of laws, maintenance 
of a system, etc. ...
(1) The importance of appropriability is analyzed by Head, 3.,
Public Goods and Public Policy, Public F i n a n c e , Vol. 17, 1962, 
p. 197-219.
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If a good is appropriable at no costs, then the provision condi­
tions are unaffected. However, the expenditure of exclusion costs, 
which transforms a non-appropriable good into an appropriable oood, 
will affect provision requirements. The extent of exclusion costs 
can be related to the non-appropriability spectrum. The larger the 
degree of non-appropriability, then the greater will be the necessar 
exclusion costs. The relationship between non-appropriability and 
exclusion costs is crucial in resolving whether markets or nonmarket 
structures should provide the good (1).
The discussion of the characteristics of the public pood indi­
cated that after a point one person's consumption of such a good 
may decrease the amount available for other people (i.e., there will 
be congestion costs) and that people can be excluded from the bene­
fits of the good through some exclusion devices. Apart from these 
major conclusions, we also referred to a minor point, i.e., the 
localization of a public good and its effect on the consumption of 
it. Eventually, the concept of the pure public good has come under 
increasing scrutiny.
2. Impure Public Goods
The practicality of the theory of public goods seems severely 
reduced by the elusiveness of the public good. Examples of pure 
public goods are difficult to discover. Even many standard 
examples of public goods appear to have a mixture of public and 
private good characteristics. The awareness of local effects, 
special group effects, or clear possibilities of exclusion led to
(1) See, for instance, Arrow, K., The organization of economic acti­
vity : issues pertinent to the choice of market versus nonmarket 
allocations, in Haveman, R. and flargolis, 3. (eds.), Public Ex­
penditures and Policy Analysis. Chicago: Markham Publishing Com­
pany, 1970, p. 59-^3 ; Aust9r, R. and Silver, N., Collective De­
cision Mechanisms, Public C h o i c e , Vol. 14, Spring 1973, p. 1-17 ■ 
Ruggie, 3., Collective tioods and Future International Collabora­
tion, American Political Science Rev i e w , Vol. 66, September 1972. 
p. 874-893 ; ftussett, B. and Sullivan, S., Collective Goods and 
International Organization, International Organ i z a t i o n . Vol. 25, 
Autumn 1971, p. 845—865 ; Sandler, T. and Cauley, 3., The Design 
of Supranationsl Structures, International Studies Qu a r t e r l y ,
Vol. 21, 3une 1977, p. 251-76.
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the introduction of the concept of an impure public good (1).
Essentially, a good is impurely public whenever it is partially 
divisible and/or partially excludable. Earlier in this section we 
already referred to the tuo influences of partial divisibility, i.e., 
limited accessibility and crowding effects. Ue further mentioned 
the varying degree of exclusion possibility. Housing, for example, 
may fall into this category of mixed goods if consumers in general 
are morally or esthetically disturbed by the existence of substandard 
housing. Also education can be considered a mixed good by treating 
the existence of universal literacy as a public characteristic, while 
the education of a specific person has a high private content, so 
that the individual gains both from his own education and from the 
general education level. A similar kind of argument can be made 
with respect to public transport, communication or health services. 
Thus, the mixed good can be considered to cover a wide range of goods, 
from those generally considered to be public goods to others not 
generally included, and covering goods generally supplied through 
the market as well as goods generally supplied directly by the govern­
ment.
(1) The literature of impure public goods is quite extensive. Some 
representative pieces include Buchanan, 3., An Economic Theory 
of Clubs, Ec o n o m i c a , Vol. 32, February 1965, p. 1-14 ; Buchanan, 
3., The Demand a n d S u p p l y  of Public Goods, Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1968 ; DeSerpa, A., ^ultl-dimensional Public G o o d s , Working Pa­
per, Arizona: State University, 1976 ; E v a n s , A . , Private Good, 
Externality, Public Good, Scottish 3ournal of Political E c o n o m y , 
Vol. 13, February 1970, p. 79-89 j Lancaster, K., The Pure Theory 
of Impure Public Goods, in Grieson, R., Public and Urban Econo­
m i c s , Lexington: Lexington Books, Chapter 8 ; Litvack, TI and 
O a t e s , U . , Group Size and the Output of Public Goods, Public Fi­
n a n c e , Vol. 25, Nr. 1 , 1970, p. 42-58 ; McGuire^ 1*1., Private 
Good Clubs and Public Good Clubs : Economic Model of Group For­
mation, Swedish 3ournal of E c o n o m i c s . Vol. 72, February 1972, 
p. 84-99 ; Ng, Y., The Economic Theory of Clubs : Pareto Optima­
lity Conditions, E c o nomica, Vol. 40, August 1973, p. 291-298 ; 
Pauly, FI., Optimality Public Goods and Local Governments : A Ge­
neral Theoretical Analysis, 3ournal of Political E c o n o m y , Vol. 78, 
l»lay-3une, 1970, p. 572-585 ; Sandler, T., Pareto Optimality Pure 
Public Goods, Impure Public Goods, and Multiregional Spillovers, 
Scottish 3ournal of Political E c o n o m y , Vol. 22, February 1975, 
p. 25-38 j Winch, 0., The Pure Theory of Non-pure Goods, Canadian 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, May 1973, p. 149—163.
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The v/ariety of impure public goods suggests that a one dimension­
al impurity spectrum is a rough oversimplification. Buchanan intro­
duced the size of the interacting group as an important consideration 
for public good classification (1). Sandler and Cauley have expanded 
the Buchanan two-dimensional diagram to a three-dimensional box (2). 
Essentially, the public good character of goods is related to three 
spectrums, i.e., the degree of no n - r i v a l n e s s , the extent of non- 
exclusion of the goods's benefits, and the size of the interacting 
group that consumes the benefits of the good.
In Figure IV-1 we have drawn a boxdiagram which is much inspired 
by Sandler and Cauley. The degree of non-rivalness of consumption 
is measured along the x-axis. At point 0, there is complete rival- 
ness of consumption (e.g., goods such as bread, shoes, ...). A good 
located at point A, however, is perfectly non-rival (e.g., goods 
such as clean air, the sun, ...). The degree of non-exclusion is 
measured along the z-axis. At point 0 the good is completely appro­
priable so that the provider (or owner) can fully control who receive
Fiaure IV — 1 Box-diagram of Public Goods
G
(1) Buchanan, 0., o p . c i t . , 1968, p. 171-177.
(2) Sandler, T. and Cauley, 3., the Design of Supranational Structure 
International Studies Qu a r t e r l y , Vol. 21, Nr. 2, 3une 1977,
p. 2Sl?-i^8.
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the benefits associated with the good, i.e., exclusion is possible.
A good located at point 8, however, is perfectly nonappropriable 
so that the provider is unable to influence whoever receives the bene­
fits, i.e., exclusion is not possible. The degree of nonappropria- 
bility is determined by the level of the costs of the exclusion.
Finally, the size of the group that is influenced by the good 
is deputed on the y-axis. The size of the interacting group can 
vary between 0 and C, where 0 designates an individual and C the 
entire world community. In the polar case, where the size of the 
interacting group is one individual, no interdependencies are 
created. As soon as more than one community member is affected, 
a potential public good problem arises. Most public goods affect 
more than two individuals and differ with respect to the size of 
the interacting group they affect. The size of the interacting 
group is measured along the spectrum 0C.
Any good can now be located somewhere within the box. In the 
box full exclusion exists anywhere on the OCEA plane and non—exclu­
sion is shown anywhere on the BFGD plane. Ue can reason in a simi­
lar fashion for the two other dimensions of the goods. Private 
goods are located along the 0C l i n e ,depending upon the size of the 
interacting group,because these goods are completely divisible and 
fully appropriable. On the contrary, world pure public goods such 
as the sun, the monitoring of the ozone layer, the removal of plu­
tonium waste etc. ... are located at point G.
One may now envisage the partition of the box into areas corres­
ponding to goods depending upon the size of the interacting group 
(e.g., neighbourhoods, local, regional, state, national, internatio­
nal, worldwide, etc. ...). For instance, private, public, and impure 
public goods of local nature may be located between and on plane 
OBDA and plane (0BDA)L . The area between (0BDA)N and plane CFGE re­
presents the area of international political concern. Here, the|\l N
size of the interacting group can vary between 0 and C, where 0
designates a national state and C the whole international community. 
This is the area which is the focus of our own research.
3. The Relationship uith Other Concepts
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Ue end this discussion on the concept of public good uith some 
remarks on the relation uith similar concepts. The apparent simi­
larities betueen the concepts of joint production, externality and 
public goods have long been alluded to by many economists. But a 
systemic analysis of their interrelations uas only started uith 
professor Head's article in 1962 and professor Shoup's contribution 
in 1965 (1). These contributions uere then quickly folloued by the 
succession of papers contributed by other leading figures in the 
field. The discussion generally rev/olv/ed around the similarities 
and differences betueen joint production, externality and public 
goods (2).
Most of the orthodox micro-economic theory has been developed in 
application to exchanges of goods and services that uere purely pri­
vate in consumption and that uere produced seperately, not jointly. 
Therefore, it uas not necessary to distinguish betueen a unit of 
good in production and a unit of good in .consumption. Houever, if
(1) Head, J.G., Public Goods and Public Policy, Public F i n a n c e , Vol. 
17-3, 1962, p. 197-221 ; and Shoup, C.S., Public Coods and Joint 
Production, Rivista internazionale di scienze economiche e 
c o m merciali, Vol. 7, 1965, p. 254-264.
See also Head, J.G. and Shoup, C.S., Public Goods, Private Goods 
and Ambiguous Goods, Economic J o u r n a l . Vol. 79, September 1969 , 
p. 567-572.
(2) In this context ue only refer to some interesting uorks uithin 
this grouing literature : Buchanan, J., Joint Supply, Externali­
ty and Optimality, Ec o n o m i c a . Vol. 33, 1966, p. 404-415 ; 
Buchanan, J. and Stubblebine, U., Externality, E c o n o m i c a , Vol. 2 
p. 371-384 ; Evans, A., Private Good, Externality, Public Goods, 
Scottish Journal of Political E c o n o m y , Vol. 17, February 1970, 
p. 79-89 ; H o l t e r m a n n , S.£., Externalities and Public Goods, 
E c n o m i c a , Vol. 39, February 1972, p. 78-87 ; Kamien, M., Schuart 
ATT and Roberts, D., Exclusion, Externalities and Public Goods, 
Journal of Public Ec o n o m i c s , July 1973, p. 217-230 ; Meade, J.E. 
The Theory of Economic Externa l i t i e s . Leiden : Sijthoff, 1973 ; 
Mishan, E.J., The Relationship betueen Joint Products, Collectiv 
Goods and External Effects, Journal of Political E c o n o m y .
Vol. 77-1, 1969, p. 329-348 ; Mishan, E.J., The Postuar Literatu 
on Externalities : An Interpretative Essay, Journal of Economic 
Li t e r a t u r e , Vol. 9, March 1971, p. 1-28 ; Shibata, H., Joint Pro- 
duction, Externality and Public Goods, in Bird, R.M. and Head, 
J.G. (eds.), Modern Fiscal Iss u e s , Toronto: University Press, 
1972, Chapter 2.
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the relations between joint production, externalities and 
goods are to be dealt with, discussion can be clarified i 
tinction between production units and consumption units i 
plicit. Henceforth, we frame our discussion of these con 
in the analysis of the phenomena of interdependence in pr 
and consumption : joint production being treated as a spe 
of production externality, and a public good as a special 
consumption externality.
a. Public Goods and Externalities
Ue first focus our attention on the relationship between exter­
nalities and public goods. The difficulties of making a clear dis­
tinction between public goods and private goods, and of linking the 
former to external effects appear to be attributable to a number 
of factors : 1) The use of such term as public goods on the one 
hand, and private goods on the other, terms which have conventional 
associations, as a means of making a conceptual and functional dis­
tinction, has led to some confusion ; 2) because of the conventional 
association of such terms, the definition led to some rigidity and 
consequently, decreased the usefulness of these concepts ; 3) there 
was a failure to abstract initially from congestion costs or, more 
generally, from external effects in determing which category a spe­
cific good falls into ; and 4) there was also a failure to make a 
distinction between - which we have already mentioned - two types of 
collective goods, optional and nonoptional.
There has even been a tendency in the literature on external 
economies to ignore the public good aspect of externalities and a 
tendency in the literature on public goods to identify the two con­
cepts with each other. However, many externally produced commodi­
ties do have the character of public goods. In s h o r t ,despite some 
elaborations and notational distinctions, the nature of the relation­
ship between public goods and external effects has remained elusive.
public 
f a dis- 
s made ex­
cepts with- 
oduction 
cial case 
case of
An externality exists whenever the consumption or production 
activities of one individual affects, either positively or nega­
tively, the activities of several other individuals, and where no 
mechanism exists to compensate those bearing external costs. Ex­
ternalities may exist between two or more producers ; between two 
or more consumers ; or between producers and consumers. Moreover, 
producers may correspond to individuals, firms or nations.
For instance, a firm may produce smoke from its chimney and 
noise from its machinery. The smoke and the noise are imputs in 
the production and consumption activities of other economic agents, 
but the firm does not pay anyone any compensation for consuming its 
byproduct. The commodities which exert external effects on other 
economic agents can be called external outputs. They are produced 
jointly, in fixed or variable proportions, with the commercial out­
put of the firm.
If costs and benefits of externalities are unrecognized when 
allocative decisions are reached, inefficiency results in the form 
of suboptimal provision of some desirable activities and superopti­
mal provision of some undesirable activities. Pareto optimality 
will not result from a voluntary exchange in the market. However, 
not all interdependencies are matters of concern, only those which 
prevent optimum-solutions.
Uhen costs are recomputed to include all relevant social costs, 
the externality is said to be internalized in efficient allocations. 
Four fundamental methods permit internalization : 1) A tax subsidy 
scheme can be implemented in order to equate social and private 
costs or benefits ; 2) The parties can bargain ; 3) A court can im­
pose a liability assignment that internalizes the externality, or 
A) A nonmarket structure can regulate the level of externality. The 
second solution is most relevant to situations involving only a 
small number of participants so that benefits from cooperation are 
easy to recognize and inexpensive to achieve. The other three solu­
tions necessitate the existance of a specialized institution, i.e., 
a fiscal mechanism, a court or a nonmarket structure. In the last 
section of this chapter, we return to this discussion of internali­
zation of an externality, particularly in the field of international 
relations.
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Uhat nou about the exact relationship betueen externalities 
and public goods? Whether or not a good is a public good, depends 
on the characteristics of the good. And because of the nature of 
a pure public good, it is its total supply which enters the con­
sumption or production vector of each economic agent affected by it. 
Public goods are then closely related to externalities since a 
special class of consumption externalities can be analyzed as public
goods. If x1 *^ represents the i th individual's consumption of the 
t h * *
j good and x1  ^ is a public good to the interacting group, then 
the welfare conditions for this consumption externality are equiva­
lent to that of a public good, i.e., ^  M R S 1 * MRT, where PIRS^ 
refers to the marginal benefits deriiecl from x1 ^ by each indivi­
dual. Thus, a consumption externality that all individuals expe-. 
rience is equivalent to a public good.
For instance, it is the total quantity of flowers in A's garden 
visible to passers-by that B and C enjoy, and B's enjoyment of the 
view of A's flowers does not diminish the quantity of A's flowers 
available for C to enjoy. The external output, flowers visible to 
passers-by, is a public good. Pollination services of bees, nectar 
from apples, exhaust fumes from cars, smoke from factory chimneys, 
noise from aircrafts, waterpollution from chemicals - all these 
standard examples of external outputs may be treated appropriately 
as public goods. An example of a negative consumption externality 
in the international sphere concerns the explosion of a nuclear 
device. As the cloud of nuclear fallout moves, other nations re­
ceive harmful fallout from a consumption activity that they had no 
part in.
Ue have already said that, when production or consumption exter­
nalities are unresolved, Pareto optimality will not result from a 
free operation of the market mechanism. In the case where market 
failure is created by the presence of a public good, the externality 
is noncompensated for,due to one of the following reasons. First, 
given existing technology, exclusion may be impossible as in the 
case of nuclear waste. If exclusion is impossible, then full pre­
ference revelation is problematic, and the set of Pareto efficient 
prices cannot be ascertained. Second, it may be possible to ascer­
tain the set of Pareto efficient prices by forcing preference re­
velation but prohibitively costly to do so.
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However, in some instances, this type of externality can be 
compensated for or internalized through the market system. Thus, 
within the framework of decentralized markets, if procedures exist 
that provide for internalization where all costs and benefits are 
included, interdependencies do not inhibit the attainment of the 
Pareto efficient conditions (i.e., a public good does not always 
create a market failure). The problem, of course, is that in many 
instances institutionalized procedures do not exist to internalize 
interdependencies.
b. Public Goods and Joint Products
Let us now say a few words about the relationship between joint 
production and public goods (1). Joint production requires that 
the same intermediate imputs produce two or more outputs, i.e., the 
unit of production embodies two or more final product components.
In the classic Marshallian example,.the cattle breeder produces 
steers, each unit of which embodies both meat and hide ; or oil pro 
duces gasoline, kerosine and synthetic fibre.
For public goods, an intermediate imput may produce one or more 
pure public goods as well as private or impure public goods. For 
example, defence expenditures by an alliance produces deterrence 
(pure public good), earned foreign exchange for nations that host 
military bases (private good) and protection against attack (impure 
public good) (2).
(1) On public goods and joint products, see especially : Mishan, 
J.E., The Relationship between Joint Products, Collective Goods 
and External Effects, Journal of Political E c o n o m y , Vol. 77-1, 
1969, p. 3 2 9 - 3 4 8  ; Oakland, Ü . . Joint üoods, E c o n o m i c a . Vol. 36 
1969, p. 2 5 3 - 2 6 8  ; Samuelson, P., Contrast between Welfare Con­
ditions for Joint Supply and for Public Goods, Review of Econo­
mics and Sta t i s t i c s , Vol. 51, February 1 9 6 9 , 'p. 2 6 - i d  ;*Shibata
H., Joint Production, Externality and Public Goods, in Bird, 
R.M. and Head, J.G. (eds.), Modern Fiscal I s s u e s « Toronto: U n i ­
versity Press, 1972, Chapter”  j Shoup, £.5., Public Goods and 
Joint Production, Rivista internationale di scienze economiche 
e comm e r c i a l e . Vol. 7, 1965, p. 2îi4-èë4.
(2) See, for instance, Shaffer, S., Alliance Politics : A Model on 
Divisibility of Pay-offs, in Loehr, U. and Sandler, T., Public 
Goods and Public P o l i c y , Beverly Hiils, Ca.: Sage Publications, 
1978, Chapter 8.
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Joint products complicate the form of provision conditions in 
the sense that these conditions uill be essentially a conglomerate 
of the provision conditions of the various goods produced. In short, 
joint products tell us something about the uay the goods are produced, 
uhereas public goods tell us something about the uay the goods are 
consumed.
Olson's by-product theory may best be understood from this per­
spective (1). Many types of organizations obtain their support 
mainly because they provide some private goods besides their main 
performance (e.g., labour unions, family organizations, professional 
organizations, cultural associations, etc. ...). In other uords, 
they provide selective incentives to induce people to join and to 
bear their share of the burdens in achieving public goods. Those 
incentives may be considered joint products.
c. Public Goods and Economics of Scale
A final uord is said about the relationship betueen public goods 
and economics of scale. While the concept of public good refers to 
the characteristics of the good (i.e., non-rivalness in consumption 
and non-exclusion), economics of scale refer to the production func­
tion of a good and consequently, determines the contour of the pro­
duction possibility curve. In other uords, any good, be it public 
or private, can be produced jointly to take benefit of the economics 
of scale in production. Ue uill return to this idea of economics 
of scale in the production of goods in Chapter I/.
(1) Olson, M., The Logic of Collective Action ; Public Goods and the 
Theory of G r o u p s , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 
Chapter 6.
-114-
B. An Assessment of the Cournot Model of Group Behaviour for 
Public Good Allocation
1. Introduction
In a second section ue try to analyze the model of group beha­
viour on uhich most of our theoretical thinking for this research 
has been based. In 'The Logic of Collective Action', Olson strongl 
criticized the work of the analytical pluralists, particularly with 
regard to the fairness of the outcomes in a pluralist system (1). 
The foundation of his criticism and consequently, the elaboration 
of his theory of collective action in international relations, is 
based on the Cournot model of group behaviour in the presence of a 
public good.
As ue described in Chapter III, Olson concluded that larger 
groups are less able to provide collective goods through Cournot 
behaviour than small groups. Our oun analysis remains chiefly in 
the Cournot determined group behaviour (2). In the following 
theoretical exposition of group behaviour ue uill analyze the non- 
cooperative Cournot equilibrium and uill compare it uith the 
cooperative Pareto equilibrium.
If countries choose to take into account the positive externa­
lities conferred upon each other, optimal cooperation entails that 
the countries reach a bargain which satisfies the Pareto optimality 
conditions, so that the externality uill be internalized. Should
(1) Olson, M., o p . c i t .. Chapter 5.
(2) Other analyses uhich have used the same framework are : Salisbur
R., An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, Midwest Journal of 
Political S c i e n c e . Vol. 13, February 1969 ; Stigler, G., Free 
Riders and Collective Action : An Appendix to Theories of Econo­
mic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Political S c i e n c e . 
Vol. 5, Autumn 1974 . p. ; Uaqner. R.. Pressure ¿roups
and Political Entrepreneurs : A Review Article« Papers on Non- 
Market Decision-Making, Charlottesville, Virginia: University of 
Virginia, 1966, p. 161-170.
Another type of model (i.e., game theoretical framework) is 
given by Guttman, 3., Understanding Collective Action : Matching 
Behaviour, American Economic Review, Vol. 68-1, 1978, p. 251-255
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they decide not to cooperate, but rather seek to maximize their 
welfare independently of one another, the resulting equilibrium 
will be suboptimal under fairly broad assumptions. One important 
scheme of non-cooperation is the Cournot behavioural assumption (1).
In the Cournot model of independent maximization behaviour each 
consumer acts independently in deciding how much public good he wants 
to purchase. He takes the purchases of the other consumers as given 
and adjusts his own purchase so as to obtain his highest possible 
indifference level. Uhen each consumer is in a position where he 
has no incentive to change his purchase, the economy is in equili­
brium.
The Cournot equilibrium is characterized by a set of actions, 
based on a number of expectations, determining o t h e r s’ actions that 
result in everyone's expectations being met. It supposes that no 
payments are made for spillovers and that each person attempts to 
maximize his welfare under the assumptions that the production of 
the good by the others remains constant. The Cournot independent 
welfare maximization results in underproduction of the good.
It should be noted that this conclusion does not hinge upon the 
assumption that spillovers imply no repercussions on domestic pro­
duction and consumption patterns. On the contrary, changes in the 
production of the good by individual B induce changes in the equili­
brium production and consumption patterns of individual A. This 
reasoning implies a reaction curve process similar to the uell- 
known one first derived by Cournot. An equilibrium position, which 
takes into account changes in behaviour caused by externalities and 
also satisfies the independent welfare maximization conditions, will 
be reached. Once again, the resulting equilibrium is suboptimal.
Of course, the analysis assumes that the parties fail to take
(l) The independent adjustment equilibrium has been discussed by 
many authors including Buchanan, J., Cooperation and Conflict 
in Public Goods Interaction, Western Economic J o u r n a l , Vol. 5, 
March 1966, p. 109-121 ; Chamberlin, 3., A Diagrammatic Exposi­
tion of the Logic of Collective Action, Public C h o i c e , Vol. 36, 
Summer 1976, p. 59-74 ; Chamberlin, 3., A Collective Goods Model 
of Pluralist Political Systems, Public C h o i c e , Vol. 33, 1978-1, 
p. 97-113 ; 3 e r imias, R. and Zardkoohi, A., Distributional Impli­
cations of Independent Adjustments in an Economy with Public 
Goods, Economic I n q uiry, 3une 1976, p. 305-308.
advantage of the opportunity to gain through efficient cooperation.
If the problem is viewed as a non-cooperative game, we define 
the equilibrium position as a Cournot equilibrium. And, as we 
said, the connection between equilibria and optimality is broken. 
Therefore, two properties of Cournot behaviour are of particular 
interest, i.e., the amount of the public good provided through 
Cournot behaviour and the amount which would be provided if the op­
timality conditions of the economy theory were to be met.
The optimality conditions require that the marginal costs of 
producing the public good should be shared among its consumers in 
proportion to the marginal benefits received. From the infinite set 
of cost-sharing plans which result in a Pareto optimal allocation a 
particular one will be used in the analysis below, i.e., the one 
suggested by Lindahl.
In the Lindahl model (1), a kind of cooperation is evoked : 
each consumer contributes the value that the public good has for 
him. This is done by assigning to each consumer a personalized 
price for the public good. The price for the private good remains 
the same for everyone* When the system of personalized prices is 
such that everyone prefers the same quantity of the public good, 
then the economy is in a Lindahl equilibrium. In the Lindahl equi­
librium the close connection between equilibria and optimality of 
the competitive model is preserved. At the same time, however, 
these personalized prices prevent the Lindahl model from serving 
real world allocation purposes.
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(l) For a discussion of the properties of the Lindahl equilibrium 
see Musgrave, R., The Theory of Public F i n a n c e , New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1959 "j and Heao, 3., Public Goods and Public Wei 
fare, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 19^4.
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2. Graphic Representation of a Non-Cooperative Cournot Equilibrium 
and a Cooperative Pareto Equilibrium
a. The Cournot Equilibrium
Ue can construct the follouing graphic representation of the 
Cournot equilibrium (Figure IV-2) (1). Consider an individual A 
faced uith a choice allocating his income to purchases of tuo goods, 
a private good (Y) and a public good (X). The preferences of the 
consumer are represented by a set of indifference curves 
(1-j* ^2» •••)• H^ s production possibility curve is given by the 
line PP'. He uill maximize his satisfaction by purchasing a commo­
dity bundle on the highest indifference curve consistent uith the 
production possibility constraint. In Figure IV/—2 the individual's 
optimal consumption is located at point E q . At EQ he uill buy 0XQ
of X and OY of Y. 
o
Figure IV-2 The Cournot Equilibrium
Y
(1) For other graphic representations, see Chamberlin, 3., A Dia­
grammatic Exposition of the Collective Action, Public C h o i c e , 
Vol. 36, Summer 1976, p. 59-74 ; and Danziger, t., A Graphic 
Representation of the Nash and Lindahl Equilibria in a Economy 
uith a Public Good, 3ournal of Public Economics, Vol. 6, 1976, 
p. 295-307.
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In the Cournot model each consumer acts independently. He 
considers the purchase of the others as given uhen he decides 
hou much he himself wants to purchase. Now suppose others purchase
g
an amount OX of the public good. Because of the non—exclusion
g
property of public goods, this amount OX is automatically availabl
to the first individual. This has the effect of shifting the ver-
B
tical axis to the right by the amount OX . Also the production
B
possibility curve PP* is shifted to the right by the amount of OX 
since the individual now consumes this amount of the public good 
without having to pay for it. This public good spillover effect 
increases the first individual's income and he is free to allocate 
his income as he chaoses so long as he consumes at least an amount
g
OX of the public good. He cannot, however, spend more than the 
amount OP on the consumption of the private good (Y). The indivi­
dual's optimal consumption is now located at point E^, point of 
tangency between the highest indifference curve and the shifted pro 
duction possibility curve. This induced income increase at E^ re­
sults in a higher consumption of both private and public good. At 
the same time we see that individual A will drop his own public
good production from OX to OX,.
0 1
For alternative quantities bought by others, a consumer's 
choices of X and Y will lie on a line beginning in E q and passing 
through the points where the different production possibilities 
curves are tangent to the indifferent curve. In the Cournot equi­
librium the individual responds to increases in his income brought 
about by the provision of the public good by others. The locus 
of the individual's optimal consumption equilibria (Eq , E ^ , ...
E , E') is designated as the Cournot line and resembles an income- 
s s
consumption curve. They are not totally identical for two reasons 
first the Cournot line originates in E q , while the income-consumpti 
line originates in 0 and second, due to the nonnegativity require­
ment of (Y), the Cournot line cannot intersect the line parallel 
to the abscissa. If others were to provide an amount of the public 
good greater than or equal to OX^, the individual will devote his 
entire budget to the purchase of the private good as indicated by 
the horizontal line E^E^.
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The slope of the Cournot line depends on the income elasticity 
of the demand for goods X and Y. In the literature ue usually 
deal with 'normal goods', i.e., goods with a positive upward 
slope of the Cournot line. On the basis of their income elastici­
ties, goods are distinguished in three broad classes, i.e., nor­
mal goods, inferior goods and superior goods. In the case of a 
normal good, an extra unit of the collective good provided by others 
induces a reduction in the provision by the individual of less than 
one unit. For an inferior good, an extra unit provided by others 
induces the individual to reduce his own provision of the good by 
at least one unit, and for a superior good, an extra unit provided 
by others induces an increase in the amount provided by the indivi­
dual of at least one unit (1). Three representative Cournot lines 
are shown in Figure IV-3.
Figure IV-3 Possible Cournot Lines
Y
(1) These categories of goods have corresponding Cournot lines with 
the following slopes : cQ
- normal good : o ^ e ^ -s— So is Consumption
0 of the good
Io is Income
- inelastic good : o < e < 1
- elastic good : 1 ^ e ^
- inferior good : e o
- superior good : e ^
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b. The Lindahl Equilibrium
The other model of allocation of a public good is developed 
by Lindahl. He examines a competitive allocation process similar 
to that uhich prevails in the private market, but where a revenue- 
expenditure process operates to satisfy public goods demands. This 
is done by introducing a system of personalized prices for the pub­
lic good. For each consumer the personalized price is equal to his 
marginal benefit from X ; so a consumer gives a contribution uhich 
captures the value X has for him. The resulting allocation corres­
ponds to a pseudo-competitive equilibrium in the public sector.
The Lindahl equilibrium is characterized by each consumer acting 
according to a personalized price p^ when he decides hou much X he 
wants to be allocated. ^ i p i  Production price of the public
good, and every individual prefers the same quantity of X.
This Lindahl equilibrium can be found in a way analogous to 
the Cournot equilibrium. By varying the personalized price p^, the 
consumer's choices of X and Y appear in Figure IV-4 as a line begin- 
ing in E q and passing through the points where the different budget 
lines are tangent to the indifference curves. This line is designate 
the Lindahl line. The Lindahl line corresponds to a price-consumptic
Figure IV-4 The Lindahl Equilibrium
Y
curve except that it originates in E , where the consumer pays all
the costs of the public good.
As compared to the Cournot model, the Lindahl model uses the
individual's responses to variations in the price of the public good
(brought about by an agreement among the individuals involved to
share the costs of providing the public good). The E E shows a
o s
portion of the price-consumption curve for the individual, which is 
the locus of the indi v i d u a l’s optimal consumption as the price he 
is charged for the public good declines. The slope of the Lindahl 
line depends on the price elasticity of the demand for X respective­
ly Y. The same reasoning can be repeated as we already did for the 
income elasticity in the Cournot model.
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3. A Comparison of the Cournot Equilibrium and the Lindahl Equilibriun
Figure IV-5 shows the relevant positions of the income and price 
consumption curves and the original budget line. The Cournot and 
Lindahl lines both originate from the same point, namely point E Q . 
Here, the consumer alone pays for the public good. In addition, a 
new budget line is shown, corresponding to a price of p/n for the
Figure IV-5 A Comparison of the Cournot Equilibrium 
and the Lindahl Equilibrium
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public good. This budget line would result if the individuals 
were to share the costs of providing the public good. The Cournot 
equilibrium occurs where the income-consumption curve intersects 
the budget line (with price p/n for the public good), and the 
Lindahl equilibrium occurs where the price-consumption curve inter­
sects this same budget line. After point E q , it appears that the 
Cournot line will always lie above the Lindahl line. This follows 
from the fact that the slope of each indifference curve is decreasir= 
so that a Cournot budget line is tangent to an indifference curve 
for a smaller amount of X than a Lindahl budget line is tangent to
the same indifference curve. Accordingly, X ^  will lie below *££•
The well-known proposition follows that more X will be allocated in 
the Lindahl equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. Because 
the Lindahl equilibrium is Pareto optimal, the degree of suboptimali 
ty associated with Cournot behaviour is measured by (*£|_ ~ *EC^'
As to the Cournot equilibrium, the following conclusions can be 
derived :
1 . Xg-£ increases as group size (n) increases.
2. X^£ decreases as the price of the public good (P)
i n c r e a s e s .
As Olson argued, Cournot behaviour results in a suboptimal pro­
v i s i o n - of the public good. The following conclusions concerning 
the degree of suboptimality can be drawn :
1 . The more price-elastic the demand for the public 
good, the greater the degree of suboptimality.
2. The more income elastic the demand for the public 
good, the less the degree of suboptimality.
The argument for collective provision of pure public goods rests 
on the inability of independent maximization behaviour to guarantee 
a more efficient allocation of resources to public wants. Ue showed 
that the Cournot independent adjustment equilibrium is not Pareto 
optimal. However, in many instances the inefficiency of independent 
adjustment may not be a sufficient cause for collective action, so 
that a rationale of collective action advanced in favour of a Lindahl 
point is less compelling than usually portrayed. This is certainly
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the case when welfare, distributional implications are taken into 
account (1). In other words, the expanded opportunities for con­
suming public goods in the Lindahl solution, are not always sufficient 
to compensate a person for giving up the effective income expansions 
obtained through independent adjustment. Some scholars have even ar­
gued that greater cooperation within groups may result in less effi­
cient political processes, so that it would be difficult to argue 
that all processes involving increased cooperation would be an im­
provement over the unorganized processes.
To sum up, in this section we have analyzed the behaviour of two 
types of groups, i.e., unorganized and organized groups. Although 
the great majority of public goods in the real world are not allo­
cated according to the conditions of one of the models of group beha­
viour, there is still reason to believe that the unorganized, non- 
cooperative model of Cournot group behaviour is a useful tool for 
analysis. It is this theoretical model of voluntary collective action 
which is assumed in the present analysis.
(1) See, for instance, Dersmias, R. and Zardkoohi, A., Distributional 
Implications of Independent Adjustments in an Economy with Public 
Goods, Economic Inquiry, June 1976, p. 305-308 ; and !*lo-Yin, T. 
and P e r s k y , On the Distributional Implications of Collective
Provision of Public Goods, Public C h o i c e , Vol. 33, 1970-4, 
p. 61-69.
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C. An Assessment of the Public Good Concept in International 
Cooperation
The major objective of this section is to illustra 
mics and, in particular, the theory of public goods, c 
in the study of international cooperation. Our purpos 
much to talk about specific devices of international c 
it is to illustrate hou concepts from economics can be 
analyzing the types of problems that emerge in interna 
ration. Ue address ourselves to some broad questions 
cept of public good in international relations and the 
between an international cooperation structure and the 
a public good.
Introduction
First, an application of public good elements to international 
relations implies a good command of the concept of public good.
And from our discussion in the first section of this chapter, ue 
may recall that the public good concept is more complicated and in­
tricate than most analyses make us believe. The application of the 
collective goods theory to international relations has been strongly 
stimulated and influenced by O l s o n’s 'Economic Theory of A l l iances’ 
and its elaborations by other scholars. As ue have indicated in 
Chapter III, economists and political scientists have spent consider­
able theoretical and empirical effort in studying military alliances 
from a public goods perspective (1).
Olson analyzed defence as a pure public good. Uithin an alliance 
a unit of defence production uas assumed to render a full unit of 
defence service to all alliance residents regardless of the location i
(1) Economic issues of defence alliances that directly relate to the 
public goods theory are very well examined in Sandler, T.,
Loehr, U. and Cauley, 3., The Political Economy of Public Goods 
and International C o o p e r a t i o n , Colorado: University of Denver, 
M o n o g r a p h  S e r i e s  in U o r l d  A f f a i r s ,  1978, p. 6 8 - 8 0 .
te hou econo- 
an be useful 
e is not so 
ooperation as 
useful in 
tional coope- 
as to the con- 
relationship 
provision of
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the defence. In chapter III, it was mentioned that Sandler (1) exa­
mined the publicness of defence by seperating the defence good into 
its basic service of protection and deterrence. Defence is then 
considered as an intermediate input providing a number of joint pro­
duct outputs that are private, pure public, and impure public in 
nature.
A classification continuum for defence goods was set up from a 
purely deterrent weapon (i.e., whenever the weapon's sole purpose is 
to convey a credible treat of retaliation on behalf of an alliance) 
to a purely protective weapon which can be used exclusively to shelter 
or forewarn against an attack. Olson and Zeckhauser, Russett and 
others have focussed on the purely deterrent weapons and have, conse­
quently, treated defence as a pure public good. However, the possi­
bility of exclusion that both private defence benefits and protective 
defence goods provide gives the alliance members a leverage on free 
riders who refuse to reveal their preferences.
By not separating defence into its pure and impure public compo­
nents, previous investigators paid little attention to the effects 
of differences in the divisibility of payoff on members* actions 
and, consequently, overstated the relationship between collective 
goods and the theory of alliances (2). In effect, a more subtle use of 
the concept of public good has led to a less rigid application of 
the public goods' theory to alliance politics. This discussion 
should make us aware of the difficulties one encounters in applying 
a public g o o d s’ approach to international relations.
A second point of discussion refers to the relationship between 
international organization and public goods provision. Alliances 
are viewed as almost exclusively cooperative ventures whose purpose 
is the achievement of some commonly shared objective. Nations enter 
into alliance to pursue a goal which they cannot achieve in the
(1) Sandler, T . , Impurity of Defense : An Application to the Economics
of Alliances, K y k l o s , Vol. 30, 1977, p. 443-460.
(2) Shaffer, S., Alliance Politics : A Model on Divisibility of Pay­
offs, in Loehr, U. and Sandler, T., Public Goods and Public Pol i c y .
Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1978, Chapter 8.
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absence of cooperative effort to other nations. Olson proposes 
a straiqhtforuard relation between an international organization 
and its function of a public good's provider : "The achievement of 
any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means 
that a public or collective good has been provided for that group. 
The very fact that a goal or purpose is common to a group means that 
no one in the group is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction 
brought about by its achievement ... It is of the essence of an or­
ganization that it provides an inseparable, generalized benefit. It 
follows that the provision of public or collective goods is the fun­
damental function of organizations generally" (1).
The fact that collective goods are inherrent in organizational 
or group efforts to attain a common objective, has a special impor­
tance in the international context. Olson concludes that interna­
tional organizations, international cooperation, and military allian 
ces (i.e., various forms of international collaboration), whether 
tacit or formal, produce collective goods and that these goods are 
provided in suboptimal amounts.
However, it i3 a somewhat misleading and unshaded reasoning to 
jump from the assertion that international organizations serve the 
common interest of member states to the claim that these organizatio 
provide public goods. Gains from a cooperative arrangement do not 
imply that the goods covered by the arrangement are public. I think 
it is incorrect to assert that all outputs of governments and orga­
nizations are public goods. Therefore, in this section we try to 
widen the discussion by looking at the international dimension of 
goods which are provided through international cooperation. Ue pro­
pose a taxonomy of international goods using the properties of the 
public good in order to assess the various modes of international 
cooperation.
(1) Olson, M., The Logic of Collective Action : Public Goods and the 
Theory of G r o u p s , Cambridge, Ma«: Harvard University Press, 196^ 
p . 15.
1. A Classification of International Goods and the Relationship 
with International Arrangements
Control of plutonium waste, monitoring of the ozone layer, 
assignment of space orbits for satellites, regulation of ocean 
resource exploitation, scientific investigation, environmental 
conservation, problems of arms control, economic development, etc. 
are but a feu examples of allocative problems that the internatio­
nal community is faced with. Responses to meet these challenges 
range from national action to international action. Should a par­
ticular international structure reguire exhaustive political and 
economic integration, or should it merely provide a means for colla­
boration or coordination ? Uhat are the relevant benefits and 
costs associated with an international structure? More generally, 
what criteria should be employed in assessing tne different modes 
of allocation of international goods? Here, we limit ourselves to 
the analysis of various responses of international cooperation . * 
structures among nation states. Focus is, as we have said, on the 
use of economic theory and, particularly the theory of public goods, 
to furnish an assessment of the architecture of international struc­
tures providing international goods.
Earlier we presented a three-dimensional scheme that accounted 
for the characteristics of a public good, i.e., non-rivalness, non­
exclusion and the size of the group that is influenced by the good. 
Here, we are only dealing with goods exhibiting an international 
dimension in their production or consumption activities. Henceforth, 
in Figure IV-6, the size of the interacting group varies from one 
nation to the whole international system.
By classifying the international goods according to the approxi­
mation to the basic properties of public goods, ue arrive at a very 
simplified but useful four-fold division of international goods (1). 
The nature of the good will determine the size affected by it. That 
is, some goods may influence a small community (e.g., a drainage 
system, removal of pollution from a lake shared by two nations,
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(1) The classification is based on Ruggie, J.G., Collective Goods 
and Future International Collaboration, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 66, 1977-2, p. 874-886.
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etc.), whereas other goods may affect the entire world (e.g. 
INTELSAT). Roughly we find four boxes representing four catego­
ries of international goods.
This four-fold classification of goods and services in inter­
national relations is only meant to be suggestive. Although much 
more nuance and accuracy should be brought in this discussion, it 
still may provide us with a helpful tool for answering specific 
questions as to the level of cooperation, production, resource 
allocation, cost bearing and forms of concerted collective action 
in international relations. In other words, this division may she 
some light on the purposeful behaviour of a state to international 
cooperation, i.e., each of the four sets of characteristics i«plie 
a different form of internationally collaborative arrangement wit 
differing attitudes of the nations involved.
Figure IV-6 Box-diagram of International Goods
G
The first set of characteristics approximates a pure collec­
tive good (Box I) : equal potential availability to all exists once 
the good or service is provided for one state, and it is very 
costly or nearly impossible to exclude others from sharing in the 
benefits or for other states to protect themselves from the suffer­
ing provided by the good or service. In other words, a state may 
provide a good or service which is extended to all, or it may find 
that it suffers from another state's good or service in the sense 
that it cannot protect itself against the bad. In circumstances 
when such situations become mutual and costly, the international 
production and/or regulation of the goods become likely. Thus, in 
order to achieve a better allocation of this category of goods, some 
nonmarket mode of internalization of externalities is needed.
If such international organizational arrangements should be or­
ganized, they would perform a specific task of production or regu­
lation. In so doing, their purpose would be to compensate for both 
the decentralized nature of the interstate decision-making system 
and for the definition of political jurisdiction and ownership.
Their task, in effect, would include the introduction of elements of 
collective decision-making and collective ownership to participate 
in the production and regulation of this particular activity. The 
nature of this type of international goods justifies that, in some 
instances, depending on the costs and benefits of the agreements 
to produce or regulate these goods, supranational structures may 
be the best mode of allocation.
However, I would like to stress the point that it is not be­
cause a good falls in this first broad category or because coun­
tries have a common interest in providing the good that collective 
action according to this specific organizational form will actually 
take place. This is what Olson tries to prove with his theory. ■ I 
only want to indicate that, depending on the costs and benefits of 
the arrangements needed, there might be a relationship between the 
nature of the international good and the mode of allocation. In 
the last section I deal in some length with the costs and benefits 
of some modes of allocation of international goods.
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Deterrence , as provided by a nuclear submarine force, serves 
to illustrate a 'pure* international public good (1). The intro­
duction of an ally to an alliance does not decrease the deterrence 
consumed by the existing allies. Moreover, if the opposition per­
ceives an alliance as unified, then deterrence cannot be withheld 
from any alliance member regardless of its contribution to the de­
fence production of the alliance. Output of fundamental science (2 
international control of pollution, global environmental protection 
general devices for a New International Economic Order, technolo­
gies for weather control and climate modofocation, the formal inter 
national rules of the game for international commodity agreements, 
established by the GATT, etc. ...,they all provide examples of thi 3 
first category of international goods. Also the output of an inter 
national cartel may be considered as an international public good. 
OPEC, for instance, provides the public good of a high negotiated
oil price to members as well as to non-members.
The second broad category deals with international goods exhi­
biting a low indivisibility and a high excludability (Box II) : the 
goods or services are divisible because of 'imperfections in proper 
ty t i t l e s ',others cannot very easily be excluded from benefiting 
from it or cannot very easily protect themselves from any disservic 
it might be causing them. If other states are enjoying the benefit 
of one state's production of a good or service and this state can 
in no way, or only at high cost, exclude or charge the other states 
the cost of partaking, it would be unrealistic, given the assumptio 
made, to expect them to contribute voluntarily. Or, if other state 
are suffering from a state's provision of a good or service -and 
cannot, or only at high costs, exclude themselves from such negative 
spillovers, it would be unrealistic to expect this state voluntaril 
to offer compensation. In both theoretical examples a divergence 
between private and social costs exists as this state would tend 
to underproduce the first kind of good and overproduce the second. 
To the extent to which such divergences become costly, the inter­
national production of tha first type of international good and
(1) Sandler, T., Impurity of Defense : An Application to the Econo­
mics of Alliances, K y k l o s , Vol. 30, 1977, p. 443-460.
(2) Ruggie, 3.G., o p . cit., p. 883.
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the international regulation of the second kind becomes more likely.
The organizational arrangements would be different from those 
explained under the first case. In performing a specific 
task, they would be required to compensate for 'those imperfections 
In property titles' uithin the interstate system which generates 
this divergence between private and collective costs (1). Uithin 
a task-specific context, their role would include introducing and 
representing definitions of collective ownership and jurisdiction.
The exploitation of the seabed beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction is an interesting instance of this second type of in­
ternational good (2). More precisely, a common property resource 
such as fisheries outside of coastal waters, for example, is divi­
sible since one nation's catch fully detracts from another nation's 
ability to catch the same fish. However, these fisheries are, at 
present, only partially appropriable because of 'imperfections in 
property titles' (3).
Although the oceans have been declared the 'common heritage of 
mankind', the operationalization of this concept is far from settled 
and redefinition of property titles is still being discussed. This
(1) An interesting article in this perspective is : Conybeare, 3 . A., 
International Organization and the Theory of Property Rights, 
International Organizat i o n , Vol. 34, Nr. 3, Summer 1980,
p. 307-334.
(2) See Amacher, R.C. and Sweeney, R.D., The Law of the Sea : U.S. 
Interests and Alternatives, Washington D.C., 19?i) ; Friedmann,
W., The Future of the 6cea n s , New York: G. Braziller, 1971 ; 
Tollison, and Willett, TT, Institutional Mechanisms for 
Dealing with International Externalities : A Public Choice Per­
spective, in Amacher, R.C. and Sweeney, R.D., The Law of the 
Sea : U.S. Interests and Alternatives, Washington D.C., 1976, 
p. 77-101 ; Sweeney, R.3., Tollison, R.D. and Willett, T.D., 
Market Failure, the Common-Pool Problem, and Ocean Resource 
Exploitation, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, Nr. 1,
April 1974, p. 179-192 t Wirsino. R.G.. international Relations 
and the Future of Ocean Space, Columbia, S.C.. University of 
South Carolina Press, 1974.
(3) The Cold War between Iceland and England was a good example of 
the difficulty on behalf of both nations to appropriate fully 
the benefits of the fisheries uithin the 200 mile limit of
Iceland.
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redefinition could come about through the proposed collective 
arrangement, uhich uould be designed not only to facilitate the 
performance of the exploitation of the seabed but also to com­
pensate for imperfection in the basic definitions of political 
jurisdiction. This, houever, uould not imply the necessity for 
extensive regulatory measures over ocean economic activity.
The third category deals with international goods defined by 
a lou indivisibility and a lou excludability (Box III) : goods or 
services provided by a state are rival in consumption and others 
can easily be kept from benefiting or be charged for benefiting. 
In other words, this category dBals uith international private 
goods.
It is the provision of these goods and services uhich account 
for many activities of governmental organizations. Thus, simply 
in order to be able to do what it cannot do, to do more or do 
more efficiently uhat it is already doing, a state may enter in­
ternational arrangements and seeks the collaborative production o 
a particular task or service. International goods of this type 
uould be provided through joint production schemes in order to 
take benefit of the economics of scale. Consumption, though, 
will be private.
The kinds of international organizational arrangements these 
situations could lead to is still of another variety. The purpos 
of these arrangements uould clearly be to facilitate or enhance 
a particular national capacity, i.e., to enlarge the range of uha 
is technically possible for each member in the performance of a 
specific task. In other uords, the transformation curve for each 
state uould shift outuard, auay from the origin, or at least no 
state uould be left uorse off as a result of some being better of 
Common examples of this type of international good are the ou 
puts of international collaboration in areas of applied science 
and technology (l). Through a system of licences and patents, goo
(1) Nau, H.R., National Politics and International Technology. Ba 
tiraore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 19*^4 ; I'iau, H.R., 
Collective Responses to R.&D., Problems in Uestern Europe : 1 
58 and 1968-73, International Organi z a t i o n . Vol. 29, Nr. 3, 
Summer 1975, p. 617-53 t l/illeeourt. L.. Forms of Cooperation 
Problems of Science P o l i c y , Paris; OECD, 1968.
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can be fully appropriated. 3oint production of national scienti­
fic and technological capabilities happens with the framework 
of the 3oint Research Centre and the Committee for Research and 
Development of the European Community (1). Uithin the OECD, for 
example, specific member countries may participate project by pro­
ject, without involving other OECD members not interested in a 
particular concern.
To sum up, many states will respond to problems and possibilities 
the international system poses by seeking the extension of national 
capacities through joint production facilities. These arrangements 
are producers of essentially private goods. Their first consequence 
will be to augment the ability of states to act in the international 
system. Common self-interest appears to be the main basis of pro­
duction of this third type of international goods within internation­
al cooperation (2).
The last category of international goods are goods which 
approximate the characteristics of non-rivalness and lou-excludabi- 
lity (Box IV) : the product of a state's activity is non-rival, 
in the sense that extension of that good to others is facilitated, 
even though others can be excluded or charged for it. In other 
words, this category deals with international goods produced by 
clubs that only protect their own members.
If states were of the impression that some other states would 
supply the good or service in any case, they would have no incentive 
to contribute to its production. But even if other states were 
willing to contribute, the opportunity cost of supplying the good 
or service to an additional state might well be negligible.
(1) For a good analysis of the coordination of science policy 
uithin the EEC see Brickman, R., National Science Coordination 
in the European Community, International Organization, Vol. 31, 
1977, p. 473-496.
(2) This judgement is strengthened by King, A., International 
Scientific Relations : Introduction, Problems of Science P o l i c y , 
Paris : OECD, 1968.
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Finding itself in a situation of this kind, a state has a number 
of alternatives available : exclude others and ignore the social 
pressure uhich may result ; extend the good to others and absorb 
the costs ; cease the activity altogether ; or seek to organize 
the production of the good internationally with some cost-sharin 
devices.
This type of international good is quite frequently encounte 
in international relations. It will depend upon circumstances 
uithin the domestic and international system and upon the object 
and preferences uhich behaviour a state uill acquire to consume 
this type of international good.
The kinds of international arrangements, if organized, uould 
be designed to compensate for the decentralized structure of the 
interstate decision-making system by organizing internationally 
those national activities exhibiting non-rivalness. Their role, 
then, in addition to producing a specific good or service, uould 
include at least the partial introduction of collective criteria 
into the international system. Cost-sharing schemes are often a 
important aspect of these organizations.
Outputs of EEC coordination policies in the field of agricull 
trade, money, aid, etc. may be considered examples of internatio 
goods exhibiting non-rivalness in consumption for the members of 
the group uith possibilities of excluding others. Also in the a 
of science and technology,examples of this last category of good 
may be found. They concern the observation, surveillance, and m 
nitoring of the earth's surface, the climate and the oceans. Oa 
pictures of global ueather systems, taken from U.S. satellites, 
and distributed through the World Ueather Watch, or the various 
experiments carried out under the auspices of the Global Atmosph 
Research Program are examples of this fourth category of interna 
tional goods. These have concerned primarily one state, the Unit 
States, producing a good or service, and then sometimes,through 
international auspices , choosing to extend it to others and to 
absorb much of the cost of so doing. If the cost should become 
very high, there uould be a case for some international cooperat
with the inclusion of cost-sharing schemes. The American initia­
tive to establish a U.N. Environment Fund which would include 
financing for monitoring is a good example.
In the present section we explored a classification of inter­
national goods and the relationship with international arrangements. 
The four-fold classification of international goods by no means 
exhausts the range of possibilities. Ue have only suggested it as 
a possible way for further analysis. This classification does, 
however, provide us with a better idea of the actual nature of 
international goods and consequently, with a better indication of 
the various possibilities of their provision. International goods 
can be provided through a national production, a joint production 
scheme, an intergovernmental organization or a supra-national 
design.
Table II/-3 suggests in a systematic way the tentative relation­
ship between the type of international good and the type of inter­
national collaborative arrangement that would most likely be the out­
come if the good or service should be produced or regulated on an 
international level. From this suggestion it does not follow that 
any kind of international good has to be organized, produced or 
regulated on an international level. The production of any of 
these goods can be left to the individual state. A whole range 
of possible actions are open to a state when it is confronted with 
any of these international goods. It may over- or underproduce 
the good or service as might be the case for goods of category II, 
or it may extend the good or service to others and absorb the costs 
as might be the case for goods in category I and IV, etc. ...
The purpose of this undertaking is to indicate that the spe­
cific nature ef the various categories of international goods has 
some specific implications for the behaviour of the individual 
state. In some instances, a specific form of international 
arrangement could be a better and more efficient mode of producing 
or regulating that good.
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Table IV-3 Relation betueen Categories of
International Goods and Interna­
tional Arrangements
Categories of 
International 
Goods
International Arrangements
Purpose F orm
Category I
non-rivalness 
non-excludability 
(public good)
Compensation of both 
the decentralized na­
ture of interstate 
decision-making and 
the definition of 
political jurisdiction 
and ownership
Supranational 
structures which 
introduce element 
of collective de- 
cision-making and 
collective owner­
ship (e.g. common 
policy substitutei 
for independent n 
tional behaviour)
Category II
rivalness 
non-excludability 
(commons good)
Compensation for 
the imperfections 
in property titles
International or­
ganizations which 
introduce element 
of collective 
ownership
Category III
rivalness 
excludability 
(private good)
Facilitate or en­
hance a particular 
national capacity
Inter-governmenta 
organizations 
which coordinate 
national activi­
ties (e.g., joint 
production scheme.
Category IV
non-rivalness 
excludability 
(club good)
-
Organization of 
activities exhi­
biting non-rival­
ness
International or­
ganizations which 
introduce collec­
tive criteria inti 
the interstate de­
cision-making sys­
tem (e.g. common 
policies integra­
ting national be­
haviour)
To resume, ue have tried to suggest that the relationship betueen 
the provision of international goods and a possible international 
organization is more complex and diversified than Olson's theory 
of groups and organizations seems to imply. International arrange­
ments may produce a uhole range of outputs going from private goods 
over mixed goods to public goods. Therefore, one has to be careful 
in applying public good elements to international relations.
2. The Importance of Side-effects in International Cooperation
The main focus of the relationship betueen the provision of an 
international good and international cooperation is on the indivi­
dual calculus of a country uhether or not to participate in the 
production or regulation of the good. Ue already asserted that any 
sort of international cooperation is meant to accomplish common 
goals with respect to the provision or regulation of international 
goods. However, the provision of an international good of any of 
the four categories may also produce by-products in the sense of 
side benefits and/or side costs. A country uill have to assess 
these side-effects to determine its actual behaviour touards inter­
national cooperation.
The specific nature of the international good determines the 
costs and benefits of an eventual cooperation. These costs and 
benefits are considered by-products of international cooperation 
and should be taken as elements uithin a country's calculus. Coope­
ration permits efficiency gains (or welfare gains). These gains are 
expected to result because a subset of nations which are affected 
by the good may have their marginal benefits taken into account 
when production decisions are reached. Another benefit concerns 
the increase in information and communication possibilities that 
cooperation may generate. These side benefits may include data 
gathering and analysis, facilitation of inter-state consultation, 
suggestions for coordination etc. Benefits may also coma from scale 
economics. To the extent that cooperation increases beyond those 
levels associated with independent adjustment, scale economics can 
be attributed to the operation of an international arrangement.
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For example, the operation by two nations of a water treatment 
plant, which serves to purify the water of a commonly shared 
lake, may be less expensive per unit of operation than the con­
struction of two separate plants. The reduced costs on those units 
that would have been supplied by the independent provision decisior 
comprise the scale economy benefits. All these side-benefits hold 
for all four categories of international goods.
On the cost side, the operation of international arrangements 
is usually associated with large expenditures on decision-making 
costs, enforcement and interdependency costs (1). As to the inter­
dependency costs, as a nation joins an international arrangement, 
a loss of autonomy and flexibility may be experienced. This loss 
of autonomy may impose costs on the operation of national policy 
whenever conflict between national and international goals exists. 
In cases of conflict, enforcement costs in terms of military force, 
economic sanctions, etc. may have to be expended by the internatioe 
al arrangement. These costs are external to the extent that the 
state expects costs as a result of the actions of other nations ove 
which it has no direct control (e.g., economic boycott of Rhodesia, 
arms embargoes, etc.). Decision-making costs are often a function 
of a state's participation in the international arrangement, i.e., 
the decision rule required for agreement when a state participates 
in this activity. Consequently, as the number of states required 
to agree increases, the decision-making costs will increase too. 
also the bureaucratic, non-market costs should be considered part 
of these decision-making costs.
Some of these side-effects (positive or negative) are uncompen­
sated in the international system and can be viewed as internations 
externalities. As a consequence, some international arrangements 
are then also seen as institutional structures for internalizing 
those international externalities. However, it is quite important 
in this context to look at the relevant trade-offs involved in de­
signing policies and institutions to internalize international ex­
ternalities. The mere existence of an international externality 
does not lead to the conclusion that it should be internalized at
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the highest level of government possible. It is possible that some 
of the international goods are better handled by bilateral or re­
gional agreement at a more decentralized level of decision-making 
than by an international organization. Thus, it is particularly 
important to recognize that merely showing that the market is failing 
to perform perfectly or that there is some scope for gain from 
coordination of national policies is not sufficient to establish a 
clear case for international action. Not every externality needs an 
international body to deal uith.
Therefore, it is crucial to analyze specific externality problems 
uith respect to the basic trade-offs involved in deciding at uhat 
level they should be handled : 1 ) the nature of the distortion, ex­
ternality - does it exist, is it uorth the cost of doing something 
about it and 2 ) the efficiency of organizations designed to deal 
uith the spillover. Is there a rationale for an international re­
gulation or an institutional structure for internalizing internation­
al externalities?
In other uords, the problem of the public good element in in­
ternational relations arises from a failure of the decentralized 
decision-making system to operate efficiently. This failure comes 
about as a result of the interdependence betueen or among community 
members, and the inability of a decentralized system to compensate 
members for these relevant interdependent effects. Whether an ex­
ternality should be internalized and by uhat means it should be in­
ternalized, should depend upon the relative costs and benefits of 
internalization. Whenever the additional costs of internalizing an 
externality are greater than the additional benefits derived from 
creating and/or implementing an internalization mechanism, then it 
is inefficient to do so. This suggests that more attention should 
be given to approaching international policy issues in the sequence 
of their likely cost-benefit ratio rather than attempting to indis­
criminately rush after the internalization of all international ex­
ternalities.
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To summarize, the complexity of the characteristics of interna­
tional goods suggests that international arrangements may serve 
different purposes and consequently, may have different forms. 
Still, some general conclusions can be draun as to the individual 
calculus of a country whether or not to participate in internationa 
cooperation. It should enable us to assess any international arran 
ment which provides an international good. It is obvious that the 
basic reason of the existence of any international arrangement is 
the provision of a joint gain. The task for institutionalizing the 
provision and/or regulation of any type of international good is to 
ensure that this cooperative joint gain aspect prevails. An impor­
tant obstacle to the creation or preservation of joint gain situati 
is given by the economic reasoning which purports that 'market dis­
tortions' may lead to disruptive conflicts over the distribution of 
gains or the sharing of costs. These ensuing conflicts will often 
destroy the potential for joint gain.
Besides this joint gain element in any international arrangemen 
international cooperation may also provide by-products in the sense 
of side-benefits and side-costs. These side-effects may play an 
important role in a country's decision-making process.
Finally, the mode of organizing the provision and/or regulation 
of a good on the international level, is based on the comparative 
advantages of each in terms of different basic values. Market me­
thods promote efficiency in appropriate circumstances, such as 
the absence of major costly externalities and indivisibilities. 
Moreover, they depoliticize the decisions in any allocative process 
On the other hand, markets work within a given initial distribution 
uhich is not always acceptable to participants. Organizational de­
vices involving representation and politicization of differing in­
terests may be introduced into the process of allocation. This mod 
of organizing the provision of the international good may result in 
a system of collective decision-making (l).
The relationship between the type of international good and in­
ternational cooperation seems more complex than it has often been
(1) Auster, R. and Silver, M., Collective Goods and Collective De­
cision Mechanisms, Public C h o i c e , Vol. 14, Spring 1973, p. 1-17
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thought. Here ue have only suggested that more attention should 
be given to the likely cost—benefit ratio, in approaching the 
provision and/or regulation of any type of international good.
3. The Relevance of a Public Goods Perspective in International 
Relations
In this concluding section ue round up our discussion of the 
use of the public good concept in international cooperation. As 
has been amply discussed in the first part of this chapter, the pub­
lic good is an abstract concept which has been introduced from 
economics into the analysis of political phenomena. Ue indicated 
that the very nature of the good leads to failures of decentralized 
decision-making so that political and social organizations are often 
required to cope with collective good situations. The existence of 
public goods in international relations indicate similar problems of 
collective action at the international level and, henceforth, may 
create the need for cooperation between states. However, arguing 
within the framework of the rational actor assumptions, some central 
points must be made clear about the public goods approach to Inter­
national Relations.
A first point is related to the use of the concept of public 
good in an analysis of international cooperation. The focus should 
be put on a clear definition of the actual relationship between a 
collective arrangement and the nature of its output. Olson's one- 
to-one relationship between an international organization and a 
collective good output has been misleading and misinterpreted in the 
literature. Moreover, in present research we are often left with 
ambiguous conclusions as to the explanatory and predictive power of 
such a public goods approach to international relations. Therefore, 
a more precise and less generic definition of the task performance 
of a collective arrangement between states is required, i.e., what 
does an arrangement provide, how is it provided, for whom and what 
is its impact? In other words, the nature of the output of an 
arrangement must be well defined.
To remedy the conceptual problem of the collective good con­
cept in international relations we introduced a suggestive distinctly 
of four categories of international goods, i.e., international pub­
lic goods, international 'commons' goods, international private 
goods and international club goods. We further explained that each 
of these four categories of goods has specific problems of allocati« 
and distribution of resources. Those problems can be solved in 
varying forms of cooperation among states. The actual behaviour of 
an individual state towards the realization of such international 
goods is assumed to be guided by the rational actor assumptions.
A second point that should be borne in mind is related to the 
variety of outputs that a collective arrangement between states may 
produce. International arrangements often provide joint outputs of 
different categories of international goods. In other uords, arranc 
ments at international level may provide and/or regulate a number 
of goods. For instance, a military alliance, such as NATO, provides 
a joint output of different goods. It provides the public good of 
deterrence, the club good of protection and the private good of 
joint production and resources from military infrastructure. The 
existence of joint outputs may influence the behaviour of a state 
towards such an organization.
An important aspect in this perspective is the distinction we 
make between the basic services and the specific services of inter­
national organizations. Often the generic task performance of an 
international organization contains a public good element, while 
the practical applicability to implement the working of the organi­
zation has an impure public good character. In many instances of 
international arrangements public goods are provided in the sense 
of the abstract concept of non-rivalness and non-excludability of 
the basic information, the basic research and the basic task perfor­
mance. However, from the moment an organization elaborates its fa­
cilities to actually provide and/or regulate the goods, impure publi 
goods are often introduced into the analysis. The facilities of 
these collective arrangements can be public goods, private goods, 
commons goods and club goods.
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Thus, any scientific attempt to analyze international arrange­
ments from a public goods perspective should take into considera­
tion that arrangements may provide simultaneously goods uith 
differing characteristics and that international goods may be 
dealt uith in differing frameworks of cooperation. In sum, if a 
public goods approach is to be applied to international cooperation, 
a thorough analysis is needed on the number of international goods 
involved, the nature of the different goods and by what kind of 
framework the goods are actually provided (i.e., the mode of allo­
cation, distribution and cost sharing). This, of course, would mean 
a series of monographs of international organizations or detailed 
studies of international goods.
It is not the purpose here to present a long agenda of further 
research possibilities in this area. Ue only want to suggest a way 
to assess international arrangements and international issues from 
a public good perspective. It is believed that a better understand­
ing of a nation's behaviour towards international cooperation could 
be arrived at if the above reasoning should be accepted. Let me 
illustrate this with a few examples of research possibilities.
Take, for instance, the area of Research and Development. It 
has long been recognized that scientific knowledge is a public good 
in the fundamental sense that once produced, its benefits can be 
enjoyed without diminishing its usefulness to others. On the other 
hand, most of the practical application of knowledge in countries 
takes place through private firms which typically attempt to exclude 
other users for the purpose of maximizing their own profits. They 
provide private goods.
In an international setting national governments have multiple, 
sometimes conflicting objectives in the R4D area. They recognize 
the need to support fundamental research which no single firm would 
find profitable because of insufficient excludability but, which is 
nonetheless of benefit to the citizens. They also often have an 
interest in keeping such information from flowing freely to 
foreigners : they wish to aid their own firms in the international 
market-place as well as to gain maximum general political and economic 
influence from proprietary control of publicly-supported research
and development. This, in turn, leads other countries to take 
competitive or at least defensive positions. The ensuing compe­
tition leads to a smaller aggregate advance in knowledge than 
might otherwise be the case. But national governments also under­
stand that cooperation in the pursuit of R4D can in principle con­
tribute to the efficient provision of international goods by re­
ducing inefficient redundancy in resource expenditures, allowing 
the realization of comparative advantage, and in some cases over­
coming the high costs of isolated efforts.
Recent experience appears to confirm strongly the rivalry of 
nations, rather than a tendency for cooperation. Furthermore, it 
seems that the individual nations can often be thought of virtually 
as competing firms. Moreover, the excludability of R4D by performii 
nations is sometimes quite high. In other words, commercial inte­
rests and other national rivalries appear to have blocked extensive 
international cooperation. This brings us to the assertion that 
most of the R&D practical applications can be defined as internatio 
al private goods or international club goods, while fundamental 
scientific research can be considered a public good. This distinc­
tion has an important impact on the way the mode of allocation, dis- 
tribution and cost-sharing is to be assessed.
For instance, a public goods approach to the study of interna­
tionally collaborative R&D arrangements (e.g., OECD, IEA, CERN, 
Euratom, ENEA, etc.) provides an interesting path of research. In­
terest should then first be directed to a discussion of the nature 
of the specific good(s) the organization provides. This should be 
followed by an analysis of the mode of allocation, distribution and 
cost-sharing of the organization. In t h e .perspective of these two 
main lines of reasoning, the behaviour of an individual state to­
wards a specific international good should be assessed.
A public goods approach to an analysis of the Oceans problem is 
another broad area of research. Problems of ocean resource exploi­
tation, ocean pollution and the concept of the oceans as the common 
heritage have long been considered common-pool problems. The funda­
mental cause of any common—pool, as has already been indicated, 
is the difficulty of identifying and asserting property rights 
over a resource. As a consequence, each country with access to 
the resource has an incentive to exploit currently as much as it 
profitably can, thus neglecting the effects of its actions on re­
source availability in the future. These common-pool features of 
resource exploitation may create divergencies betueen private and 
social costs and benefits and, as a consequence, some forms of 
collective agreements may be required to regulate the resource ex­
ploitation.
In the lau of the sea negotiations the resources of fish, oil 
and manganese nodules have received much interest. A research in 
this area could reveal the relevant trade-offs in designing arrange­
ments to regulate the exploitation of these ocean resources. For 
instance, the exploitation of highly migratory fish that swim through 
many national uaters or spend their lives in fresh uater far at sea 
(e.g., tuna, salmon), is an international commons good that needs to 
be regulated at international level. On the other hand, the exploi­
tation of coastal fish only calls for national fishery regulation.
The extension of the national jurisdiction to the 200 mile zone re­
defined the property rights over this resource. In other words, the 
problem of the exploitation of coastal fish uas settled. Also the 
control of deep seabed resources is considered a commons good. Does 
that imply that the exploitation of manganese nodules requires in­
ternational regulation? Nodules are not like fish since they do 
not move around and since the future stock does not depend on current 
exploitation. Focus of research should thus be put on the relation­
ship betueen the specific nature of the good and the mechanism for 
dealing with this resource. This reasoning applies for a number of 
problems in the Oceans area.
Actually,ue have only mentioned a feu examples of further research 
possibilities. Houever, ue believe that all international organiza­
tions, programs or arrangements can be studied from this internation­
al goods perspective. It is supposed to give us a better under 
standing of the behaviour of an individual state towards internation­
al cooperation. The area of international development aid uill be 
taken to assess this approach.
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Conclusion
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In this chapter ue have assessed some elements of Olson's p u b ­
lic goods theory. In a first section ue clarified the public good 
concept as it uas developed in economic theory. It became clear 
that the elusiveness of the pure public good induced further deve­
lopments of the theory by introducing the concept of impure public 
good. Moreover, the distinction uith similar concepts uas stressed 
This discussion demonstrated that the public good concept is mor 8 
complicated and intricate than most analysis makes us believe.
In a second part ue assessed the Cournot model of independent 
adjustment group behaviour on which our own analysis of public good 
in international relations is based. It was shown that the non- 
cooperative Cournot model of public good allocation calls for a 
collective provision of public goods. The analysis clearly indi­
cated that Olson's conclusions of his theory are to be understood 
from this independent adjustment behaviour.
In the last part of this chapter we discussed the usefulness of 
the public good concept to an analysis of international cooperation 
To remedy some of the problems that occurred in the analysis of in­
ternational relations from a public goods perspective, we introduce 
a suggestive distinction of four categories of international goods. 
This helped to understand the actual relationship betueen i n t e m a t i  
al arrangements and the specific nature of their outputs. And be­
cause our interest is on the individual calculus of a country wheth 
or not to participate in the realization of an international good, 
by-products of international cooperation in the sense of side benef 
and/or side costs were introduced. To resume, a public goods persp 
tive to international cooperation can be useful if ue take into con 
sideration that arrangements may provide simultaneously goods uith 
differing characteristics and that international goods may be dealt 
uith in differing frameuorks of cooperation. These tuo elements 
do have an impact on the actual behaviour of states towards inter­
national cooperation.
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In the next chapter ue will add tuo main theoretical qualifi­
cations to the analysis. First, ue will introduce the element of 
preferences into Olson's analysis of the production of a public 
good in international relations. Secondly, ue will introduce 
the element of economics of scale into the analysis of joint pro­
duction schemes in international relations. Both theoretical ela­
borations uill have an impact on the behaviour of small states to­
wards international cooperation.

CHAPTER V THEORETICAL QUALIFICATIONS OF A PUBLIC GOODS APPROACH 
TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Introduction
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In this fifth chapter ue will explore two theoretical qualifi­
cations of problems of collective action in international relations.
In a first section it is argued that Olson's exploitation thesis, 
i.e., large countries are exploited by small ones uith regard to the 
cost-benefit ratio of the public good, is not completely accurate. 
Under certain conditions the disproportionality of burden-sharing 
in the production of the public good is reversed,so that the cost- 
benefit ratio of the smaller country may be greater than that of the 
larger country. In other words, Olson's exploitation hypothesis is 
qualified by the introduction of differential preferences of countries 
towards the consumption of a public good. This is shown by concen­
trating on the reaction process in public good theory. The discussion 
of the equilibrium conditions for public good output will demonstrate 
results which contrast with Olson's model.
The second section widens Olson's analysis of public goods in 
international relations by introducing a distinction between national 
and international arrangements to achieve a country's objectives.'
This is done by introducing an international cooperation model, very 
much inspired by Ruggie. The main conclusion of the model is that 
there is an inverse relationship between the ratio of resources spent 
on international arrangements and resources spent on national arrange­
ments and the total level of national resources to attain a specific 
objective. This model certainly adds another element to the analy­
sis of the behaviour of states towards international cooperation.
*
In short, while Olson's analysis and its qualification are based 
on the study of the consequences of an international public good 
on the behaviour of states, Ruggie's model is based on the impact 
of the returns to scale in the production of national and interna­
tional arrangements on the behaviour of states.
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A. A Reaction Process Model : A Qualification of Qlson*s Public 
Goods Model
Introduction
In the model that guides the investigation of the NATO alliance 
Olson maintains that the country with the relatively larger output 
prior to the reaction process aluays bears a disproportionately 
larger share of the cost of providing the public good relative to a 
country uith a smaller output before the process. He concludes that 
in public good situations larger countries are exploited by small 
ones uith regard to the cost-benefit ratio of public goods.
Houever, it uill be argued here that O l s o n’s exploitation thesis 
is not completely accurate. Under certain conditions the income 
effect of a public good reserves the disproportionality of burden 
sharing, i.e., the country uith the relatively smaller output prior 
to the reaction process may bear a disproportionately larger share 
of the public good's cost after the process. Thus, in contrast to 
Olson's model, the cost-benefit public good ratio of the smaller 
country may be greater than that of the larger country.
To minimize these unexpected costs, or to introduce certainty 
uith regard to costs, a smaller country may voluntarily engage in 
international cooperation uith a larger nation about uhat constitutes 
the proper supply of various public goods. In other uords, coopera­
tion may occur because the country uith the relatively large isola­
tion output can have a very ueak interest in marginal increments of 
the public good, uhile the country uith the relatively small isola­
tion output can have an extremely strong interest in marginal in­
creases of th 8 public good.
In this chapter ue stress the existence of a rationale for inter­
national cooperation that relies upon the recognition of varied pre­
ferences. Drauing upon the Cournot model of group behaviour it is 
argued that the recognition of mutually advantageous exchange may 
lead to international cooperation between larger and smaller coun­
tries. This implies that a smaller country may have an incentive to
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cooperate uith large ones uhen providing a public good. Size is 
thus not the only element in the analysis of cost distribution of 
a public good (1 ).
1. The Independent Adjustment Process
a. Assumptions
As ue have noted in Chapter I , our general analytics are based 
on the assumptions of the single actor model of economic self-inte­
rest. While ue assume this in a reasonable approach to elaborate 
on Olson's public good model, we are quite auare of the limitations 
of such an approach in analyzing international cooperation.
The economic model ue use, differs in some points from the one 
employed by Olson. First, it can include income effects. Income 
effects, i.e., shifts in production and consumption possibilities, 
are important in determining eventual equilibrium position. In 
other uords, the international provision of any good, aither public 
or private, has an effect upon the state's real income. Secondly, 
reference is made to goods other than public goods, i.e., private 
goods, since the production and consumption of goods of all kinds 
are intimately interrelated. International cooperation does not 
provide exclusively public goods. Thirdly, ue do not assume equal 
taste patterns, i.e., countries may have different preference 
patterns with regard to the supply of public goods.
The economic model postulates tuo countries (A and B), uhich 
are rational actors uith given preferences and production possibi­
lities, and tuo goods of uhich good (X) has the characteristics of 
a public good and good (Y) of a private good. The use of a produc­
tion constraint enables the analysis to include income effects and 
to refer to private goods as the numéraire to measure the opportu­
nity cost of providing the public good in terms of the private good* 
The model further assumes independent adjustment, the absence of
(1) See also Broun, S.N., Price, 0., and Raichur, S., Public Good 
Theory and Bargaining betueen Large and Small Countries, Inter- 
national Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, Nr. 3, September 1976, 
p. 343-4I T -------------
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bargaining between countries and the existence of a pure public 
good. Briefly the model is placed within the framework of a 
Cournot model of group behaviour.
In Chapter IV it was said that the impact of a country's public 
good production on another country was interpreted as increased in­
come. Uhen countries are aware of an increase in income, it affects 
their decision about how much of the public good they should pro­
vide through their own efforts. Hence, states adjust their own 
provision of the public good to account for the amount of spillover, 
which is the amount of another country's public good production.
This constitutes the reaction process in public goods theory.
In arriving at the conclusions cited earlier, Olson assumes that 
there is no cooperation among the parties involved, i.e., no cost 
sharing arrangements are permitted and each country bears the entire 
costs of any increase in the amount of the public good which it 
initiates. The amount of the public good provided is thus determined 
through a process in which the country reacts independently to the 
behaviour of others in deciding how much of the public good to pro­
vide by itself. The noncooperative nature of this process is crucial 
to Olson's exploitation thesis, for this is based upon an examina­
tion of the properties of the equilibrium of the noncooperative 
process. This process is now illustrated.
b. A Public Good Reaction Function for One Country
From the Cournot line we constructed in Chapter It/ a public 
good reaction function may be derived. Figure I/-1 illustrates the 
public good reaction process for one country (A). Ue make the 
assumptions of a linear income expansion path and a constant pro­
duction possibility curve to simplify the derivation of the reaction 
function. In Quadrant I of Figure V - 1 ,the horizontal axis measures 
the amount of public good that may be produced by country A ; the 
vertical axis measures the amount of private good that may be pro­
duced ; and the line PP' represents the different combinations of 
the two goods that may be produced. Line E QE 3 is the Cournot line
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and every point on the path represents utility maximization for 
lines parallel to PP'. The vertical axis of Quadrant II measures 
the amount of spillover, i.e., the amount of the public good pro­
vided by country B, while the horizontal axis is common to Quadrant I.
The reaction curve must describe at least two conditions : 1) 
the amount of public good production when spillover is zero, and 2 ) 
the nature of the relationship between spillover and adjustment in
A
a country's public good production. In Quadrant I, point EQ is
country's A isolated optimum. It represents a particular production
combination of private good and public good that maximizes benefits
, A A>
when spillover is zero (Xg, Y q ). Of course, spillover is equal to 
zero only when no other country produces the same public good.
□
Now suppose that country B is providing OX^ of the public good. 
Uith the help of a 45° degree line ( )f)» this amount is plotted on
the horizontal axis. Aware of this spillover, country A will not
A A
consume at point Eg but at point C^, which is to the right of Eg and
below the Cournot line. This is only a consumption spillover and
there is no resource transfer. Country A treats the amount of spill- 
B A
over (OX^ = ^ 0 ^ 1  ^ as constant. To maximize benefits, the country 
must consume on the Cournot line. To do this, country A must reduce 
its own public good production. Therefore, it decreases its public
good production to point P 1 on the production possibility curve PP',
' n
which stands for an amount of 0 X 1 of the public good. Point P. en-
A
ables country A to consume at point E^ of the Cournot line. It is
apparent that the country is producing less of the public good after
the adjustment than it was before. It dropped its public good pro-
A A
duction from 0Xn to 0 X 1 . Consequently, we find a point of the re-
A
action curve,i.e., R 1 , which gives the amount of the public good
A B
A uill produce (0X1) when B is providing 0 X 1 of it.
B
Uhen country B provides 0 X 7 of the public good, the consumption
A
spillover amounts to EgCj. In order to maximize its benefits, coun­
try A will reduce its own public good production to P 7 and will find
A
a new equilibrium on the income consumption path at point In
B
other words, consumption spillover of OX- amounts to a public good
A
production of OX- by A. Still another point on the reaction curve is 
A
found, i.e., R^.
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Fiqure V-1 Public Good Reaction Function for 
One Country
This establishes the nature of the relationship between public 
good production and spillover. The relationship is inverse and 
therefore a sufficient amount of spillover could reduce A’s public
good production to zero. In the context of a production constraint, 
the production of the maximum amount of one good and no production 
of the other is a corner solution. A corner solution and maximiza­
tion of utility exist in the reaction process uhen, as in Figurea
V - 1, the country produces at point P but consumes at point Eg. Thus,
the amount of spillover necessaTy to create a corner solution must 
A
equal PEg which is plotted on the vertical axis of Quadrant II as 
X* ( i.e., Eq C s ).
The slope of the reaction curve( o() is the marginal rate of 
adjustment in a country's public good production for every unit of 
spillover. And because the reaction curve is derived from the Cournot 
line, the slope of the reaction curve will depend upon the income 
elasticity of the demand for the public good. In the discussion of 
the Cournot model reference was made to the three classes of goods, 
normal, inferior, and superior. These categories of goods have 
corresponding slopes of the reaction curve : for a normal good the 
slope of the reaction curve is ^ 1 ; for an inferior good it is the
slope \  1 ; and for a superior good it is the slope t y o  • Three re­
presentative reaction curves are shown in Figure V-2. It is to be 
expected that most public goods will have normal income elastici­
ties (1 ).
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Figure V-2 Types of Reaction Curves
effects, considering only the case in which the slope of the 
reaction curve is (<k * 1). In Olson, PI. and Zeckhauser, R., 
o p . c i t . , p. 270, some attention is paid to income effects.
The actual value of the reaction curve is affected by the con­
tour of the production possibility function and the shape of the 
Cournot line. The Figures of V - 3 illustrate the effect of the con­
tour of the transformation function on the reaction curve. In all 
figures the Cournot line is linear. In each instance, the consumption 
spillover clearly reduces public good production. However, the 
opportunity cost is constant in Figure V-3a, increasing in Figure 
V-3b and decreasing in Figure V-3c. In other words, a linear pro­
duction possibility curve implies a linear reaction curve, a concave 
production curve a concave reaction curve,and a convex production 
function a convex reaction curve (1 ).
Figure I/-3 The Effect of the Production Possi­
bility Curve on the Reaction Curve
Figure V-3a Figure V-3b Figure V-3c
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(1) There is a tendency in the literature to draw concave reaction cur­
ves. Concave production functions constitute the standard assump­
tion. As suggested in these figures, other cases may be relevant 
too.
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The Cournot line also affects the reaction function. Figures 
V-4a, V-4b and l/-4c illustrate this. The production function is 
linear, but three different Cournot lines are drawn. If the Cournot 
line is linear, such as E q E s in Figure V-4a, then the reaction curve 
too will be linear. If the rate of increase of public good consump­
tion is decreasing, such as depicted in Figure V-4b, the reaction 
curve will be concave toward the origin. The rate of decrease in 
public good production is increasing. If the rate of increase of 
public good consumption is increasing, such as EgEg in Figure l/-4c, 
the reaction curve will be convex toward the origin. The rate of de­
crease of public good production is then decreasing
Figure V-4 The Effect of the Cournot Line on the 
Reaction Curve
Figure V-4a Figure V-4b Figure V-4c
For the further course of the analysis we will use linear pro­
duction possibility curves and linear Cournot lines. These assump­
tions, however, do not detract from the analytical insights provided 
by the application of the reaction process to the public goods theory.
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c. The Reaction Process between Two Countries
The case in which two countries are independently reacting to
one another is illustrated in Figure V-5. Quadrants I and III repre-
A
sent the Cournot lines of countries A and B. En stands for country
A A 8
A's isolated equilibrium with a product mix (Xg, Yg)» while Eg gives
the commodity bundle of B's isolated equilibrium (X?t Yp).
A B
Quadrant II reaction curves for both A and B are drawn (R , R ).
Figure V-5 Reaction Process between Two Countries
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The reaction process may be considered as an iterativ/e process.
The two countries act independently, but concurrently. Country A
takes the public good production of country B in the preceding stage
of the iteration as given when deciding how much it wants to produce.
A B
The independent adjustment process will reach an equilibrium E * ,
where the reaction curves intersect. The equilibrium results in A
A B
producing X^ . of the good and B producing X^ . of the good. Both coun­
tries consume an amount of the public good equal to the sum of these
A B
two productions (X^ + X^ .) (Figure V- 6 ).
Figure V- 6  Public Good Equilibrium between 
Two Countries
2. The Determinants of the Reaction Curve
Attention may now be turned to examining the relationship between 
the slope of the reaction curve, factor endowments and preference 
functions in our two-country model.
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CASE I : Ue assume that each country's factor endowments are
equal but that the countries have different preference functions,
A B
Referring to Figure V-7, it means that OP equals OP , but that the 
slope of the Cournot lines is different. In Figure I/—7 country A 
has a higher preference for the public good relative to the private 
one. This flatter Cournot line for country A implies a steeper 
slope of the reaction curve so that o< ^  (} . It shows that the 
greater a country's preference for the public good relative to the 
private good, the steeper the slope of the reaction curve, the smaller 
the reduction of the public good production and the greater the amount 
of spillover necessary to force the country into a corner solution.
Figure V-7 The Effect of Different Preference 
Functions on the Reaction Process
CASE II : Ue assume that each country's factor endowments are 
different, but that the countries have equal preference functions. 
Both Cournot lines have the same slope so that, given identical 
production functions, the slope of each country's reaction curve 
is equal to that of the other, i.e., of = yS (Figure V- 8 ). Olson's 
public good model can be framed in this second case.
Figure V- 8  The Effect of Different Factor Endowments 
on the Reaction Process
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These two cases clearly indicate that the amount of public 
good at isolated equilibrium (Xg) and the amount of spillover 
necessary to ensure a corner solution (X<,) are important elements 
in determining the reaction curve. In other words, not only factor 
endowments, but also preference functions of countries are criteria 
to analyze the cost distribution of public goods between countries 
and, consequently, to determine a public good equilibrium.
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3. Equilibrium Conditions for Public Good Output
After a discussion of the determinants of the reaction curve, 
attention may nou be turned to an analysis of the system's equili­
brium conditions in general. A formula exists to predict the amount 
of public good production in any country given the income effect 
of spillover. The formula for country A is : X A = Xg - oC(X^) (1 )
A
where : - X^ equals the public good output of A prior to spill­
over, i.e., the public good production at isolated 
equilibrium
A
- oc equals the slope of the reaction curve R
0
- X^ equals the amount of spillover from B
A
- X^ . equals the equilibrium public good output of A
The formula for country B's adjusted production is similar to that 
shown in Equation 1 : D _
XE - X0 - /3<x") (2)
Equations 1 and 2 represent a system of tuo linear equations in
two variables, and the solution of the system renders the equilibrium 
value of the public good production in countries A and B. The system 
may be solved by the standard method of comparison :
Y ^  _  (V Y ®
xe  -2----- 7 T—  (3>
L 1 -
wB y A
B . *0 - *0 (4)
E 1 -
The numerators of the right side of equations 3 and 4 give the equi­
librium conditions :
Y A yB 
*0 “ 0
if x£ - X® - k
if X* - xjj > k
if x£ - X® <  k
t  < K
(5)
* x 0 -  fJxg *
then X A
E
CD 
UJ 
XII ( 6 )
then X A
E > XE
(7)
then X A
E < XE
( 8 )
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Uith these equilibrium conditions ue can now examine the re­
lationship between the equilibrium public good output of the two 
countries, given the relationship between the isolated public good 
output and that between the slope of their reaction curves. Four 
cases are examined.
CASE I : Assume that A ’s isolated public good output is less
A B
than B's isolated production (Xg ^  *g)» an^ that the slope of coun­
try A's reaction curve is greater than country B's slope ©<,>$ •
A B
From equation 5 it is obvious that X^ . ^ X^ ., i.e., the indepen­
dent adjustment process will result in an equilibrium where country 
A will always produce less than country B. The reaction process re­
sults in lower production levels of the public good for both coun­
tries, but A's reduction of the public good production will be greater 
than B's decrease. In other words, the country with the lower public 
good output at isolation and lower preference for the public good 
relative to the private good,will always produce less than the other 
country (Figure V-9a).
In case the isolated public good output of the country with the 
greater isolated public good output (B) equals or is greater than 
the spillover necessary to reduce the other country's production to
B v ^
zero, a corner solution will be reached (Xg // X^). Equilibrium out­
put then equals B's isolated public good production. Country A will 
have a free ride, producing nothing of the good and consuming an 
amount Xg of the public good (Figure V - 9 b ) .
Figure V-9 Public Good Equilibrium (Xg
Figure V-9a
B
Figure V-9b
X
B X
X
A
CD 
CD 
CD 
UJ
CASE II : Assume that A's isolated public good output is less
A B
than B's production at isolation (Xg <  * q )» but that the slope of 
country A's reaction curve is also less than country B's slope (*</*).
The steeper reaction curve of A implies a preference function 
biased toward the public good ,relative to B's preference function.
n
The equilibrium output is in this case indeterminate, i.e., Xr may
B
be greater than, equal to, or less than X^.
Equation 8 indicates that if the difference of pre-spillover pro­
duction is smaller than the difference of A's reaction to B's output 
and B's reaction to A's output, then the country producing a smaller 
amount of the public good before the reaction process,bears in equi­
librium a smaller proportion of the public good's costs. This is the 
cost distribution that Olson predicts in his theory (Figure l/-10a). 
However, Olson's prediction does not hold when equations 6 and 7
a
characterize the two-country model. Indeed, it is possible that Xn
B
may be smaller than Xg, but in equilibrium country A may produce 
more of the public good than country B (Figure \/-10b).
0
A corner solution may still be arrived at when Xg equals or is 
greater than the public good spillover necessary to ensure a zero 
public good production for A. Equilibrium output will then be entire­
ly produced by B and country A will have again a free ride 
(Figure V-10c).
Figure U-10 Public Good Equilibrium (Xg < Xg,<*</3 )
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Figure V-10a Figure V-10b Figure V-10c
c a s e  III : Assume that A-*s isolated public good output is greater
A R
than B's production at isolation (Xg > xq)» anc  ^ the slope of A's re­
action curve is greater than country B's slope (o<)/3). The flatter 
reaction curve of country A implies a preference function biased to­
ward the private good relative to B's preference function. Also in
A
this case the equilibrium output is determinate, i.e., Xr may be
B
greater than, equal to, or less than X^. The ambiguity can be resolved 
by referring to equations 6 to 0 .
Equation 8 indicates that if the difference of pre-spillover pro­
duction is smaller than the difference of A's reaction to B's output 
and B’s reaction to A's output, than the country producing a larger 
amount of public good before the reaction process bears in equilibrium
a smaller production cf the public good's cost. It is thus possible
A B
that Xg may be greater than Xg, but in equilibrium, country A may
produce less of the public good than country B (Figure l/-11a). Brief­
ly , if the two-country model is characterized by the conditions set 
out in equations 6 and 8 , Olson's prediction of the cost distribution 
does not hold. Only the conditions set out in equation 7 lead to a 
confirmation of Olson's thesis (Figure V-11b).
A corner solution uill appear in this third case when A's isolat­
ed public good output is equal to or larger than the spillover ne­
cessary to ensure a zero production for B. At equilibrium, A produces 
the same amount of public good that it produces at isolation, while B doe*
A v Q
not produce anything of the good (Xg '/ X^) (Figure V-11c).
Figure V-11 Public Good Equilibrium (Xg } X g , * > ^ )
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CASE IV : Assume A's isolated public good production is larger
A B
than B's isolated output (Xg ^ Xg) and the slope of A's reaction
curve is less than the slope of B's reaction curve ( oifft).
A v B
It is obvious from equation 5 that X^ / X^, i.e., the independent
adjustment process will result in an equilibrium uhere country A will 
always produce more than country B. In other words, the country with 
the larger public good output before the reaction process and the 
higher preference for the public good relative to the private good, 
will always produce more than the country with the smaller pre-spill­
over production and lower preference for the public good (Figure V-12a).
A corner solution will appear when country A's pre-spillover out­
put is equal to or larger than the amount of public good necessary to
A V 0
ensure a zero production for country B (Xg ^  * 5 )* After the reaction 
process, country A will produce all of the public good, while B has 
a free ride (Figure V-12b).
Figure V-12 Public Good Equilibrium (Xg ^ X g , oi<|3)
Figure V-12a Figure V-12b
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All the possible outcomes for cases I to 11/ are summarized 
in Table U - 1 (1). It is apparent that knowledge of size alone is
insufficient to analyze cost distribution of a public good. One 
country may have a larger factor endowment than another, but this 
does not mean that the former necessarily has a larger public good 
production than the latter.
O l s o n’s theory of exploitation in public good situations says 
that larger countries are exploited by small ones with regard to 
the cost-benefit ratio of public goods. Our elaboration of O l s o n’s 
public good model indicates that income effects may modify the pub­
lic good production predicted by Olson's thesis. Important, there­
fore, is to know a c o u n t r y’s preference function, i.e., how much a 
country will increase its consumption of the public good with a 
given public good spillover effect. Knowledge of a preference func­
tion is available within the context of a constraint, i.e., the 
amount of spillover necessary to ensure a zero public good production. 
Furthermore, a reaction curve is used to illustrate the equili­
brium output of the public good. Derivation of a reaction curve, 
however, is possible only when preferences are known. This high­
lights the importance of bringing preferences into a public good 
a n a l y s i s .
(1) Table V - 1 only deals with equilibrium conditi 
public goods (i.e., 0  < ot , fi < 1 ). For the s 
completeness we mention that the analysis can 
to the conclusion of the categories of superi 
goods. The different configurations which mi 
it do not, however, modify the general conclu
ons of ’no r m a l '
ake of theoretical
ea sily be extended
or and inferior
gh t result from
sions o f the model.
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Table V-1 Equilibrium Conditions for Public Good Output
Equilibrium condi­
tions for public 
good output
Equilibrium
Output
Range of equilibrium 
possibilities
Corner-
solution
CASE I
yA ^  J.B 
*0 0
ocyfi
X A /  x^ 
E ^  E
A A 
0 ^  x£ <  Xg
0 <  X® ^  X®
if X0 ^  XS
then
wB yB
A e - xQ
x£ = 0
CASE II
XA <  XB 
*o *0
* < ( 3
x* ^  4
U é: XA <. X A 
0 <■ X® ^  X®
if 4 *  x*
then
XB » XB 
E 0
X A = 0
CASE III
x A >  x B 
*0 0
*>/3
4 *  4
A A
0 <  x” ^  x”
0 XB ^  X®
u *e 0
A B
if x*
then
y A y A
E * 0
4  - o
CASE IV 
A 8
x2 > x o X A X® xE >  xE
A A 
0 ¿1 X£ éi X”
0 ± 4  ^ x ®
if xg i  XBS
then
y A yA 
E * 0
X® - 0
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Conclusion
The above analysis has demonstrated that a small country's cost- 
benefit ratio for a public good can be higher than that of a large 
country (cfr. Cases II and III). This implies that different states 
place correspondingly different evaluations on the consumed amount 
of the public good that is not domestically produced. A state's evalua­
tion of the public good spillover is reflected in the slope of its 
reaction curve. If the slope of the reaction curve approaches zero, 
then the country highly values the marginal increases of public 
good consumption ; if the slope approaches one, then the country is 
not much interested in additional consumption of the good.
The intersection of the reaction curve will determine the equi­
librium public good output of both countries. The equilibrium con­
ditions of public good output, i.e., the isolation output and the 
slope of the reaction curve, uill determine how muwh each country 
will actually provide of the good. However, the two reaction curves 
need not always intersect. In this case the equilibrium output will 
be the same as the isolation output of the country with the largest 
isolation output before the independent adjustment process. Then 
the general conclusion of Table V - 1 was that the rationale for in­
ternational cooperation with respect to the provision of a single 
public good stems directly from the relative importance of the public 
good's marginal increases.
The analysis implicitly assumes the existence of several public 
goods, because this may reveal a variety of preferences with regard 
to the public goods. And it is this variety of preferences which 
may engender international cooperation for an increased supply of 
public goods. A multi-purposed organization in which members have 
differing interests creates an environment facilitating the recogni­
tion of varied preferences and therefore room for cooperation be­
tween countries as to the supply for public goods. Henceforth, an 
organization should be structured in a way that disadvantages of 
non-cooperation and changes for mutually advantageous exchange and 
economic cooperation are readily apparent to members. In short, we
discussed equilibrium public good conditions that may bring forth 
international cooperation between large and small countries as to 
public good supplies. The results demonstrated that with the in­
troduction of preferences, Olson's exploitation hypothesis with 
regard to the cost-benefit ratio of public goods, needs to be 
qualified (1).
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(1) Our analysis concentrated on the cost-sharing arrangements with 
regard to the public good production. However, exploitation 
of one country by another should perhaps not be measured only 
by cost-sharing, but also by the gains of living in an interna­
tional environment (for instance, comparing production and con­
sumption at open equilibrium with the production and consumption 
in isolation for the two countries).
-170-
B. An International Cooperation Model : A Re-statement of Ruggie's 
Model
Introduction
In the elaboration of Olson's public good model we were pri­
marily concerned with an analysis of the equilibrium conditions 
of public good output for countries of different size. It uas 
meant to offer a qualification of Olson's conclusion that large 
countries are exploited by small ones with regard to the cost- 
benefit ratio of public goods. By introducing preferences into 
the analysis, it uas argued that mutually advantageous exchange 
may lead to cooperation between large and small countries about 
public good supplies.
Here ue introduce an international cooperation model, very 
much inspired by Ruggie, to add an important qualifying perspective 
to the study of the actual behaviour of states touards international 
cooperation (1). Whereas Olson's model analyzes the behaviour of 
states in the presence of a public good, the international coopera­
tion model puts its emphasis on the choice betueen national organi­
zational and international organizational arrangements that coun­
tries face in the pursuit of their objectives. Uhat is a state's 
rationale, given certain possibilities and constraints, to select 
from among alternative modes of achieving objectives, both national 
and international?
(1) Ue should be aware that Ruggie is a political scientist who 
starts off his analysis from an International Relations' per­
spective. Ue refer to Ruggie, 3.G., Collective Goods and 
Future International Collaboration, American Political Science 
R e v i e w , Vol. 66, 1972-2, p. 874-892 ; and Ruggie, 3.G., Inter- 
national Responses to technology : Concepts of Trends, Inter­
national Organization, Vol. 29-3, 1975, p. 557-583.
1« R u q o i e’s Model of International Collaboration
Very briefly we explicate the main assumptions upon which 
Rugaie's analysis is based, i.e., the structure of the. contemporary 
interstate system and the states as actors within that system. They 
both fall completely into the framework of the Rational Actor Model 
we explained in Chapter I .
The contemporary interstate system is viewed as "a partially 
modified Westphalia system : still essentially decentralized, and 
based upon the will of states, but with each state willing to accept 
and to engage in some form and some extent of international organi­
zation (1) ".
States are v/ieued "as knowing what it is they will, and of being 
able to order the various things they will in terms of priority. 
Moreover, I view them as preferring to accomplish more of an objec­
tive rather than less, and of wishing to do so with the least ne­
cessary expenditures of limited resources. Finally, ... I view 
states as preferring to limit their dependence upon others to the 
least necessary level above that assumed for all states (2)". In 
short, states are seen as rational actors. It is thus obvious that 
both assumptions fit into the Rational Actor Model. Ue may now in­
troduce Ruggie's general model.
The basic model imagines a world consisting of two identical 
states A and B, having identical preferences and resources ; state 
A being confronted with the choice of what combination of national 
and international arrangements it needs to perform a given task ; 
constant returns to scale ; and, finally, no direct interaction 
between A and B.
What a state will try to accomplish through international 
arrangements - defined by Ruggie as ’the propensity for internation­
al o r g a n i z a t i o n’ - is determined by an interplay between the need 
to become dependent upon others for the performance of specific
(1) Ruggie, 3.G., Collective Goods and Future International Colla 
boration, American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, 1972-2, 
p. 877.
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t . . p. 878.
tasks, and the general desire to keep such dependence to the 
minimum level necessary. Ruggie constructed a point demonstrating 
that relationship. This is diagrammatically shoun in Figure V - 13.
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Figure \l- 13 Ruggie's Model
Transformation curve T T determines the optimum allocation
0 0
of country A's resources between national and international arrange­
ments. This production possibility curve represents the locus of 
feasible and efficient combinations of national and international 
'task performance' that A can secure, given its level of national 
resources. The slope of the curve at any point indicates the margin­
al rate of transformation of national for international arrange­
ments (or vice versa), i.e., how much more international performance 
can be obtained by transferring resources from national arrangements.
In the same figure Ruggie has plotted a set of indifference 
curves. They indicate the preferences of a state between coopera­
tion with other states of the performance by any one particular 
task and the desire to maintain limited dependence upon others.
The slope of the curve at any point indicates the marginal rate of 
substitution of one good for the other one, i.e., the extra benefit 
gained by foregoing one extra unit of 'national task performance' 
for one extra unit of international arrangement.
Uhat country A will seek to do is then defined by equilibrium
point E . point of tangency between the transformation curve T T 
o’ o o
and the highest possible indifference curve. At E q , MRS = NRT.
The coordinates of E will mark the combination of organizational
o
arrangements that country A will select, i.e., I and N . The
6 6
interplay between the need to become dependent upon the others for 
the performance of particular tasks, and the general preference to 
keep such dependencies limited, is graphically expressed by this 
equilibrium point of the general model.
Ruggie then relaxes a number of the initial assumptions of the 
model by introducing inequality of national resources and the fac­
tor 'time' into the analysis (1). The impact of these varying con­
ditions upon the equilibrium point demonstrates that : 1) "There 
exists an inverse relationship between the ratio of i/n and the total 
level of national resources" (2) (i being 'the task performance 
through international organization' ; and n 'the task performance 
through national organization') ; 2) "Over time, as national capabi­
lities increase and become sufficient to perform a given task, the 
propensity for international organization decreases” (3).
To illustrate the postulated changes in the equilibrium point 
of the basic model that the above propositions indicate, Ruggie has 
examined the behaviour of industrialized countries in two areas,
i.e., the funding of development assistance and the financing of
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(1) Ibid., o p . c i t . , p. 880-882.
(2) Ibid., o p . c i t . t p. 881.
(3) Ibid., o p . c i t . t p. 881.
research and development. Actual behavioural tendencies in both 
areas suggested a good approximation of the hypotheses.
2. Re-statement of the International Cooperation Model
So far I have presented the basic dynamics of Ruggie's model 
of international cooperation. His hypotheses are very useful and 
interesting to deal with, certainly if one is interested in ana­
lyzing the behaviour of states towards international cooperation, 
uhatever output these international arrangements may bring forth. 
Because I felt ill at ease with Ruggie's confusing terminology 
of the model, in the further course of this part I will try 
to re-state the arguments of the international cooperation model, 
based on a more explicitly economic reasoning.
There may be different ways to interpret Ruggie's model of inter­
national cooperation. Here we reason in a production scheme.
Given a fixed amount of resources, a state faces the problem of 
which kind of combination of two qualitatively different goods, i.e., 
national arrangements and international arrangements, it will choose 
to pursue its objective.
Ue draw on Ruggie's basic figure (Figure V—13) for our own ex­
planation. The transformation curve T T indicates the feasible
o o
and efficient combinations of national and international arrangements 
a country can secure, given its fixed total level of resources. Ue 
assume an 'increasing opportunity cost', so that the transformation 
curve has a concave shape. In this output scheme different commu­
nity indifference curves are drawn. They rank the preferences for 
a total level of utility derived from different combinations of the 
two goods. The steep slope of these indifference curves indicate 
the relative high preference for the national arrangements, i.e., 
before a country would be willing to give up one unit of N, the 
payment in terms of units of I would need to be quite large. The 
country will now choose the best possible combination of the two 
goods,given its total level of resources and preferences. This is
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indicated at equilibrium point E q . A corner solution exists uhen 
the equilibrium is situated on the I-intersect, i.e., given the 
level of resources, a country does not produce any national arrange­
ments to achieve an objective and does spend all of its resources 
in international arrangements. This possibility may be viewed as 
a real case for countries with very small resource bases.
In any case, it may well be impossible to operationalize such an 
equilibrium point in an empirical setting. However, it is not 
purpose to do so. Uhat is important here is the emphasis on the 
choice a country has in achieving an objective by selecting a par­
ticular combination of national and international arrangements. 
Having presented the basic model, we now introduce some additional 
conditions.
Instead of assuming identical actors, we recognize - as Ruggie 
has done - the possibility of different states with different le­
vels of national resources. This inequality of resources is related 
to the choice a country has between national and international 
arrangements to achieve its objective. Figure V/-14 repeats the ge­
neral model for country A : a transformation curve T T , a set of
’ 0 0'
indifference curves and the point of equilibrium E .
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Figure V/-14 Combination of National and 
International Arrangements
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If A's level of resources were, however, actually lower than the
amount indicated by T T , the overall level of possibilities would
o o
decrease and the transformation curve would shift inward towards 
the origin T ). Similarly, were A's level of resources to be 
higher, the T q T q curve would shift outward, away from the origin
< V b >-
The transformation curves of countries with different levels 
of resources are drawn in the sense that the rate of transformation 
between the production of international arrangements and the pro­
duction of national arrangements decreases as the size increases.
As to a higher output of national arrangements it is assumed that 
the higher the resource base of a country the less resources need to 
be given up from the production of the international arrangements ; 
or the lower the resource base of a country the more resources need 
to be given up from the production of the international arrangements. 
This situation is clearly shown in Figure V - 14 when countries with 
different levels of national resources move from to N£. In other 
words, for countries with small resource bases returns to scale are 
very important in the production of national arrangements, while 
they are rather negligible in the production of international arrange­
ments.
In Figure V-15 different transformation curves are plotted for 
countries with different resource bases. Both national and inter­
national arrangements can be seen to increase as the level of n a t i o n ­
al resources increases,and decreases as resources decrease, but not 
by like amounts. The consecutive points of equilibria indicate differ­
ent combinations of organizational arrangements that countries will 
select. In practice, it means that the ratio of international 
arrangements over national arrangements decreases the higher the to­
tal level of national resources, and increases the lower the level 
of resources. There seems to be an inverse relationship between the 
ratio of international over national arrangements and the total level 
of national resources.
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Figure V - 1 5 The Impact of Inequality of
National Resources
The line linking the different equilibrium points demonstrates 
the impact of inequality of national resources on the combination 
of goods N and I the countries will select. The shape of this line 
is determined by the returns to scale in the production of the two 
goods. It is probably the case that countries with very small resource 
bases will spend all their available resources on the output of in­
ternational arrangements to attain a specific objective. In this 
case the line linking the different equilibrium points will start 
off from the I-intersect.
The operationalization of these hypotheses in an empirical 
setting brings us to two related hypotheses : 1) there exists an 
inverse relationship between the ratio I/N and the total level of 
national resources ; and 2) there exists an inverse relationship be­
tween the proportion of national resources devoted to a specific 
objective and the ratio of I/N. These hypotheses will be taken and 
tested in the analysis of the Foreign Aid Sector which will be dealt 
with in the last chapter.
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Equally interesting is another implication which can also be 
derived from Figure V-15, i.e., the impact of the time factor on 
the combination of national and international arrangements. This 
impact of changing levels of national resources over time for one 
and the same country is demonstrated in this figure. Instead of 
representing different countries with different resource bases at 
one moment, the equilibrium points now indicate the development 
of one country's choice in the production of the two organization­
al arrangements when its resource base is changing over time. As 
national resources rise, the combination of N and I changes. The 
production of both arrangements increases : I increases, but at ever 
smaller increments, and eventually levels off ; N on the other hand, 
continues to rise as long as resources rise, and as long as the 
specific objective is to be achieved. In short, this indicates that 
as the national resource base increases over time, a country will 
increasingly produce national arrangements to achieve its specific 
objective. To operationalize this implication in an empirical 
setting, it is stated that over time, as national resources increase 
and become sufficient to achieve a given objective, the relationship 
of international over national arrangements uill decrease.
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Conclusion
Ruggie's international cooperation model that we re-stated in 
a more economic reasoning adds another element to the analysis 
of the behaviour of states towards international cooperation.
Olson's rather straightforward' public good model does not take 
much interest in the analysis of alternate modes of pursuing one's 
objectives. He only analyzes the production behaviour of coun­
tries in the presence of a public good in international relations. 
Ruggie's international cooperation model is situated in a joint 
production framework. He considers the choice of a combination of 
two goods in the pursuit of an objective. In addition, while Olson's 
arguments are based on the consequences of the characteristics of a 
public good, Ruggie's model is based on the impact of the returns 
to scale-argument in the production of national and international 
arrangements.
Resuming, in the study of the actual behavidur of states towards 
international collaborative arrangements, both complementing per­
spectives should be taken into consideration, i.e., the output of 
public goods for countries of different size and with different 
preferences, and the choice between national and international 
arrangements that countries with different resource bases are face- 
ing in the pursuit of their objectives. It also implies that we 
arrive at a rather complex set of propositions with regard to the 
behaviour of small states towards international arrangements* On 
the one hand, Olson's public good model is related to the 'exploi- 
tation- h y p o t h e s i s ' of the big by the small in the production of a 
public good, qualified, however, by the introduction of differential 
preferences of countries towards the consumption of a public good. 
Ruggie's international cooperation model, on the other hand, is 
related to the hypothesis that countries with smaller resource bases 
have important returns to scale in the production of national 
arrangements, i.e., the smaller the level of national resources, 
the more a country will look for international arrangements in the 
pursuit of its objectives.
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In the following empirical analysis of the Foreign Aid Sector, 
ue mill profit by the combined impact of these two perspectives of 
international cooperation to assess the performance of the objective 
of development assistance and its financing through multilateral and 
bilateral aid channels for a number of industrialized countries.

CHAPTER UI THE PHENOMENON OF ‘INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID
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Introduction
The time has come to turn our attention to the more empirical 
part of our study. International development aid is taken as that 
area of international cooperation in which the assumptions and tools 
of the Rational Actor Approach will be tested (l). This method of 
analysis does not imply a value judgement about the reasons, the 
amounts and channels of foreign aid. It only aims at an analysis 
and/or tentative explanation of the foreign aid behaviour of some 
donor countries according to some assumptions and analytical tools.
In this chapter we present a descriptive analysis of the pheno­
menon of international development aid. First, we describe the 
history of development aid since World War II; Second, we present 
the general characteristics of the aid performance of a specific 
donor group.
International development aid has become known under the form 
of a political notion. Like most political notions it is subject 
to varying interpretations. In many governmental aid programs de­
velopment aid has got intertwined with military aid, political 
support, export promotion or cultural propaganda. Often, such 
varied private activities as missionary work, industrial investment
(1) The analysis of aid now seems to have achieved the status of a 
distinct field of study and, consequently, there exists a large 
number of textbooks. For some particularly useful ones, see 
Bhagwati, 3. and Eckaus, R.S. (eds.), Foreign A i d , Harmondsworth, 
England: Penguin, 1970 ; Hunter, R.E. and Rielly, 3.E. (eds.), 
Development To d a y , New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972 ; Little, 
i.M. and Clifford, 3.M., International Aid, London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1965 ; Mikesell, R.f1., Economics of Foreign Aid. London: 
Ueidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968 ; ftincus, 3., Economic"~Aid and 
International Cost Sharing, Baltimore: The 3ohns Hopkins Univer­
sity Press, 1^65 ; Wall, D., The Charity of N a t i o n s , New York: 
Basic Books, 1973 ; White, 3.. The Politics of Foreign Aid. 
London: Bodley Head, 1974 ; Zeylstra. W.G., Aid of Development : 
The Relevance of Development Aid to Problems 'of Developing Coun­
tries, L e i d e n : A.W. Sijthof, 1975.
and lending at commercial'rates of interests are being referred 
to as 'aid'. In short, it is an ambiguous political notion.
moreover, statements on foreign aid policy are often not suffi­
ciently precise to meet the requirements of the social scientists 
for a rigorous analysis of the means for achieving well-defined 
ends. Motives, targets, and policy instruments tend to become 
confused in the rhetoric of public policy statements. Hence, 
it is not a very easy task to aim at generalizing conclusions and 
theoretical analyses in a complex and fluid field such as Foreign 
Aid. A mere glance in the Foreign Aid field will quickly confirm 
this tendency. One may note several distinct perspectives.
If one adopts the perspective of the donor countries, foreign 
aid may serve national objectives, ranging from direct economic or 
security aims to the promotion of world peace and stability. Al­
though the U.S. foreign aid doctrine has undergone several shifts 
since Uorld Uar II, basically aid has been seen as a means of carry­
ing out national foreign policy objectives. For the European colo­
nial powers, aid has been closely associated with national policy 
objectives relating to former dependencies with which they continue 
to have special economic and political ties. Other donors concen­
trate more on a purely economic rationale for their aid disburse­
ments, while still others put more emphasis on the humanitarian 
motive of foreign a i d V ^ T h e  multiplicity of these goals and the 
changes in their importance over the last decades have affected the 
aid performance of the donor countries in volume as well as in dis­
tribution of the disbursements. The diversity of goals makes the 
use of theoretical models to analyze the behaviour donor countries 
somewhat restrictive. Any scientific undertaking in the foreign 
aid domain ought to be aware of the limitations of this analysis.
Foreign aid doctrine in the recipient countries is usually 
based on an entirely different philosophy of aid from that held by 
the donors. They are frequently resentful or suspicious of the 
donor countries' national objectives that are being served by aid. 
Recipient countries tend to regard aid as an obligation of rich 
countries, and a right of the recipients. Therefore, one can
understand that most recipient countries prefer that aid be 
provided by United Nations' agencies, largely controlled by 
developing countries but financed by the developed countries.
Goran Ohlin has suggested a 'United Nations Approach' towards 
foreign aid. It regards aid as a moral responsibility on the 
part of the advanced countries and an essential element in pro­
gress towards international peace and stability (1). None of 
the various aid doctrines are mutually exclusive and elements 
of the United Nations doctrine can be found in varying degrees 
among the national objectives of aid expressed by donor countries.
In the further course of the study we have chosen to limit our­
selves to the analysis of development assistance by donor countries.
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(1) Ohlin, G., Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered. Paris: OECD, 1966.
A. The History of the Phenomenon of International Development Aid
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In the history of the phenomenon of international development 
aid, ue uill describe the impact of the changing characteristics 
of the international system on the actual aid performance of donor 
countries* It uill become clear that development aid since World 
War II has experienced distinctive periods of focus, content and 
form of aid. These changing elements have often found an expression 
in the actual aid policies of donor countries. This uill be shoun 
in the follouing historical section (1).
1. Idealism of the Immediate Postwar Period
The immediate postuar period was marked by a strong idealism. 
This idealism was not so much a response to external impulses, but 
was rather inspired by a growing awareness of responsibility for 
the state of the world at large after the terrible experience of 
the Second World War. The conferences of Breton Woods and San 
Francisco were expressions of this idealism.
Two new financial institutions were created, i.e., the Interna­
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the In­
ternational Monetary Fund (IHF). They were organized to cope with 
tasks such as the reconstruction of Europe, the restoration of in­
ternational trade, and the development of backward areas. At the 
founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 the spirit 
of the world uas reflected by the wording of the Charter ; "To 
achieve international cooperation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character" • (2); 
and this uas adopted as a common purpose.
Very soon, however, it became evident that the reconstruction 
in Europe and the development of backward areas uere tasks of alto-
(1) For part of the evolution of 'International Development Aid' 
ue rely on Zeylstra, U.G., Aid or Development. The Relevance
of Development Aid to problems of Developing c o u n t r i e s , Leiden;
• A.U. Sijthoff, 1975, p. 9-103.
(2) Ibid., op.cit., p. 26.
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gether different dimensions from those foreseen in Breton Uoods, 
and would require efforts far beyond the possibilities entrusted 
to IBRD and IMF. Moreover, the spirit of solidarity among the 
allies did not long survive the end of hostilities. It certainly 
weakened the prospects of a collective approach to world problems.
The practical point of reference for the assistance envisaged 
in Breton Uoods has been the economic aid the U.S. had given to 
allies from 1941 under the Lend-Lease arrangements. This kind of 
assistance had not been new. International aid had been known as 
an instrument for obtaining short-term political resalts in the 
national interest. Also during the First Uorld Uar the U.S. had 
lent large sums to its European allies, to be refunded after the 
war. The Breton Uoods conference introduced the idea of foreign 
aid, not exclusively motivated by the specific national interests 
of the donor nor given in expectation of rapid results. Uith a 
view to these distinctions the Americans had insisted that the ope­
ration of foreign aid should be a matter for international cooperation, 
though realizing that initially they themselves would have to carry 
the main burden.
Coming out of the uar as the only participating country with 
its economic potential undamaged and even considerably increased, 
the U.S. was torn between interest in seeing its European allies 
recover from the uar and reluctance to accept long-term engagements 
for this purpose. For this reason, the U.S. policy was directed to 
consolidating the multilateral aid agencies within the United Na­
tions' framework as a permanent form of mutual cooperation.
This American strategy for a multilateral drive in development 
assistance, however, did not work very succesfully. The urgent de­
mands for aid in Europe left no room for development assistance to 
backward areas. Because of the heavy dependence of the multilateral 
aid agencies on American distributions, the non-European applicants 
started to accuse the U.S. of discriminating against them. Under 
the pressure of these criticisms the American government increasing­
ly resorted to bilateral assistance. Thus, circumstances forced the 
U.S. gradually to relinquish the axiom that solving international 
problems of an economic and social character should be left to in­
ternational organizations.
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2. The Truman Doctrine ; Consent and Effects
The swift change of U.S. conception of development assistance 
was backed by an ideology, professing the U.S. to be a model to 
all other nations and 'the American way of life' the key to solving 
social problems. This identification of the affairs of the world 
at large with those of the U.S. explained why American bilateral 
aid programs, although still motivated by national self-interest, 
also started to be represented as altruistic and directed towards 
the benefits of the receiving countries. However, this combined 
impact of a humanitarian and a foreign policy view of aid allocation 
proved to be a very short-lived illusion.
The Greek-Turkish conflict in 1947 forced the U.S. to adopt 
a new policy which was formally put forward in the Truman Doctrine. 
Henceforth, bilateral economic assistance would be accepted in the 
U.S. as a form of national self-protection. The U.S., in effect, 
assumed a position of world leadership in which it identified its 
own national interest, most broadly defined, with that of other 
countries in the free world (1). This assumption of identity of 
interest formed the core of its aid policy.
The core of the Truman Doctrine was that the new American poli­
cy, i.e., "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted sub­
jugation by armed minorities or by outside pressured ... (and to) 
assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own 
way" would be pursued "primarily through economic and financial aid 
which is essential to economic stability and orderly political pro­
cesses" (2).
(1) A survey of American foreign aid since 1941, published by the 
Brookings Institution defined foreign assistance as "the use 
of public funds to finance the transfer of goods and services 
abroad as a means of obtaining stated objectives of American 
foreign policy”. Those objectives were "to strengthen countries 
making common cause with the United States in resisting - ' 
aggression; and to strive for the establishment throughout the 
world of the conditions of stability and progress that are 
essential to the security and well-being of the United States", 
in Brown, W.A. Jr. and Opie, R., American Foreign Assistance. 
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1953.
(2) Zeylstra, W.G., o p . c i t ., p. 33.
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The Truman Doctrine has acquired special significance as the 
preface to the Marshall Plan, the most extensive program of bila­
teral aid that history has yet seen. The ’Marshall' aid included 
not only material and financial aid, but besides, technical assis­
tance, transfer of know-how, and the financing of projects. When 
the aid became a reality, the rscipient countries were forced to in­
corporate their policies into the Organization of European Economic 
Cooperation.
Whatever the merits of the results produced by the 'Marshall' 
aid, they bore little relation to its original objective as stated 
in the preamble of the Economic Cooperation Act : "to promote world 
peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign poli­
cy of the U.S. through economic, financial and other measures ne<- 
cessary to the maintenance of conditions abroad in which free insti­
tutions may survive in consistence with the maintenance of the 
strength and stability of the United States" (l). Once the program 
had been set in motion, it started achieving a rationale of its own, 
stressing the national security objective of foreign aid.
The communist invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, suddenly 
placed the problem in a completely different light. From then on, 
the remaining part of the program was directed towards more than 
one objective : not only should production in Western Europe be 
sufficient to guarantee a certain standard of prosperity, but also 
allow the region's rearmament. The Cold Uar was at its highest 
point. It constituted the core of the American aid policy.
This situation also brought a new orientation of the American 
bilateral aid policy into existence, i.e., bilateral economic aid 
was extended to regions outside Europe. Truman's Point Four Pro­
gram can be regarded as the first break-through of development coope­
ration in the direction of a world wide vision (2). In practice,
(1) Ibid., o p . c l t . , p. 31.
(2) For a more extensive discussion of Truman's Point Four Program 
we refer to Brown, W.A. Jr. and Opie, R., American Foreign 
Assistance, Washington D.C.ï The Brookings Institition, 1953 ; 
and Banfield, E.C., American Foreign Aid Do c t r i n e s , Washington 
D.C.î American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1963.
however, there uas no question of rejecting American self-interest 
as the main criterion for the distribution of aid. Simultaneously, 
a more liberal funding uas provided to the programs of the United 
Nations.
Point Four has not inspired other countries immediately to 
follow the American example. Up to the end of the 1950s, aid to 
poor, independent states by industrialized countries outside the 
U.S. was pretty well restricted to the amounts subscribed to the 
United Nations agencies and programs. From about 1960, however, 
these countries increased their aid effort, mainly by the way of 
bilateral assistance to their former colonies.
3. The First Development Decade
a. The Decolonization Process
It can be argued that 1960 was a milestone in the history of 
development aid. Around this year a change in the patterns of 
assistance can be discerned. This shift in behaviour of a number 
of countries was linked to the political transformation of the 
underdeveloped world resulting from the decolonization process (1).
It is understandable that this new situation led to an increase 
of existing American programs. Decolonization opened large areas 
to U.S. influence which had formerly been exclusively the political 
responsibility of the colonial powers. Moreover, the former European 
colonial powers France, United Kingdom, Portugal and Belgium emerged 
as important contributors of bilateral aid. This trend clearly 
points towards a certain relationship between assistance and decolo­
nization. In other words, the historical relationships with the 
principal recipients were an important motivation of development 
assistance for the former colonial powers.
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(1) A good discussion about the decolonization period can be found 
in Little, I.FI. and Clifford, 3.FI., International A i d , London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1965, p. 30-45.
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b. Financial Aid as the Principal Need
The changed atmosphere was responded to with the establishment 
in 1959 of the International Development Association (IDA) and the 
United Nations Special Fund (UNSF), but even 3 0  the possibilities 
of distributing aid through the United Nations remained far short 
of the urging needs of the developing countries. While the rich 
countries stubbornly resisted efforts further to enlarge U.N. funds 
for development finance, they increased their bilateral aid. They 
were prepared to recognize development aid to any country in need 
of it as a collective duty of all U.N. members, but uere not yet 
convinced of the importance of multilateral aid. The objective 
nto acclerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of the econo­
my of the individual nations and their social advancement" (1 ) was 
expressed by a resolution declaring the Nineteensixties the 'United 
Nations Development Decade'. It implied that all rich countries 
should recognize a common responsibility for doing their share to 
help attain this objective (2).
The propaganda accompanying the introduction of the Development 
Decade mainly served to win public support for decisions of govern­
ments to assist developing countries. The general public uas en­
couraged to regard development aid as a category within public ex­
penditure by which an international moral obligation would be ful­
filled. It created a receptive atmosphere for an appeal of develop­
ment assistance. In practice, however, the aid programs remained 
very much linked to the pursuit of political aims considered to be 
of national interest of the donors and proved to be of an increasing­
ly financial character.
(1) XXX, The United Nations Development D e c a d e , Neu York: United 
Nations, 1962, p. 7.
(2) In Singer, H.W., International Development Development : Growth 
and C h a n o e , New York: ClcGraw Hill, 1964, p. 31, the author summa­
rizes very well the course that the events actually took :
"A major recent development which could not have been foreseen, 
has been the spread of public financial aid from developed coun­
tries to the underdeveloped countries. The most striking thing 
about this is not the giving of aid itself but the degree in 
which giving aid has become a recognized responsibility of the 
more advanced countries and an institution which they recognize as 
being in their enlightened self-interest".
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This emphasis on the financial aspect of aid suggested that 
development aid uas seen from a mere economic perspective. Parti­
cularly since it would be related to the effect of the Marshall Aid, 
the problems of the developing countries were seen in terms of the 
standard of living only. It followed that these problems could be 
identified by observing discrepancies and similarities between data 
on both groups of countries through comparison. And comparability 
could only be achieved through quantification. In short,the develop­
ment economists defined development as a measurable concept. More­
over» the presentation of aid as a predominantly financial affair 
facilitated publication of comparative information concerning aid 
efforts of the rich countries and the geographical allocation of 
assistance.
The view of development aid as primarily a matter of supplying 
financial flows to developing countries has been embodied in the 
famous 'one per cent target', adopted by the U.N. General Assembly 
in 1960, elaborated at the meeting of UNCTAD in Geneva '1964' and 
endorsed in 1964 by the DAC (1). We refer to the next section for 
a more detailed statistical analysis of the resource flows of the 
members of the Development Assistance Committee to the developing 
countries.
Soon, the initial optimism of the Development Decade showed 
signs of cooling down. Development financing did not bring about 
a large-scale take-off in the developing world as the development 
economists had hoped for. The rich countries introduced the notion 
of development cooperation, which suggested that development results 
were as much depending on the efforts of the recipient countries as 
on the support of the donors. The UNCTAD conferences provided this 
notion with an institutional basis.
At the end of the Decade a further shift of responsibility to­
wards the developing countries became noticeable. In 1970 the 
Peterson Report suggested that the U.S. should redesign its policies 
so that "the developing countries stand at the center of the inter-
(1) A critical rsvieu ia given in XXX, Partners in D e v e l o p m e n t . 
Pearson R e p o r t . New York: Praegers Publishers,  1969.
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national development effort, establishing their oun priorities 
and receiving assistance to the efforts they are making on their 
oun behalf" (1).
c. Preference for Bilateral Aid
Throughout the Development Decade the advanced countries have 
persisted in giving proof of a clear preference for bilateral deve­
lopment assistance over the intermediary of the various United N a ­
tions* and other multilateral channels for its distribution. This 
indicates that many donor countries attach great value to reserving 
for themselves the decision for uhich countries their aid uill be 
intended. It has often resulted in a subordination of development 
aid policies to the promotion of national interests. But frequently, 
the receiving countries too prefer assistance to be bilateral ; often 
they assume that a certain donor country is more familiar with their 
needs than others and than multilateral aid agencies, or is in a 
better position to supply the assistance they require. It resulted 
in a heavy dependence of certain developing countries on one or a 
feu bilateral donors. Traditional examples are the degree to uhich 
Latin American countries have had to look to the U.S. for aid, the 
position of France in a number of former French areas, the U.K. re­
lationship uith the Commonuealth or the close Belgian ties uith 
Zaire.
In retrospect, since the First Development Decade began, deve­
loping countries have made some progress in their social and econo­
mic development. In major part, the economic grouth of developing 
countries has been export-led, a response to the growing uorld mar­
ket, in particular, the rapid expansion of the OECD countries. Hou- 
ever, some argued that these successes in aggregate economic grouth 
were accompanied by a deterioration in the terms of trade of almost 
all developing countries. Therefore, one should be very careful 
in assessing the aid achievement of this period.
(1) Report to the President of the United States from the Task 
Force on International Development : U.S. Foreign Assistance 
in the 1970s : A New Approach (Petarson Report), Washington 
D.C., 1970, p. 3.
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4. The Second Development Decade
a. The Changed International Environment of Development Cooperation
A troubled international system made the start of the Second 
Development Decade quite difficult. The world monetary situation 
was shaken by the 1971 events and the United States was facing the 
most serious domestic economic problems that she had experienced 
since Uorld Uar II. Moreover, the pervasive and global nature of 
problems - persistent inflation in the industrial market economies, 
combined with the precarious global foodgrains situation of the re­
cent years, the explosive increase in oil prices by the OPEC coun­
tries and recession - did drastically change the economic environ­
ment of the development aid and, consequently, affected the develop­
ment partnership among developed and developing countries. Oil- 
importing developing countries suffered major deterioration in their 
terms of trade, caused by the sharp increase in the cost of oil and 
the continued rise in prices of other important goods. Recession 
in the OECD countries compounded the effects of higher import prices 
by cutting deeply into the export of most developing countries as 
the terms of trade deteriorated and the volume of aid declined.
A new element in this changed international environment of de­
velopment cooperation was the emergence of a new group of countries, 
allocating aid to developing countries. The OPEC countries, ex­
ploiting their oil resources as an important economic and political 
power source in the international system, emerged as important do­
nors of aid to non-oil developing countries. The oil countries 
make a clear distinction between politically motivated aid - which 
is likely to be balance of payments aid for likeminded countries - 
and more strictly development oriented project assistance. In other 
words, OPEC became a new factor in the area of development coopera­
tion.
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b. Global Responses
The changed international environment of development coopera­
tion called for a broadly cooperative international frame of refe­
rence. The increasing interest of countries in multilateralization 
of development assistance can be seen in this perspective. In the 
first half of the 1970s a number of declarations of principle and 
important cooperative responses evolved from a series of interna­
tional meetings. They all expressed a concern for the nature and 
the prospects of the development cooperation. In the following 
pages we only indicate the most important ones.
The UNCTAD Conferences in Santiago di Chile and Nairobi gave 
positive recognition to the principle that developing countries 
should be more actively represented at trade and monetary negotia­
tions. More stress has been put on the different needs of differ­
ent countries so that special measures could be introduced for the 
least developed countries. An important factor in this perspective 
was the coming to existence of the Group of 77 developing countries. 
The rich countries, however, became less indulgent to commit them­
selves to policies which might put additional burdens on their ba­
lance of payments.
In 1974 the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted a new approach to trade and development which 
found its expression in the 'Declaration on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order'. Particularly important was the 
launching of the United Nations Emergency Operation to help the 
poorest countries maintain essential imparts. It re-affirmed the 
special and collective help of the international community to the 
poorest countries. The developing countries, on the other hand, 
expressed their interest in a better integration of their trade and 
investment in the global patterns of trade.
An important global response to the broader aid and trade in­
terests of developing countries has been the replacing of the 
Yaoundé-style association by the Lomé Convention of 1975, which
constituted a far-reaching attempt to establish a multilateral 
framework between the European Community and some fifty or so 
African, Carribean and Pacific countries (ACP). The convention 
combined a package of trade, aid and technical measures addressed 
to the needs of developing countries for more integrated assistance 
with their development programs. A novel aspect of the Lomé Con­
vention was the establishment of an export revenue stabilization 
scheme, known as 5TABEX. This scheme helps to stabilize export 
incomes for supplies of some eligible products. It further es­
tablished a fourth European Development Fund with a capital of 
3,000 million EUR (1). The Lomé Convention lasts five years. 
Presently, we are in an interim stage between Lomé I and Lomé II.
Another cooperative global response to the persistent problems 
the countries were facing was the World Food Conference meeting 
in Rome during November 1974. It evoked proposals for a compre­
hensive response to ameliorate world food problems. The Conference 
adopted principles for a cooperative global approach, objectives 
to be achieved over the next decade, and the institutional means 
for attaining them. Actual implementation of the proposals, how­
ever, has not been so successful.
The Second General Conference of UNIDO, held in Lima during 
March 1975, proposed both broad objectives and specific measures 
to encourage the industrialization of the developing countries 
and to increase their share in world industrial production to at 
least 25 % by the end of the century. Important in the Lima Con­
vention is the determination of developing countries to broaden 
their development in an effort to lessen their economic dependence 
as primary producers in the global division of labour.
All these conferences indicate that, despite the disruptive 
events of the early seventies, nations tried to seek common means 
for dealing with problems of development cooperation. They re­
affirmed the principle that the community of nations has a collec­
tive responsibility to protect its weakest members. This spirit
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(1) A good summary is given by Twitchett, C.C., The European
Community and Development Cooperation, International Relations, 
Vol. VI-1, May 1978, p. 257-271.
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of seemingly productiv/e cooperation of the mid-1970s uas well 
summarized in the OECD Ministerial Meeting of May 1975. It 
stressed the need for "increased participation of the developing 
countries in the benefits of an improved and expanding world eco­
nomy and of the progress touards a more balanced and equitable 
structure of international economic relations” (1). Once again, 
it can be said that the collective task of development assistance 
can be considered as an international public good. The problem 
becomes more complicated, however, if one is analyzing the actual 
aid performance of different donors to achieve this collective 
task. Then one may wonder if donor countries have paid more 
than lip service to this generally accepted task of genuine deve­
lopment assistance.
c. Search for a Coherent Basis of Development Cooperation
The last two decades have been characterized by a continuous 
search for a more coherent basis of development cooperation among 
developed and developing countries. The early optimism accompany­
ing the proclamation of the First International Development 
Strategy in 1960,when development cooperation was focussed on the 
gap in living standards and average incomes of developed and de­
veloping countries,proved unfortunate. The strategy for the Deve­
lopment Decade beginning in 1970 attempted a'more comprehensive 
direction of development policies by seeking to engage countries 
in a wide range of issues and sectors, and by setting specific 
targets in order to encourage and measure progress. One important 
new feature uas a better synthesis of social and economic goals. 
However, in practice, the International Development Strategy failed 
to gain effective international support, and was ultimately over­
taken by dramatic changes in the international environment. The 
last few years were marked by a changing outlook which has 
challenged the traditional goals of development and the adequacy 
of past efforts. It has been clear by now that the rich as well
(l) OECD, Development Coop e r a t i o n , 1975 Review, p. 27.
as the poor countries have a direct stake in a more effective 
and coherent pattern of development cooperation.
Uorld opinion has shifted in recent years, placing emphasis 
on greater equity and special progress as the essential objective 
of international development. It resulted in a changing outlook 
for development policies and objectives. Since 1974 the uorld 
has entered a transitional international economic order. The 
perspectives for a neu international order are discussed within 
the framework of the North-South dialogue. There is at the 
moment a growing concern for a new world order in that indus­
trial countries, suffering from inflation and recession, are find­
ing it more difficult to provide for continued growth and stabili­
ty without new means of economic cooperation among themselves and 
with developing countries.
One of the principles which has emerged as a guidepost for 
the transitional economic order is that of accommodation and mu­
tual gain among relevant partners. Recent events in international 
trade and finance have demonstrated interests in common among de­
veloped and developing countries. The objectives of sustained 
and stable world economic growth, freer trade, stable commodity 
markets and security of food and energy supply are in the long 
term interests of all countries. Proposing 'mutual gain benefits' 
on the basis of the interrelatedness of the economic interests is 
now the guideline for development cooperation among developed and 
developing countries. An innovative approach in this respect is 
the 'Programme of Concerted Action' adopted by the OECD Ministers 
in 1978. Overall, however, the North-South dialogue has yielded 
disappointing results up to now. Also the results of the UNCTAD
V Conference proved to be rather disappointing (l). In other 
words, the end of the second Development Decade did not show much 
genuine progress in the development cooperation among the many 
different partners.
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(1) Bischoff, S., UNCTAD V, Overzicht en Evaluatie, Internationale 
Spe c t a t o r . September 1979, p. 527-537 ; Rothstein^ R.L., Global 
Sargaininq. UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Econo­
mic Order, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 19?9.
B. General Characteristics.of the Aid Performance of the Development
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Assistance Committee
1. The Development Assistance Committee
After the description of the history of international develop­
ment aid since World War II, our further attention will now expli­
citly be turned to the analysis of the aid performance of a speci­
fic club of donors, i.e., the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the OECD. The DAC has been by far the most active insti­
tutional form in the area of development cooperation (l). We 
briefly indicate the history and task performance of the DAC.
The history of DAC goes back to 1959. Within the framework of 
the negotiations to restructure the Organization for European Eco­
nomic Cooperation, it was agreed that a Development Assistance 
Group (DAG) should be established to act as a forum for the dis­
cussion of common problems between the Western countries which 
supplied aid to developing areas. With the establishment of the 
OECD, the DAG became the DAC.
DAC's primary real purpose from the U.S. viewpoint was less 
to coordinate than to rfeise the total flow of aid and particularly, 
to increase Europe's share of it. In the London and Tokyo meetings 
of DAC in March and Duly 1961, the U.S. attempted to introduce a 
burden-sharing scheme based on 2 principles : 1) DAC members 
(which were then the U.S., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and the U.K.) should agree to 
contribute one per cent of their combined annual gross national 
product as aid to underdeveloped countries ; 2) contributions to 
that total should be made on the basis of a progressive income 
tax, self-levied by the member governments. In fact, no common 
aid fund was proposed, but each country was supposed to refer its 
own aid effort to these criteria. At the July 1961 meeting, the 
other countries rejected the American proposal, both in respect
(1) See Cunningham, G., The Management of Aid Agencies. London: 
Croom Helm, 1974, Chapter 3.
to total amount and composition. Countries uere not uilling to 
accept constraints on the national budget process that uould 
follou from accepting an international contributions' scheme of 
that magnitude. In effect, the U.S. proposal uas aimed at getting 
other countries to contribute more money to the task of economic 
development of developing countries ; other countries uere un­
willing to commit themselves to any formula that uould ensure 
greater contributions.
As a result of these discussions, the members finally agreed 
on a mere annual revieu procedure based on the NATO-model, which 
would not make specific recommendations on the size of national 
foreign aid budgets. As a matter of fact, it was an.even less 
coercive review than the NATO-system. The annual DAC reviews re­
ferred to no agreed level of aid, but only to the much more gene­
ral criterion of adequacy of effort.
As to its task performance, the OAC is considered a specialized 
committee within the OECD, although membership of the two organi­
zations is not identical. Its chairman, a nominee of the American 
government, is separately appointed and has no other role in the 
OECD. He is the chief official, handling aid and developing 
matters. The Committee possesses a regular staff of professionals 
and carries out a considerable amount of research. Under the D i ­
rector for Development Assistance there are three divisions - the 
Economic Development Division, the Aid Review Division and the Fi­
nancial Policy Division - and a Statistical Unit. The most regular 
activity of DAC is the annual Aid Review.
This review publication, which now goes under the title 'De­
velopment Cooperation : Efforts and Policies of the Members of the 
Development Assistance Committee' collects and evaluates statistic­
al material concerning new developments and general trends, volume, 
geographical allocation, distribution between types of aid, terms 
of aid, aid-tying, guaranteed export credits, private investment 
and contributions by private organizations. It constitutes the 
most comprehensive readily available source for statistics and 
comments on the programs of Western donors. Ue make abundant 
use of these resources for the empirical part of our study.
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' The geographical distribution of aid is published every feu 
years under the title ‘Geographical Distribution of Financial Flous 
to less Developed Countries*. The third main publication, also 
produced every feu years, is the so-called ’Flous R e p o r t’, uhose 
full title is ’Resources for the Developing Uorld, the Flow of Fi­
nancial Resources to Less Developed C o u n t r i e s’. This volume con­
tains much detailed material on each donor's program and is there­
fore useful in assessing the aid performances of the different 
DAC members
2. Methodology
Resource flous to developing countries remain difficult to 
measure (1). The most comprehensive figures that are available 
cover official flous from DAC member countries and multilateral 
agencies. The information about the DAC members ue use for our 
analysis is taken from the just mentioned official and published 
sources. The bulk of it is obtained from the D A C’s annual aid re- 
vieus. Despite recent improvements in published information, the 
figures still need to be treated uith some caution. A feu comments 
may suffice.
In the past DAC has refrained from committing itself on an ac­
tual definition of aid, accepting instead all non-military govern­
ment contributions in cash and kind from member countries to de­
veloping countries into a broad category designated as ’the flow of 
official financial resources'. Since the publication of the Pearson 
Report this category has been supplemented by a narrower one, termed 
'official development assistance' from uhich official export credits 
and official loans on non-concessionary terms have been excluded.
The term ’aid' nou refers only to official development assis­
tance uhich covers resources provided to the developing countries 
and the multilateral agencies 1) by the public sector, 2) uith the 
promotion of the economic .development and uelfare of developing
(1) See Dinuiddy, B., Aid Performance and Development Policies of 
Uestern Countries« Studies U.S.. U.K.. EEC and butch P r o grams, 
Neu York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.
countries as its main objective and 3) including an element of con­
cessionality (i.e., grants or loans with at least 25 % grant ele­
ment) (1). In 1978 such flows (net disbursements) amounted to 
$  19.9 billion.
Total flows ( $ 7 1 . 3  billion in 1978), to which the internatio­
nal target of one per cent of GNP applies, include, beside official
development assistance the following categories :
1) Other official flows ( .$5.2 billion in 1978), 
i.e., those made on terms approximating to market 
conditions, e.g., official export credits, the 
taking up of IBRD bond issues by central banks 
e t c . ;
2) Private flows at market terms ( $ 4 4  billion in 
1978), e.g., direct investment, portfollio in­
vestment, private export credits ;
3) Grants by private voluntary agencies, e.g., foun­
dations, missions and other non profit-making
organizations which have been included in DAC 
figures since 1970 - approximately $  1 .7" billion).
The distinguishing of these various categories has been a useful 
step towards the formulation of a more precise definition of aid.
It should, however, not obscure the fact that the implication of 
the present definition is still unsatisfactory and allows the in­
clusion of items which can only doubtfully be interpreted as develop­
ment aid.
Another problem which must make us careful of any conclusion 
about aid performance of donor countries, is the arbitrary line that 
separates developing from other countries. The countries and terri­
tories which are recipients of the bilateral flows taken into account 
by the DAC comprise ; 1) all African countries and territories with 
the exception of South Africa, 2) all American countries and terri­
tories with the exception of the U.S. and Canada, 3) all the non­
communist Asian and Ocean countries and territories with the exclu­
sion of Australia, Japan and New Zealand, and 4) in Southern Europe :
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(1) OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n . 1978 Review, p. 171
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Cyprus, Gibraltar, Greece, Malta, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
This large list of developing countries used by DAC explains large­
ly the differences against the figures published by the United Nations.
Flows of the last group of recipients are not included in the U.N.
figures. Moreover, the DAC subdivision includes a number of coun­
tries which are relatively well off in the developing group, so 
that these countries receive aid which counts in the DAC figures.
Apart from the difficulty of choosing the flows that deserve 
to qualify as development assistance, there are also problems of 
measuring the recorded flows. ODA, e.g., may be in cash or kind, in 
free foreign exchange or tied to donor procurement, and may carry 
restrictive conditions on its use. Its real value may therefore di­
verge considerably from its nominal value as recorded in aid statis­
tics. Although statistics on resource flows are given in net terms, 
it must be emphasized that, in arriving at the net figures only amor­
tization and disinvestment are deducted. The figures often overstate 
the true net resource flow in any given period and should therefore 
be read with some caution.
3. Main Characteristics of the Period 1963-1977
As a matter of practical and statistical convenience we will 
roughly concentrate for the further analysis on the period 1963- 
1977. For the DAC countries taken as a whole, this period was mark­
ed by 1) a significant increase in monetary terms as well as in real 
terms of the total flow of resources to the developing countries and 
also an increase in the proportion of these flows to GNP ; 2) a de­
crease of the official development assistance as a percentage of GNP 
as well as a percentage of total flows ; 3) an appreciable increase 
in the volume of resources made available to multilateral aid agen?- 
cies as well as an increase in its proportion to GNP ; and 4) a sig­
nificant change within the DAC group concerning the aid performance 
of the various members. Each of these trends is described uith the 
help of tables and graphs. As a matter of fact, the collection of 
these data are taken as empirical material in order to test the pre­
viously discussed analytical tools and assumptions in the field of
aid performance within the DAC group. Ue should, however, keep in 
mind that the aid figures should be read in the context of the re­
servations on reliability and coverage we noted at the beginning 
of this section.
a. The Flow of Financial Resources
I
The main trends in the resource flows of the DAC group to the 
developing countries and multilateral agencies are indicated in 
Table VI-1. It is estimated that the total net flow of official
Table VI-1 The Flow of Financial Resources to
Developing Countries and Multilateral 
Agencies ( DAC Countries (a))
Net disbursements (b) - ^ m i l l i o n
1963-
1965
1966-
1968
1969-
1971
1972-
1974
1975-
1977
1978(c)
Official Development 
Assistance (ODA)
5,873.1 6,276.1 7,022.57 9,743.77 13,982.77 19,881.8
as % of CNP 0.48 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.35
as % of TRF 61.7 53.3 44.5 40.7 32.1 27.9
Other Official Flows 194.4 567.6 977.23 2,064.1 3,216.0 5,214.3
Private Voluntary 
Agencies - - -
1 ,207.4 1,395.0 1,663.2
Private Commercial 
F lows
3,468.9 4,934.0 7,184.46 10,968.1 24,944.0 44,611.3
as % of CNP 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.59 0.78
as % of TRF 36.5 41.9 45.5 45.8 53.3 62.5
Total Resource Flows 
(TRF)
9,512.4 11,778.13 15,773.7 23,967.03 43,538.1 71,370.6
as % of CNP 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.79 1.03 1.26
Notes : (a) The 17 countries which are at present members of the Development 
Assistance Committee are Australia, Austria, Belgiun, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. The aggregate figures 
of the period 1963-69 take the aid performance of the then member 
Portugel into account and exclude the aid disbursements of Fin­
land and New Zealand which only became member of the DAC in the
1970s. From 1970 the aggregate figures include the aid contribu­
tions of these two new members and exclude Portugal which has left 
the DAC.
(b) Net disbursements, net of amortisation and disinvestment, current 
prices.
(c) Included capital subscriptions to multilateral agencies under the 
form of bills peyable at sight.
Sources î OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n . Annual Aid Reviews.
OECD, Flow of Resources to Developing C o u ntries. 
Paris, 1973.
and private resources has increased from 9.5 billion in 
1963-1965 to 43.5 billion in 1975-1977, rising significantly 
as a share of GNP from 0.77 per cent to 1.03 per cent. Between 
1963-1965 and 1972-1974 the total flows increased at current prices 
and exchange rates by some $ 1 4  billion and from 1972-1974 to 
1975-1977 by a further #  19.6 billion. In 1978 the total flows 
amounted to 4^71.4 billion. Concerning the fraction of the total 
flows in GNP, it is only in the last years that the United Nations' 
one per cent target has been reached.
b. The Flow of Official Development Assistance
The Official Development Assistance (ODA), the relatively new 
concept introduced by the DAC, is the concept to which 'aid' is re­
ferred. The record of the disbursements of ODA by DAC members over 
the period 1963-1977 can only be described as dismal. The ODA as 
a percentage of GNP shows a long-term decline from the peak in the 
early 1960s. In fact, since that date,, the DAC ODA/GNP ratio has 
fallen every year except four (1967, 1971, 1974 and 1975). This 
long-term decline in the ODA/GNP ratio has by no means implied a 
decline of ODA disbursements in absolute terms. At current prices 
they have risen permanently over the whole period with steep in­
creases from 1970 onwards. However, the nominal increase in the 
DAC total aid volume between 1963-1965 and 1975-1977 from 5^ 5.9 
billion to 5^ 14 billion has nearly completely been offset by higher 
prices, so that there has only been a very modest change in the 
volume of real resources transferred in this period. In short, 
taking account of inflation on the basis of the GNP deflator and 
specific ODA price deflators, the yearly net ODA disbursements of 
all DAC countries combined remained approximately stable in real 
terms in the 1960s and have increased somewhat in the 1970s. These 
trends in the ODA aid flows are shown in Table 1/1-2 and Figure V/I-1.
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Table VI-2 DAC ODA Volume in Real Terms
(on the basis of the GNP deflator) 
(1961*100)
1962 ,..........  102.4 1970 ............ 98.3
1963 ..........  106.1 1971
1 964 ..........  106.7 1972 ............ 105.6
1965 ..........  102.9 1973 ............ 101.5
1 966 ..........  101.0 1974 .............  111.1
1967 ..........  108.3 1975 ............ 120.7
1968 ..........  100.9 1976 ............ 118.4
1969 ..........  100.6 1977 ............ 117.9
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation, Review 1978, p. 124
Figure VI-1 DAC ODA Net Disbursements (1961 = 100)
Source : OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n , Review 1978, p. 124.
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In Figure VI-2 the diverging trends of the net disbursements 
of the total flows and the ODA as percentages of GNP are drawn. 
Net ODA flows account for one third of the total net flows of re* 
sources (32.1 per cent in the period 1975-1977 compared with 
61.7 per cent in 1963-1965). This decline is not due to a fall 
in the amount of the ODA made available but to the fact that pri­
vate resource flows have risen much faster. In 1963-1965 the
Figure VI-2 DAC Flows as Percentage of GNP 
(Net disbursements, 1963-1978)
Source : OECD, Development C o operation. Annual Aid Reviews.
-206-
Private Commercial Flows counted for 36.5 per cent of the total 
resources ; they increased their share to over 50 per cent in 
the period 1975-1977 (see Table VI-1). In the next section we 
introduce some additional aspects to the general picture of the 
aid performance of the DAC. They will place DAC's development 
assistance in its proper perspective.
4. Aid in Perspective
An important element in the attempt to offer a realistic pic­
ture of the aid performance of the DAC countries is the need to 
place the aid effort of member countries in perspective, especially 
as far as its effects on donors' economies are concerned. In ge­
neral, people are ill-informed as to the size of the aid effort 
their countries contribute to developing countries. They often 
over-estimate the size of the aid effort.
a. The Real Value of Aid
One reason for the public's tendency to exaggerate the effort 
by their countries is that in most public statements aid is con­
ventionally measured in current dollars. This presented little 
difficulty in the 1960s when exchange rates against the dollar 
were generally fixed and when the prices of exports to the develop­
ing countries rose only slowly - much more slowly, in fact, than 
domestic prices in the donor countries. In the last years, how­
ever, the situation has changed sharply uith increases of export 
prices of aid-financed goods and of exchange rates of many donors 
against the dollar.
Each of these factors has meant that the dollar figures for 
recent years have presented an inflated picture of the changes in 
real terms. Applying the ODA deflator series to the nominal fi­
gures for ODA from DAC members gives an estimate of the evolution 
of ODA in real terms. A comparison between nominal dollar in­
creases and deflated increases for individual countries between 
1970 and 1977 is shown in Table VI-3. It clearly shows the poor
performance of countries like the U.S., the U.K. and Italy, and 
to a lesser extent of France, Germany and Australia.
Table UI-3 Increases in ODA at Current and 
Real Prices (1970-1977)
(Percentages)
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Country Increase in 00A, 1970 - 1977
In current prices After applying 
ODA deflator
Australia + 110.8 + 2.42
Austria + 1011.3 +
G
O
o
Belgium + 210.- ♦ 31.5
Canada + 186.3 + 67.43
Dennark + 336.4 + 107.0
Finland + 616.2 + 217.65
F ranee + 133.4 + 0.99
Germany + 218.5 7.72
I taly ♦ 26.4 - 33.-
Japan + 211.- + 50.9
Netherlands + 358.- + 104.39
New Zealand 203.2 + 07.59
Norway + 704.6 + 260.82
Sweden + 566.1 + 193.85
Switzerland + 294.- + 66.79
United Kingdom + 104.5 - 0.56
United States + 36.5 - 22.9
DAC Total + 116.5 + 8.76
Source : OECD, Development C o o peration. Annual Aid Reviews.
b. Aid Flows and GNP
Another element which may put scientific undertaking of the 
study of the aid performance of donor countries in its proper 
perspective is the comparison between aid flows and national pro­
duct. The GNP percentage remains the most familiar presentation
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of aid flows in the perspective of the donor countries. However, 
if one is looking at the persistently declining trend of the ODA 
percentage of the total DAC members' GNP from around 0.5 per cent 
in the early 1960s to just over 0.3 per cent in recent years, one 
easily forgets that either 0.5 or 0.3 per cent of GNP is a remark­
ably small part of DAC resources. This very modest aid effort in 
terms of GNP makes the usefulness of any abstract model in the 
field of foreign aid quite restrictive.
The relatively small amounts of resources involved in develop­
ment assistance may give the donor countries a wider margin of 
flexibility in the pursuit of their own policy objectives and/or 
motives, and that in an international system which gives little 
room for manoeuvring. In other words, these modest aid flous in 
terms of GNP give donor countries the possibility to adapt their 
aid effort much quicker to changing economic and political circum­
stances of the international system. This may have an immediate 
impact on the aid performance in general, and on the composition 
of the aid flows. This is a conclusion for DAC countries as a 
group. In fact, several countries have significantly increased 
their 0DA/GNP ratio, in particular, the Scandinavian countries, 
Canada and the Netherlands.
c. Aid in Relation to Budgetary Expenditures
A factor which complements the former one is the relation be­
tween the aid effort and the total budgetary expenditures. Although 
it has been a major concern of aid donors and of the DAC to measure 
the relative aid burden (1), one should not forget that we are only 
talking about a very small part of national budgets devoted to de­
velopment assistance.
The major share of DAC members' ODA is financed out of budge­
tary appropriations subject to regular parliamentary review. Aid 
as a percentage of public sector expenditures is, therefore, an
(1) See Mikesell, R.F., The Economics of Foreign A i d , London:
Ueidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968, p. 237-24fi ; Pincus, 3., Econo­
mic Aid and International Cost S h a r i n g . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1965, Chapter 3.
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important expression of a country's interest in development assis­
tance. In fact, for all countries, aid forms a very small part 
of national budgets. As an example, the proportion of aid 
to total public expenditure in 1973 is shown in Table VI-4.
The ODA disbursements as a share of public expenditure for all 
DAC countries amounted to 0.9 per cent and in no case exceeded 
1.6 per cent.
Table VI-4 Aid and Other Public Sector Expenditures 
(1973) (Percentages)
Country
Defense expendi­
tures as share 
of public expen­
diture
Health expendi­
tures as share 
of public ex­
penditure
ODA disburse­
ments as 
share of pu­
blic expendi­
ture
Australia 9.7 7.4 1.5
Austria 2.8* 9.4a 0.4“
Belgium 6.3 • • 1.3
Canada • • • • 1.2
Oenaark 4.6* 9.5* 1.2*
Finland 4.3 11.8 0.5
F ranee . . • • 1.6
Germany 7.5 • • 0.8
Italy 5.2 3.0 0.3
Japan * • • • 1.1
Netherlands 6.3 • • 1.1
Mew Zealand • • • • • •
Norway 6,9 2.3 1.0
Sweden 6.7" 10.4* 1.2*
Switzerland • • • • • •
Unitad Kingdom 11 .7 9.3 0.9
United States 18.0 1.1 0.7
Total DAC • • • • 0.9b
a. 1972
t>. Includes astiaates for Naw Zealand and Suit2erland
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation, Revieu 1975, p. 103.
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The comparison of these figures with the defence or health 
expenditures as a share of public expenditure, reveals a rather 
low profile in the aid effort of the donors. The hard fact is 
that aid must compete with other forms of public expenditure, 
many of which are not only important but of particular interest to 
that country or to the taxpayer, such as defence, health, housing, 
education, etc. And at times of budgetary stringency, aid pro­
grams are a particularly vulnerable category.
However, some countries have recognized the importance of try­
ing to insulate aid from general budgetary cuts. In particular, 
the Scandinavian countries have been successful in insulating the 
aid budget from the reduction of planned government expenditures. 
Although the aid effort in terms of the share of public expendi­
ture is quite small for all DAC members, the efforts made by some 
donors to safeguard the aid budget from restrictive budgetary 
measures irrespective of the economic situation, do say something 
about the actual objectives and motives of the development assis­
tance by these countries.
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Conclusi on
As the Second Development Decade has come to an end and per­
spectives for development cooperation in the 1980s are opening 
up, one may be induced to make a feu concluding remarks. The 'Inter­
national Development Aid' as a historical phenomenon is a concept 
that has been changing its content and objectives since it was 
introduced as an aspect in international relations. The spirit 
of solidarity, uhich characterized the immediate aftermath of 
Uorld War II, led to the creation of a number of important inter­
national organizations. Important uas the dominant position of 
the United States in restructuring and guiding the international 
relations. Also in the domain of development assistance the United 
States acquired uorld leadership. Identifying its oun national 
interest uith that of the uorld at large, the United States allo­
cated its aid out of an enlightened self-interest. The Cold Uar 
period, however, introduced a foreign policy vieu-element in the 
development aid, so that aid became a mere function of the national 
security objective of the U.S.
The year 1960 may be considered a milestone in the historical 
evolution of 'International Development Aid'. The search for a 
more coherent casis of relations among developed and developing 
countries began systematically uith the concept of a 'Development 
Decade'. Moreover, some European countries became important con­
tributors of bilateral aid. Still, the historical and economic 
relations among some developed and developing countries made foreign 
aid an instrument of predominantly national interest. Emphasis uas 
also more and more put on the financial, quantifiable aspect of 
the aid performance. The optimism of the early 1960s, however, 
diminished and made place for the more realistic notion of develop­
ment cooperation. The UNCTAD conferences provided the institution­
al basis for this shift of responsibility.
The many problems at the beginning of the Second Development 
Decade changed the international environment of development coope­
ration. The pervasive and global nature of the problems called for
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cooperative international frames of solutions, hence the in­
creasing role of multilateral agencies.
While the last two decades can be viewed as targeting decades, 
when there was agreement on new directions and goals, nou more 
stress is being put on institutional innovation and reform. It 
seems essential to adopt a framework of mutual cooperation which 
addresses itself to overall common interests, while allowing for 
flexibility of implementation by individual countries. The basic
needs approach to development should be counted as one of the
important contributions to a better coherence in development 
cooperati on (1).
Up to now we described the history of the phenomenon of inter­
national development aid and presented some of the general charac­
teristics of the aid performance of a specific donor group, i.e., 
the DAC. The next chapter will draw on this descriptive analysis 
of the phenomenon of international development aid. The aid per­
formance of the DAC will then be assessed on the basis of the hy­
potheses we analyzed in earlier chapters.
(1) For a fuller explanation of the Basis Needs Approach see 
OECD, Development Cooperation, 1977 and 1978 Review.
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CHAPTER VII THE RATIONAL ACTOR APPROACH IN THE AREA OF
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
Introduction
In the former chapter ue introduced international development 
aid as the broad area in uhich the Rational Actor Approach towards 
international cooperation should be assessed. Ue described the 
history of development aid since Uorld War II and indicated the 
general characteristics of the aid performance of DAC. This final 
chapter investigates to what extent the analytical tools and 
assumptions ue explained and elaborated in the former chapters can 
elucidate the actual aid performance of a group of donors.
In a first section we will discuss the nature of the internation­
al good of development aid. A discussion of the rationale for 
foreign aid allocation will lead to an assessment of the public good 
aspect of development aid. Ue will further relate the different 
interests donors pursue in their aid policies to the distinction 
between bilateral and multilateral aid assistance.
The second section deals with an empirical assessment of Olson's 
public good model and Ruggie's international cooperation model.
Both models, guided by the Rational Actor assumptions, assert that 
the size of a donor is a distinguishing characteristic of the aid 
performance of donors.
In a third and final section we will advance some explanatory 
qualifications for the distortions from the predicted outcomes of 
both Olson's and Ruggie's models. In short, we try to assess the 
Rational Actor Approach in the area of development cooperation.
A. The Nature of the International Good of Development Aid
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1. Rationale for Development Aid
It is easy to see uhy underdeveloped countries should want 
foreign aid, but it is much more complex to see uhy industrial 
countries should offer it. Olson has argued that development 
assistance is provided to developing countries to promote their 
economic development and, consequently to assure uorld security 
and/or stability. Furthermore, he assumes that countries not 
only benefit from their oun foreign aid disbursements, but also 
from that of other countries. No distinction is made betueen 
their oun spending and that of other countries. Since the spillovers 
from the aid expenditures of other donor countries go beyond nation­
al boundaries and are characterized by non-rivalness and non­
excludability, foreign aid is called an international public good 
in Olson's model (l).
In this* section ue want to assess the public good aspect of 
development aid. This immediately introduces a discussion of the 
rationale behind the aid policies of countries. Ue distinguish 
tuo vieus, uhich are primarily differentiated by the rationale 
underlying the allocation of aid. This distinction may ahed some 
light on the nature of the international good of development aid 
and eventually on the actual allocation of official aid.
a. The Altruistic Motive of Aid Allocation
The first rationale explains the allocation of aid in terms 
of the needs of the recipient, i.e., donors are guided by altruis­
tic motives. It emphasizes the economic assistance utility, 
suggesting that the provision of aid is designed to promote eco­
nomic and social development in developing countries. Economic
(1) See Dudley, L., Foreign Aid and the Theory of Alliances, The 
Revieu of Economics and S t a tistics, Vol. LXI, Nr. 4, November 
1979, p. 564-571.
assistance is thus the primary rationale for aid (l).
It is said that the amount of aid received by each low-income 
country is positively related to its economic and welfare needs.
The rationale for this relationship is based on two factors.
First, the standard models of economic growth assume that in­
creases in investment provide the stimulus for growth. Lack of 
capital is supposed to be the major obstacle to growth in poor 
countries. Aid is then considered an important stimulus for eco­
nomic development. Second, a number of changes in the internation­
al system have precipitated an obligation on the part of the in­
dustrialized countries to provide aid. In other words, the high- 
income countries find the gap between developed and developing 
countries morally unacceptable and provide economic assistance to 
ameliorate the economic and welfare problems of the low-income 
countries. The altruistic motive seems to predominate the aid 
efforts of some donors, such as the Scandinavian countries and, to 
a lesser extent,Canada and the Netherlands.
Accepting the altruistic motive as the actual rationale for 
foreign aid, one should easily be tempted to define development 
aid as an international public good. Ue believe, however, that 
development aid guided by altruistic motives contains public as 
well as private good elements. If one agrees on the existence of 
a common interest in genuine development assistance, then aid 
disbursements may be considered as contributions to the provision 
of the public good of development aid by the donor countries.
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(1) There have been arguments that aid does not in fact provide a 
means of economic assistance on the grounds that aid reduces 
savings, creates debt-service problems and reduces the capital 
output ratio. See, for instance, Bauer, P., Dissent on Develop­
m e n t , London: Ueidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971 G r i d i n ,  K . B.,
F oreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Economic Development, 
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and 
Statistics« Vol. XXXII, Nr. 2, Play 19^0, p. 99-112 ; Ueisskopf, 
T . É . , The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings 
in Underdeveloped Countries, Journal of International Economics. 
Vol. II, 1972-1, p. 25-38.
Although the critics are useful in pointing out that the accele­
ration effect of aid on development is a function of a large 
number of factors, generally, it is accepted that aid can pro­
vide economic assistance. See, for instance, Papanek, G.F.,
The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on Savings and 
Growth in Less Developed Countries, Economic J o u r n a l . Vol. 82, 
September 1972—2, p. 934-950.
Altruism can also be interpreted as serving long-run self-interest,
i.e., a country contributes to the international public good of 
peace-keeping because of its appreciation of the importance of 
world stability. A donor's aid efforts can even be based on plain 
self-interest : the country in question wishes to maximize an ob­
jective function uhich includes, the image of itself as an altruistic 
aid donor in a world of self-seeking interests. Finally, the nature 
of the international good of development aid depends on the bene­
fits a donor derives from its aid disbursements.
The claims of altruistic behaviour made for aid to developing 
countries as a contribution to world peace and security are re­
garded by many scholars as little more than cliché, or at least 
not based on evidence. Variation in the amounts of aid received 
by developing countries do not often correspond to the differences 
in their levels of need. Moreover, one should not forget that aid 
also provides the donor with an element of control or leverage 
over the recipient. In other words, donors derive a great number 
of private benefits from their foreign aid. This pressure of self- 
interest makes altruism unsatisfactory as a basis for a generalized 
system in the area of development aid. Foreign policy interests 
seem to guide much more the aid allocation of donors (1).
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(1) For examples of studies that reject the view of aid allocation 
and that suggest a foreign policy basis, see Griffin, K.B. and 
Enos, J.L., Foreign Assistance : Objectives and Consequences, 
Economic Development and Cultural C h a n g e . Vol. XVIII, Nr.^3,
April 1970, p. 313-327 ; Hayter, T., Aid as Imperialism, Har- 
mondsworth, England: Penguin, 1970 ; 3alee, P.. The third World 
in World E c o n o m y , New York: Monthly Review Press, 1^69 ; Kaplan, 
3.J.. the Challenge of Foreign A i d . New York: Praager Publishers, 
1976 ; Knorr, K.. Power and W e a l t h . New York and London:
McMillan Publishing Cy., 1973 ; Mandorff, H., The Age of Imperia­
l i s m . New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969 ; Mason. S., Foreign 
Aid and Foreign P o l i c y . New York: Harper, 1964 ; Morgenthau,
H . 3 . , Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid, in Goldwin, 
R.A., Why Foreign A i d ? . Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962 J Nelson,
3.M., Aid. Influence and Foreign P o l i c y . New York: McMillan Pu­
blish ilTgCTTT”T5^S~ T ~ P a y e ^ T ^ ^ » 3 E £ i n i £ l - - L £ £ E »  Harmondsworth, 
England: Penguin, 1974 ; Weissman, S. and others, The Trojan 
H o r s e , San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1974 ; Wittkopf, E.,
Western Bilateral Aid Allocations : A Comparative Study of Reci­
pient State Attributes and Aid Received^ Beverly Hills, C a .:
Sage Publications, 1972.
b. The Foreign Policy Motive of Aid Allocation
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If self-interest is the guiding principle for the allocation 
of aid, then development aid is believed to be very much linked 
to the foreign policy interests of the donors. The foreign policy 
view emphasizes the instrumental utility of aid, suggesting that 
its provision is designed to promote the foreign policy interests 
of the donors. Economic assistance is then a means uhereby a 
donor's interests can be satisfied (1).
These interests rooted in political, economic and historical 
relationships, can be an achievement of greater national security, 
economic gains brought about either through opening and maintaining 
access to developing countries' markets on favourable terms or 
through ensuring access to raw material supplies in less developed 
countries at favourable prices, and diplomatic gains achieved 
through the expansion of prestige and political power. It is 
assumed that the level of commitment and dependency is a function 
of the degree of interest that a donor has in a low-income reci­
pient. The rationale underlying this relationship is based on 
the observation that all states have external interests and are 
concerned to promote and protect them.
The formulation of these interests results in a multiplicity 
of goals, which foreign aid may serve for the donor countries.
The description of the history of international development aid 
in Chapter VI has given some indication of the objectives that 
the major donors pursue in foreign aid.
(1) See, in particular, Griffin, K.B. and Enos, 3.L., Foreign
Assistance : Objectives and Consequences, Economic Development 
and Cultural C h a n g e , Vol. XVIII, Nr. 3, April 1970, p. Sl3—32^ ; 
Huntington, S.G., Foreign Aid : For Uhat and For Whom?, in 
Hunter, R.E. and Rielly, J.E., Development T o d a y . New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1972, p. 21-60 ; Mikesell, R.F., The Eco- 
nomics of Foreion Aid, London: Ueidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968, 
p. 1 - 2 6 .
b.1. U.S. Foreign Aid Objectives
In the case of the U.S., the first development loans were 
made to a feu Latin American countries during the late 1930s and 
early 1940s. This uas an outgrowth of the 'Good Neighbour Policy' 
inaugurated during the first Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, 
and of the historical relationship uhich existed since the early 
part of the nineteenth century between the U.S. and the other 
A m e r i c a s .
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the U.S. develop­
ment aid programs became closely related to the broad military and 
political responsibilities that the U.S. had taken. Foreign aid 
became an explicit function of the national security objective.
U.S. political leaders became convinced that second only to the 
security of Western Europe uas the maintenance of the independence 
of the developing countries by preventing internal and external 
Communist agression, and that development assistance could play 
a critical role in realizing thi3 objective.
For a long time tha national security objective has been em­
phasized as the guiding principle of the U.S. aid allocation. 
During the 1950s the bulk of U.S. assistance took the form of 
'defence support' providing large amounts of aid designed to en­
able the recipient countries to maintain a military establishment 
capable of dealing uith actual or threatened agression, regarded 
as inimical to U.S. political and security interest. U.S. assis­
tance to countries such as Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Formosa, etc. 
are too obvious examples. Briefly, the origins of American foreign 
aid are deeply rooted in the Cold War period.
Still, in the fifties and the early sixties, the objectives of 
American foreign aid uere often stated in terms of a combination 
of this national security abjective uith the more general motiva­
tion of uorlduide responsibility. Many of the official statements 
regarding U.S. foreign aid objectives constituted a uelding or an 
identification of short and long term national security objectives, 
and of humanitarianism or the acceptance of uorld responsibility 
for the uelfare of other nations.
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President Johnson's Foreign Aid Message to Congress on 
January 14, 1965, may serve as an example : "For our own security 
and well-being, and as responsible free men, we must seek to share
our capacity for growth, and the promise of a better life with
our fellow men around the world. That is what foreign aid is all 
about" (1). Just as the U.S. assumed the primary responsibility 
for the containment of communism through political and military 
means, it also assumed the primary responsibility for promoting 
economic development throughout the 'Free World'. Foreign aid 
did form an important element in this context.
Besides these two objectives of national security and world­
wide responsibility, national economic benefits are sometimes 
put forward as the rationale of U.S. foreign aid allocation. Aid 
is then allocated to selected countries in order ta promote national 
economic interests. The pursuit of this goal is seen as one aspect 
within an overall foreign policy. It means that the donor country 
has special interests in the development of particular countries. 
These interests, according to many donors, cannot satisfactorily 
be met through multilateral aid programs. Thus the achievement 
of this objective of aid is linked with the preference of bilateral 
aid over multilateral aid. The preponderance of the U.S. bilate­
ral aid program in the total aid performance seems to suggest that the 
U.S. imputes quite some importance to the security and economic 
objectives of foreign aid.
The foreign policy view of aid has been further analyzed 
and elaborated in a recent article by McKinlay and Little (2).
They differentiate five substantive foreign policy models by the 
type of interests being pursued by the donor. These are 1) de­
velopment interests, 2) overseas economic interests, 3) security 
interests, 4) power-political interests and 5) interests in poli­
tical stability and democracy. These foreign policy explanations
(1) Mikesell, R.F., o p . c i t . , p. 6.
(2) McKinlay, R.D. and Little, R., A Foreign Policy Model of U.S. 
Bilateral Aid Allocation, World Politics, Vol. 30, 1977-78, 
p. 58-86.
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of aid allocation were tested for the U.S. in the period 1960-1970, 
The analysis indicated that power - political aid and security con­
cerns were the central interests supported by and controlled through 
the U.S. aid program.
The changing structure of the international system, however, 
has cast some doubts on the qompatibility of foreign policy ob­
jectives with altruistic motives. The present international rela­
tions reflect more and more the dominantly political nature of 
U.S. development assistance.
b.2. European Foreign Aid Objectives
The major Uestern European powers had a much different histo­
rical relationship with the developing world and have had neither 
the resources nor the same commitment to the Cold War as the U.S.
They were concerned with achieving security and prosperity through 
cooperation among themselves. In the case of the European colonial 
powers, this concern was extended to their colonies and the 
dependencies in the developing world.
The nineteenth century attitude of the European colonial powers 
(France, U.K., Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands) toward their 
colonies as mainly sources of national economic gain or of military 
advantage (i.e., private goods) gradually gave way to attitudes of 
responsibility for the well-being of dependencies and to the concept 
of a community of economic, political and cultural interests under 
the leadership of the metropolitan country. The British Common­
wealth of Nations and the French community are the best examples of 
this evolution. The vast bulk of French, British and Belgian foreign 
aid has been directed to their respective communities, and is still 
taking a large part of their development assistance.
Thus, unlike the U.S., the European countries have not had to 
develop a special rationale in terms of either Free World Security 
or universal altruism for obtaining public support for their aid 
programs. Political, cultural, economic and altruistic objectives 
were merged with a feeling of mutual interest based on a long 
association between the European powers and the developing areas. To 
resume the foreign aid objectives of most of the West European
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countries have been generated from their historical relationship 
uith the principal recipients and have perhaps been less concerned 
uith global political strategies
c. The Mixed Nature of the International Good of Development Aid
From the above discussion it seems obvious that the internation­
al good of development aid has a rather complex nature. To con­
sider development aid an international public good uhich exhibits 
non-rivalness and non-excludability is certainly an over-simplifica- 
tion of the reality. States do often make a distinction betueen 
their oun aid disbursements and that of other countries. The aid 
effort of a country does not aluays create spillovers, in the 
sense that its aid disbursements enter simultaneously into the uti­
lity functions of other donors. In other uords, interdependence 
of utilities is not generally valid in the case of development 
aid. Therefore, it is more relevant to consider development aid as 
an international good containing simultaneously public and private 
good elements.
In the discussion of the basic assumptions in Chapter I, ue 
mentioned the variety of objectives uhich may enter the utility 
function. Here, ue have just indicated the different objectives 
uhich may determine a donor's rationale for its aid disbursements. 
These objectives may vary from altruism over enlightened self-inte- 
rest to plain self-interest. A theoretical distinction between 
different types of foreign assistance according to the objectives 
seems easy. In reality, however, aid policy usually represents 
a mixture of various purposes in which it is often almost impossi­
ble to isolate development aid as a pure component. Both rationales 
for aid allocation contain public as well as private good elements. 
Let me explain!
I think one may easily agree uith the assertion that there is 
a common international interest in the economic and social develop­
ment of the poor nations generally. That implies that one agrees 
on the existence of the international interest, if only the public
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good of peace in the purely political field, and stability and 
growth in the economic area. Development aid to developing 
countries in order to promote their economic and social develop­
ment is then a means to assure world security and/or stability.
In other words, the aid efforts of donors should be conceived 
as contributions to the international public good of world stabi­
lity. Because of the interdependence of utilities, one might ex­
pect the problems of public good allocation to occur.
However, the international common interest in development aid 
is often tied to the pursuit of national interest. If too many 
national private benefits are drawn from the foreign aid disburse­
ments, the public good nature of development aid becomes com­
promised. We already referred to the different objectives a donor 
is aiming at in his aid policy. From some objectives only national 
benefits can be derived so that the public good c h a r a c t e r i s e s  
often do not hold for specific aid contributions. We made it 
clear that the provision of aid is often justified on national 
interests which only enter into a specific donor's utility 
function. These interests range from purely economic objectives 
(i.e., creation or maintenance of export markets, cheap imports, 
financial interets, etc.) to non-tangible objectives (i.e.»national 
security, political prestige, goodwill among Third World countries, 
etc.) Mostly these interests are rooted in historical relation­
ships between donors and recipients. Thus, apart from the general 
willingness to provide development aid to.developing countries, 
many donors individually are at the same time interested in par­
ticular recipients with which they have special relationships 
for a variety of reasons (i.e., military, economic, political, 
historical, etc.).
If not self-interest but altruism is the prime motive of a 
donor, then the consumption of development aid by the developing 
countries enters into the donor's own utility function. In other 
words, there is an interdependence of utilities. We do believe 
that all donors have a genuine i n t e r e s t  in the needs of the 
developing countries. This interest may, of course, vary from 
donor to donor.
Aid disbursements guided by an altruistic behaviour of donors 
can be considered a public good if there exists a common inter­
national interest in genuine economic and social development of 
developing countries. If a donor derives specific national bene­
fits from its altruistic aid behaviour, then the aid effort may 
be considered a mere private good. The pressure of self-interest 
in the international system makes a generalized system based on 
altruism in the area of development aid rather difficult.
The actual aid effort of a donor is thus seen as a result of 
mixed motives, a synthesis of altruism and self-interest. The 
Rational Actor Approach, however, only deals with rational actors 
guided by their individual self-interest. The aid donors are thus 
assumed to pursue objectives (i.e., world stability, national in­
terests) according to the Rational Actor assumptions. Altruistic 
motives, which do have an importance in development cooperation, 
are not taken into consideration in the Rational Actor Approach. 
Within the limits of this framework, we can only state that de­
velopment aid is an international mixed good containing public and 
private good elements. In other words, donors do express a common 
interest in the development of developing countries generally, 
but derive at the same time important private or national benefits 
from their foreign aid. Ue tend to believe that the differing 
objectives of donors will have an impact on doner's actual aid per­
formance, regardless of the size of the donor.
Resuming, the discussion of the rationale for foreign aid allo­
cation indicates the mixed nature of the international good of 
development aid. Olson's theory, based on the analysis of the con­
sequences of an international public good on the behaviour of states 
seems less promising in the area of development cooperation.
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2. Bilateral versus Multilateral Development Aid
In Chapter M ue introduced an international cooperation model, 
i.e., a joint production scheme, making a distinction betueen na­
tional and international arrangements. Here ue make a distinction 
betueen bilateral and multilateral development assistance. The 
disaggregation of total aid into these tuo components is tied to 
the rationale behind the aid performance of donors. Altruism as 
well as self-interest may tell us something about the way foreign 
aid is distributed through bilateral and multilateral channels.
It has been said that bilateral aid developed out of a variety 
of political and economic circumstances uhich enabled the donor 
countries to achieve specific foreign policy objectives of security 
and/or economic benefit. Bilateral aid often reflects a particular 
or historical association betueen the donor and the recipient.
Thus, the aid flous from the industrial to the less developed 
areas cannot aluays be regarded as a common undertaking of the 
individual countries. The nationally oriented aid performance of 
the major donors only serves as an obvious example. Bilateral 
aid is then often assumed to be oriented to the foreign policy 
objectives. In other uords, much bilateral aid can be viewed as 
a private good.
On the other hand, one could argue that there is a common 
interest and a common responsibility in the economic and social 
development of the Third World. It has often been said that the 
most appropriate means of achieving this objective is multilateral 
development assistance. The international aid agencies appear to 
be less evidently an instrument of national foreign policy«
Some objective reasons for multilateralization of development 
assistance may be cited : 1) multilateral aid programs may avoid 
the political antagonisms and conflicts that often result from 
bilateral aid programs uhen the donor attempts to impose perfor­
mance criteria in given aid ; 2) multilateral agencies can be more 
efficient in stimulating development because their decisions are 
supposedly based on more technical and objective criteria ;
3) developing countries are likely to be more receptive to the 
advice of 'neutral' policy experts ; 4) developing countries can 
feel a sense of greater participation in the aid process ; 5) 
channelling aid through multilateral institutions may promote a 
feeling of cooperation rather than competition among major aid 
donors. Multilateral aid is then often assumed to be orientated 
to altruistic motives of aid allocation. In other words, much 
multilateral aid can be viewed as a public good.
This responsibility for actually promoting individual welfare 
in the developing countries has been of rather limited interest 
in the donor countries. Few countries are an exception to this 
general trend. Opposition and reluctance to multilateral aid from 
major donor countries stem from the vested interests these coun­
tries have in providing aid to specific countries and from the fear 
that they may lose control of multilateral aid programs.
Throughout the years the DAC countries have persisted in giving 
proof of a clear preference for bilateral development assistance. 
Reasons for this preference have already been indicated. How evi­
dent this preference has been for the DAC is shown in Table VII-1. 
Bilateral Development Assistance (ODAg) increased in current prices 
from $ 5 . 5  billion in 1963-1965 to . # 9 . 8  billion in 1975-1977.
It amounted to more than $ 1 3 . 1  billion in 1978. However, its 
percentage of GNP dropped drastically from 0.45 per cent in 
1963-1965 to a low 0.23 per cent in 1975-1977 (see Figure VII-1).
In recent years, however, multilateral aid appears to have 
gained some grounds. In fact, if one looks at the trend of the 
past fifteen years, one can assess that the multilateral agencies 
of the World Bank Group, the United Nations development system, 
and the regional development banks have largely increased their 
share of Official Development Assistance (Table VII-1 and Figure 
VII-1).
DAC members1 contributions to multilateral agencies increased 
in volume and proportion of GNP. The net disbursements through 
multilateral channels jumped from a very low 373.53 million in 
1963-1965 to a not unimportant 4J 4,181.57 million in 1975-1977.
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Table VII-1 Net Flows of Multilateral and Bilateral 
Development Assistance tc Less Developed 
Countries and Multilateral Agencies 
(DAC Countries)
Bilateral Official 
Development Assistance 
(ODA0 )
Multilateral Official 
Development Assistance
(0D«„)
Official Deve­
lopment Assis­
tance (o d a )
^million in % 
of ■ 
GNP
in % 
of 
ODA
^■million in % 
of 
GNP
in % 
of 
ODA
^million in % 
of 
GNP
1963-65 5,499.5 0.45 93.6 37 3.5Ì 0.03 é.4 5,¿73.1 0.48
1966-68 5,691.33 0.36 90.7 584.77 0.037 9.3 6,276.17 0.40
1969-71 5,851.9 0.29 83.3 1,170.67 0.058 16.7 7,022.53 0.34
1972-74 7,328.63 0.24 75.2 2,415.2 0.08 24.8 9,743.93 0.32
1975-77 9,501.2 0.23 70.1 4,181.57 0.10 29.9 13,982.67 0.33
1978(a) 13,122.6 0.23 66.0 6,759.3 0.12 34.0 19,881.8 0.35
(a)Included capital subscriptions to multilateral agencies under the form 
of bills payable at sight.
Source : OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n , Annual Aid Reviews.
OECD, Flow of Resources to Developing C o u n t r i e s , 
Paris, 1973,
Figure VII-1 DAC ODA, 0DAa , 0DA„ Flows as Percentages
of GNP (Net Disbursements, 1963-1978)
Source : OECD, Development Coope r a t i o n , Annual Aid Reviews.
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They amounted to 6,759.3 in 1978. After a drop in the middle 
of the sixties, both in absolute terms and as a share of total 
aid, contributions to multilateral agencies have been rising very 
rapidly to reach nearly 30 per cent of total aid in 1975-1977, 
compared uith the 6.4 per cent in 1963-1965, Also the fractional 
share in GNP increased considerably from 0.03 per cent in 1963- 
1965 to 0.10 per cent in 1975-1977. This long term positive trend 
of multilateral assistance as a percentage of GNP could only 
minimally influence the declining trend of the total ODA. 5till 
70 per cent of overall ODA uas channelled through bilateral con­
tributions in 1975-1977.
A breaking-doun of these aggregate aid figures of the DAC 
may suggest some of the determining factors of the overall de­
clining trend of the DAC aid effort and may add some indications 
of the specific developments of the aid performance of individual 
DAC members. The record of the net flou of total ODA disburse­
ments and of bilateral and multilateral aid of the 17 countries 
uhich are at present members of the Committee is given in Tables
VI I—2 and VII-3.
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Table VII-2 Net Flows of the DAC Members' 
Total Official Assistance to 
Developing Countries and 
Multilateral Agencies
Donors
1963-196S 1975--1977 1978(a)
. Value 
•f million
as % 
of 
GNP
Value
#million
as £
of
GNP
Value 
%  million
as % 
of
GNP
Australia 104.83 0.51 439.47 0.49 587.5 0.54
Austria 7.2 0.08 76.8 0.18 165.8 0.29
Belgium 84.2 0.54 362.93 0.51 536.1 0.55
Canada 79.67 0.17 919.23 0.50 1,059.9 0.52
Denmark 10.6 0.12 225.07 0.58 387.6 0.75
F inland 2.27 0.03 49.2 0.18 54.8 0.17
F ranee 800.1 0.87 2,168.5 0.61 2,705.3 0.57
Germany 434.57 0.41 1 ,466.27 0.32 2,418.4 0.38
Italy 59.3 0.11 198.23 0 . 1 1 175.4 0.07
Japan 165.7 0.21 1,225.67 0.21 2,215.4 0.23
Netherlands 52.2 0.31 741.17 0.81 1,073.5 0.82
New Zealand 8.9 0.19 57.17 0 . 4 4 54.9 0.34
Norway 10.27 0.17 232.33 0.74 355.4 0.90
Sweden 31.27 0.16 651.0 0.B8 782.6 0.90
Switzerland 9.07 0.07 111.63 0.19 173.3 0.20
United Kingdom 459.93 0.49 870.7 0.37 1,472.4 0.48
United States 3,525.4 0.54 4,166.67 0.24 5,663.5 0.27
Dac Total 5 , 8 9 4 .  e 0.48 13,982.67 0.33 19,881.8 0.35
(a) Included capital subscriptions to multilateral agencies under the form 
of bills payable at sight.
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation, Annual Aid Reviews.
OECD, Flow of Resources to Developing C o u n t r i e s , 
Paris, 1973.
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Table VII-3 Net Flows of the DAC members' Bilateral 
and Multilateral Development Assistance 
to Developing Countries and 
Multilateral Agencies (Percentage of GNP)
Donors
Bilateral Official 
Development Assistance 
(ODAg)
Multilateral Official 
Development Assistance
( ° D A n )
1963-
1965
1975-
1977
1978 1963-
1965
1975-
1977
1978
Australia 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.05 0.08 0.15
Austria 0.06 0.13 0 . 2 0 0 . 0 2 0.05 0.09
Belguim 0.49 0.35 0.32 0.06 0.16 0.23
C anada 0.13 0.29 0.32 0.04 0 . 2 1 0 . 2 0
Denmark 0.03 0.32 0.42 0.09 0.26 0.33
Finland 0.003 0 . 1 0 0.07 0.03 0.06 0 . 1 0
F ranee 0.84 0.52 0.49 0.03 0.09 0.08
Germany 0.38 0.23 0.25 0.03 0.09 0.13
Italy 0.08 0.03 0 . 0 1 0.03 0.08 0.06
3apan 0.19 0.14 0.16 0 . 0 1 0.07 0.07
Netherlands 0.19 0.55 0.60 0 . 1 1 0.26 0 . 2 2
New Zealand 0.16 0.35 0.28 0 . 0 2 0.09 0.06
Norway 0.05 0.39 0.49 0 . 1 1 0.34 0.41
Sweden 0.07 0.57 0.55 0 . 1 0 0.31 0.35
Switzerland 0.04 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0.03 0.07 0.08
United Kingdom 0.44 0.24 0.28 0.05 0.13 0 . 2 0
United States 0.52 0.17 0.17 0 . 0 2 0.07 0 . 1 0
DAC 0.45 0.23 0.23 0.03 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 2
(a) Includes capital subscriptions to multilateral agencies under the for* 
of bills payable at sight.
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation« Annual Aid Revieus.
OECD, Flow of Resources to Developing Countries« 
Paris, 1973.
A discussion of bilateral versus multilateral aid appears 
to be less clear than one would think at a first comparison.
In the First Development Decade objections against bilateral 
aid being continued by the erstwhile colonial powers in the newly 
independent countries were quite obvious. It was said that this 
represented nepcolonialism and the continuation by other means 
of the previous domination in order to pursue mere national inte­
rests. From a slightly different angle, this type of objection 
was extended to the Cold Uar aspect of bilateral political aid.
It was argued that politically motivated aid is both less effective 
and morally objectionable. Experience in a number of recipient 
countries tend to bear out these criticisms.
However, this line of criticism of the aid-giving process 
and its motivation in the bilateral field adds some other elements 
to the discussion, i.e., whether a switch from bilateral to multi­
lateral aid will in all circumstances mitigate these shortcominas ; 
whether the total amount of aid will remain unaltered ; and 
finally, whether the switch towards-multilateral aid channels will 
increase thé effectiveness of aid. Facts have indicated that the 
size of the aid effort has not remained on the same scale when 
aid has been switched slowly to multilateral channels. Thus its 
effectiveness will have to increase more than the size decreases 
if the switch is to be favourable to the mitigation of internatio­
nal inequality.
Moreover, even political motivations in giving aid must not 
be condemmed out of hand. It is a perfectly understandable de­
cision that Britain, for example, supported primarily the Common­
wealth nations. This Commonwealth responsibility, because of the 
moral obligation felt, also created a political will to make sacri­
fices in providing resources which otherwise would not have been 
undertaken on that scale. Thus bilateral aid flows in many cir­
cumstances have represented an addition to what could be forth­
coming on a multilateral basis. It is then also significant that 
in the beginning of the First Development Decade the relative con­
tributions of these countries which accepted political responsibi-
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lities, for example, France, Britain and Belgium, were higher 
than those uhich were making their contributions in a spirit 
of altruistic disinterestedness.
However, there is no doubt that some aspects of the use of 
the power inherent in the provision of aid to influence the pattern 
of development plans were not consistent with the interests of the 
developing countries, and were only pursued to gain purely nation­
al benefits. In short, bilateral development assistance is influenced 
by a complex mixing of various motives, ranging from purely nation­
al interests to genuinely altruistic motives.
Although the picture of the aid effort of the DAC members has 
been changing over the years, it remains difficult to disentangle 
the actual motives uhich guide the direction of the aid flows.
It is in this perspective that a number of arguments is put forward 
uhich support the contention that it is a reform of bilateral aid 
rather than an unconditional suitch touards multilateral aid that 
is required.
The first is that the effective decision-making in the inter­
national agencies as against formal responsibility of national aid 
distribution is to a very large extent concentrated among much the 
same countries against whom the protest against bilateral aid was 
directed. This is not surprising. Most large and highly developed 
areas have had a colonial past. The only large scale exception 
to this is the U.S., and one of the important effects of the Cold 
War has been to make the impartiality and disinterestedness of the 
U.S. in international aid agencies even less credible.
In the second place,it is not to be supposed that the mere 
fact that an international aid agency is not national, will ipso 
facto endou its principles and modes of operation uith wisdom, 
charity and efficiency. The financial and monetary criteria under­
lying the operations of these multilateral agencies and, consequent­
ly, their influence on the development of the developing countries 
do not seem to have given full satisfaction or proven invariably 
successful. The yearly budget struggle, the favour extended to 
spectacular single projects, the problems posed by multiplicity of,
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and overlap, if not conflict between multilateral aid agencies, 
their efforts at building up bureaucratic empires and their 
simple-minded technocracy, these are all actual problems uhich 
have to come in for a just assessment of the various aid flows 
to multilateral channels.
Thirdly, we may ask ourselves if governments' contributions 
to the multilateral institutions are always related to any objec­
tive view of these agencies' aid-giving performance. In fact, it 
may seem plausible that the multilateral/bilateral ratio of re­
sources, uhich was - according to Ruggie's hypothesis - negatively 
correlated with GNP till the mid 1970s, has shifted within the 
overall trend of official aid flows owing to specific local and 
political factors. Discrete national considerations do indeed 
increasingly influence the scale of multilateral flows. Any 
further retrenchment by the U.S., any deterioration of the Atlan­
tic Alliance, any increase in interest in European regional insti­
tutions, or any increased importance of OPEC as a donor, is bound 
to have a major impact on multilateral flows. As a result, the 
Uorld Bank Group, the regional development banks and the U.N. 
development system - accounting for about 30 per cent of total ODA 
have come to serve a wide variety of objectives which are not al­
ways commensurate with the task of genuine development assistance.
It does not mean, however, that one should be in favour of 
concentrating aid from multilateral to bilateral channels. Bila­
teral development assistance is still far bigger than multilateral 
aid, certainly for the DAC as a group, and I am thoroughly con­
vinced that this discrepancy should be decreased, not increased. 
However, bilateral aid has had too much abuse, not all justified. 
Therefore, close scrutiny and critique ought to be exercised over 
the way in uhich multilateral aid is channelled and controlled.
Ue may end this discussion of bilateral versus multilateral 
aid uith some concluding remarks* The arguments favouring multi­
lateral over bilateral, or visa versa, are perhaps more political
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and administrative in nature than economic. Foreign aid has al­
ways been an instrument of a donor's foreign policy and this in­
strument has been used not only in the Cold Uar or the immediate 
aftermath of the colonial period but is also used now by indivi­
dual donors for promoting their special foreign policy interests.
It is unlikely, therefore that nations will renounce all bilateral 
aid in favour of multilateral assistance. However, at the same 
time all bilateral aid cannot simply be identified with the donor's 
national interests.
Furthermore, it may be argued that the elimination of bilateral 
aid would result in a substantial reduction of total aid to de­
veloping countries, since multilateral assistance would not command 
the public support based on both economic and national interests 
that bilateral aid engenders.
Nevertheless, the donor countries have a broad area of collec­
tive interest in promoting economic progress in the developing 
countries. Hence, a considerable portion of the existing bilate­
ral aid effort is not uniquely associated with a special national 
interest of the donor, but supports a collective interest which 
could be served by multilateral aid agencies if they could increase 
the effectiveness of the genuine aid effort of donors.
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B. Empirical Assessment of the Models
1. Olson's Public Goods Model
Do small countries tend to be free riders, exploiting the 
larger countries by spending relatively little themselves while 
deriving benefits from larger countries' expenditures? Olson and 
Zeckhauser proposed their 'Economic Theory of Alliance' to explain 
this phenomenon. Lumping foreign aid with defence, they argued 
that the smaller countries were assuming an insufficient share of 
the common burden of promoting world security.
The actual starting point of the empirical analysis is Olson's
Hypothesis Three of his 'Economic Theory of Alliance' : "Among a
group of developed nations there will be a significant positive
correlation between foreign aid expenditures as a percentage of
national income and the size of the national income (1)". One set
of data revealed a correlation between national income and total
grants and loans to underdeveloped countries as a percentage of
national income in 1960 of r = 0.77. A different set of data
s
for the different years (1962) showed a correlation between GNP
and total aid as a percentage of GNP of r = 0.439. With thes
small sample of 12 nations this value fell short of the 0.05 level 
of significance.
Olson concluded that "both sets of data yield correlation 
coefficients suggesting the expected positive relationship, but in 
one case the result is clearly statistically significant and in 
the other case it falls somewhat short of the 0.05 level of signi­
ficance". These results bring him to the conclusion that "there 
is some tendency toward disproportionate burden sharing, but that 
the private or purely national benefits from foreign aid are 
probably also very important (2)”. In other words, although the 
industrialized Western nations express a common interest in the
(1) Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R., An Economic Theory of Alliance, 
The Review of Economics and S t a tistics, Vol. 48, Nr. 3, 1966, 
p. 275.
(2) Ibid., op.c i t . . p. 276.
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development of the developing countries generally, many donors 
individually are interested primarily in particular underdeveloped 
areas uith uhich they have special relationships, so that the 
presence of a private good element in the pursuit of the interna­
tional good of development assistance seems to be quite relevant.
This Olson hypothesis has nou been tested for the DAC members 
in the period 1963-1977. Since there is no assurance that the 
data ue use are parametrically distributed, a non-parametric or 
distribution-free statistical test is applied. The Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient betueen GNP and the total flou of resources
as a percentaoe of GNP is r = 0.54 in the period 1963-1965, uhich
s
is significant at the 0.05 level. Uhen the relation betueen GNP
and ODA as percentage of GNP is tested, a significant positive
correlation is found for r = 0.63. Resuming, these tuo sets of
s
data yield correlation coefficients suggesting the positive rela­
tionship Olson predicted in his hypothesis (see Table VII-4).
Houever, if the same empirical test is applied for the period 
1975-1977, ue arrive at a contrasting result (rg = -0.06) and 
O l s o n’s hypothesis seems to be rejected by the test. In accordance 
uith this result one has to accepts the null-hypothesis, i.e., 
there is no significant positive correlation betueen the tuo 
variables (see Table VII—5)• In other words, size does not seem 
to provide a decisive explicative and predictive element in the 
aid performance of a group of donors.
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Table VII-4 An Empirical Test of Olson's Model
(1963-1965)
Zountrv
IS
Gross National 
Product „ 
1963-1965 ( $ m i a )
Rank Total Flow 
of Resour­
ces as Per- 
centaae of 
GNP
Rank 0DA as 
percen- 
taoe of 
GNP
R ank
Jnited States 646.26 1 0.78 6 0.54 2
permany 105.44 2 0.65 7 0.41 6
Jnited Kingdom 93.52 3 0.95 5 0.49 5
‘ranee 91.72 4 1 .42 1 0.67 1
Japan 79.03 5 0.44 10 0.21 8
i taly 54.54 6 0.50 9 0.11 14
Canada 46.84 7 C.31 1 3 0.17 10
}ustrali a 20.69 e 0.58 8 0.51 4
5ueden 18.58 □ 0.34 1 2 0.17 1 1
'Jetherlands 16.98 10 0.95 4 0.31 7
3eloium 15.49 11 1 .20 3 0.54 3
Switzerland 12.79 1 2 1.31 2 • 0.07 16
Denmark 9.04 1 3 0.21 15 0.1 2 13
Austria 8.74 14 0.28 14 0.08 15
'inland 7.83 15 0.04 17 0.03 17
'Joruay 6.37 16 0.43 11 0.16 1 2
\!eu Zealand 4.77 17 0.21 16 0.19 9
anks :
GNP 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7
TFR as % of GNP S 7 5 1 10 9 13 8 12 4 3 2 15 14 17 11 16
0 0 A as % of GNP 2 6 5 1 8 14 10 4 11 7 3 16 13 15 17 12 9
ource : All data are taken from OECD, Resources for the Developing 
Uorld 1962-1968, Paris, 1970.
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Table VII-5 An Empirical Test of O l s o n’s Model
(1975-1977)
Country Gross National 
Product 1975- 
1977 ( J m i a )
Rank Total Flow 
of Resources 
as % of GNP
R ank ODA as 
% of 
GNP
Rank
Jnited States 1.708.47 1 0.81 12 0.24 1 2
Dapan 575.93 2 0.72 13 0.21 13
Germany 459.57 3 1 .17 8 0.32 11
r rance 354.93 4 1.36 6 0.61 4
Jnited Kingdom 232.77 5 1.53 4 0.37 10
Canada 182.57 6 0.94 1 1 0.50 7
Italy 178.9 7 0.95 10 0.11 17
Netherlands 91 .5 8 1 .84 2 0.81 2
.Australia 90.4 9 0.64 15 0.49 8
-Sweden *73.87 10 1.55 3 0.88 1
Belgium 70.53 11 1 .42 5 0.51 6
Switzerland 59.23 12 3.36 1 0.19 14
Austria 42.1 13 0.71 14 0.18 15
Denmark 38.8 3 14 1.04 9 0.58 5
Norway 31 .57 15 1 .35 7 0.74 3
f inland 27.87 16 0.27 17 0.18 16
New Zealand 12.97 17 0.54 16 0.44 9
a n k s  :
GNP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
TFR as % of GNP 12 13 8 6 4 11 10 2 15 3 5 1 14 9 7 17 16
ODA as % of GNP 12 13 11 4 10 7 17 2 8 1 6 14 15 5 3 16 9
ource : Data are taken from OECD, Development Cooperation, Annual 
Aid Reviews, 1976, 1977, 1978.
If we look at the trend from 1963-1965 to 1975-1977, ue are 
inclined to conclude that the relationship between GNP and ODA 
as a percentage of GNP shows a positive correlation and conse­
quently seems to confirm Olson's hypothesis for the sixties. 
However, the relationship between the two sets of variables shows 
a declining trend and the correlation coefficient becomes not 
significant for the seventies (Table 1/II-6). Olson's model pre­
dicting a tendency towards disproportionate burden sharing is not 
confirmed for the whole period. The most reasonable inference we 
may draw at this moment is that the size of a donor has become a 
less determining factor in the analysis of the aid performance of 
donor countries. The tendency towards disproportionate burden- 
sharing, which seems to have been present in the sixties - although 
even there one should be careful in drawing straight forward con­
clusions from the allegedly disproportionate contributions of large 
donors - can certainly not be deduced from the figures we used to 
test Olson's hypothesis in the seventies. The result of the empi­
rical test implies that it is not so sure that small countries 
contribute disproportionately less to development assistance than 
big countries.
Table VII-6 Development Assistance Correlations 
(Olson's Model)
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1963-1965 1966-1968 1969-1971 1972-1974 1975-1977
GNP - To­
tal Flow 
of Resour­
ces as 
Percentage 
of GNP
0.54 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.17
GNP - ODA 
as Percen­
tage of 
GNP
0.63 0.58 0.33 0.04 -0.06
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2. Ruqqie's International Cooperation Modal
O l s o n’s 'Economic Theory of Alliance' was primarily concerned 
with defence alliances and, in particular, with the application 
of his public good model to the NATO defence alliance. The impli­
cations for foreign aid spending were not studied in detail. In 
the previous chapter we have already indicated the variety of ob­
jectives for which foreign aid can be pursued. Furthermore, there 
is evidence that multilateral aid, that is, funds from several 
countries channelled through a joint mechanism, is determined by 
other objectives and different allocation mechanisms than bilateral 
aid, which is transferred directly from donor to recipient. There­
fore, it would be desirable to disaggregate total aid into these 
two components. Ruggie's international cooperation model intro­
duces this distinction between bilateral and multilateral aid flows 
as an important element in the analysis of the aid performance of 
d o n o r s .
Actual starting point of this second line of empirical analysis 
is Ruggie's hypothesis : "There is an inverse relationship between 
the ratio of multilateral/bilateral assistance and the total level 
of national resources (l)". Rank correlations were computed for 
each year, from 1960 to 196B, for a sample drawn from members of 
DAC. The correlation coefficients were found significantly nega­
tive and almost equally high for the entire period. Ruggie's hy­
pothesis, which - as we may recall - was based on an economics of 
scale argument, predicted that big countries spend relatively 
more on bilateral than on multilateral aid, compared to small 
countries.
We tested Ruggie's hypothesis for the period 1963-1977. The 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient between GNP and the multi­
lateral/bilateral assistance ratio for the period 1963-1965 con­
firms the predictive negative relation, i.e., r » -0.72, This 
value is significant at the 0.05 level (Table VII—7). Thus,
(1) Ruggie, 3.G., Collective Goods and Future International Colla­
boration, American Political Science Rev i e w , Vol. 66, 1972-2,
p. 881.
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Table VII-7 An Empirical Test of Ruggie's Model
(1963-1965)
Country Gross National Pro­
duct 1963-1965 ( 4|mia)
Rank Ratio 00 An 
ODAg
Rank
United States 646.26 1 0.0427 16
Germany 105.44 2 0.0757 15
United Kingdom 93.52 3 0.1159 1 3
F ranee 91.72 4 0.0326 17
Japan 79.03 5 0.0790 14
I taly 54.54 6 0.3390 7
Canada 46.84 7 0.3170 8
Australia 20.69 8 0.1200 1 1
Sweden 18.68 9 1.4750 3
Netherlands 16.98 10 0.5980 5
Belgium 15.49 11 0.1163 12
Switzerland 12.79 12 0.6680 4
Denmark 9.04 1 3 0.3090 9
Austria 8.74 14 0.3930 6
Finland 7.83 15 B . 46 1
Norway 6.37 16 2.458 2
New Zealand 4.77 17 0.1380 10
Ranks i
GNP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Ratio 0DflM 16 15 13 17 14 7 8 11 3 5 12 4 9 6 1 2 10
o d a b
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation, Annual Aid Reviews.
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Table VII-8 An Empirical Test of Ruggie's Model
(1975-1977)
Coun try Gross National Pro­
duct 1975-1977 ( Jm i a )
Rank Ratio 0DAM 
ODAg
Rank
United States 1.708.47 1 0.441 12
Dapan 575.93 2 0.469 10
Germany 459.57 3 0.379 14
France 354.93 4 0.172 17
United Kingdom 232.77 5 0.5 34 8
Canada 182.57 6 0.706 4
I taly 178.9 7 2.46 1
Netherlands 91.5 8 0.477 9
Australi a 90.4 9 0.195 16
Sweden 73.87 10 0.549 7
Belgium 70.53 11 0.466 1 1
Switzerland 59.23 12 0.619 5
Austria 42.1 13 0.388 13
Denmark 38.8 3 14 0.807 3
Norway 31.57 15 0.868 2
Finland 27.87 16 0.590 6
New Zealand 12.97 17 0.266 15
Ranks :
QNP 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Ratio 0DAM 1 2  10 14 17 8 4 1 9 16 7 11 5 13 3 2 6 15
ODAg
Source î OECD, Development Cooperation, Annual Aid Reviews.
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the two sets of variables yield a correlation coefficient 
suggesting the negative relationship Ruggie predicted in his 
hypothesis.
This inverse relationship between GNP and the multilateral/ 
bilateral assistance ratio is confirmed by the test for the sub­
sequent periods, though with a declining trend (Table VII-9). 
However, the same empirical test for the period 1975-1977 leads 
to a not significantly negative correlation between the variables
(r = -0.25) (Table VII-8). Ruggie's model predicting a tendency s
for the small countries to give relatively more aid multilaterally 
than bilaterally, when compared to the big countries, is not con­
firmed for the period 1975-1977.
Table 1/II-9 Development Assistance Correlations 
(Ruggie's Model)
ODA 
GNP~ OD a "
1963-1965 1966-1968 1969-1971 1972-1974 1975-1977
-0.72 -0.77 -0.62 -0.54 -0.25
A conclusion which may be drawn from the results of the empi­
rical testing of Ruggie's model is that the economics of scale ar­
gument on which Ruggie's hypothesis has been based, seems to have 
a diminishing impact on the actual aid composition of the donor 
countries. This may imply that the size of a country has become 
a less determining factor in explaining the aid contributions to 
bilateral and multilateral channels.
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Conclusion
The results of the empirical tests of both models, Olson's 
public good model and Ruggie's international cooperation model, 
have indicated that a change in the aid performance of the donor 
countries as regards the aid volume as well as the compo­
sition of the development assistance, has taken place during the 
period 1963-1977. In the sixties, large nations appeared to bear 
a disproportionate share of the burden of the development assis­
tance, confirming Olson's hypothesis, and small nations appeared 
to contribute relatively more resources to multilateral aid than 
big nations, confirming Ruggie's hypothesis. In the seventies, 
however, the predicted outcomes of both hypotheses were not con­
firmed by the actual aid flows. This seems to imply that size 
is not any longer a decisive element in determining the actual 
aid performance of donors.
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C. Re-assessment of the Aid Performance of DAC Countries
In the prev/ious section ue indicated that the predicted out­
comes of both Olson's and Ruggie's models were not validated by 
the seventies. In this third and final section ue will advance 
some possible explanations for the distortions from the results 
the Rational Actor Approach would predict in the area of developing 
cooperation. Size of a donor country does not seem to be a decisive 
element in determining the aid performance as Olson's public goods 
model and Ruggie's joint production scheme tend to indicate. The 
reasons ue uill explore in this section are related to the relevance 
of genuine development assistance, the changing relations uith de­
veloping countries, the impact of large donors and aid-giving 
capacity. Some of these suggested explanations may, indeed, have 
an impact on the fact that the predictions of Olson's and Ruggie's 
hypotheses are not verified in the actual aid performance of the 
DAC countries in the 1970s.
1. Relevance of Genuine Development Assistance
Uhile debate continues on uhether the foreign policies of small 
states are or are not generically different from those of large 
states, interest should also be directed to the 'quality' of their 
development aid. Olson and Ruggie constructed their hypotheses 
concerning the relationship betueen the size of a donor and its 
actual aid performance on the basis of a single indicator, i.e.,
ODA as a percentage of GNP. However, we should have to ask ourselves 
if the nature of the international good of development is best indi­
cated by a single indicator of aid performance. Does it tell us some­
thing about the 'quality' of aid that single donors provide? If 
ue focus on a donor's uillingness to realize genuine development 
assistance, attention should also be paid to the concentration of 
aid flous on lou-income recipients and at the aid-tying status. 
Moreover, the addition of these elements into an assessment of de-
-245-
velopment cooperation could also shed some light on the relation­
ship between the size of a doner and its actual aid performance.
a. Aid Share of Low-income Countries
The structure of DAC members' development assistance indicates 
a shift in DAC ODA allocations in favour of low-income countries 
and especially of the Least Developed Countries (LLDCs). An ana­
lysis of ODA commitments, which have the advantage that they are 
both forward-looking and a direct measurement of donor's policies 
does show this increased interest in the needs of the low-income 
countries. A comparison of ODA commitments between 1970 and 1977 
is shown in Table V11 — 10.
The share of ODA commitments from all sources channelled to 
low-income countries as a group rose from 53.4 per cent in 1970 to 
62.3 per cent in 1977. DAC commitments to lou-income countries as 
a percentage of total DAC ODAg increased from 53.6 per cent in 1970 
to 57.5 per cent in 1977. Its share of commitments going to LLDCs 
rose significantly from 7.1 per cent to 16.4 per cent.
Table VII-10 ODA Commitments to Low-income Countries
(1970 and 1977)
Total of which DAC ODAg
1970 1977 1970 1977
j^mla % jlfmia % J'mia % ofDAC
odab
mia ? o fDACODAb
Low- income coun­t r ie s 3.9 53.4 15.5 62.3 3.0 53.6 7.7 57.5
of which LLDCs 0.6 8 .2 5.1 20.4 0 .4 7.1 2.2 16.4
Low middle-income 2.0 27.4 5.6 22.5 1.5 26.8 2.7 20.1
Upper middle-lncome 1.1 15.1 2.1 8 .4 0.8 14.3 1.6 11.9
Higher-income 0 .3 4.1 1.7 6.8 0.3 5.4 1.4 10.4
Total 7.3 100 24.9 100 5.6 100 13.4 100
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation , 1978 Review, p. 110.
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Different DAC countries have contributed in different ways 
to these developments. Table VII-11 shows for the 17 DAC members 
the distribution in 1977 of ODA commitments to the low-income re­
cipient group and the rate of increase of the donor's commitments 
to the low-income group between 1970 and 1977. The figures indi­
cate that Austria, Switzerland-whose ODA commitments are small in 
absolute t e r m s -  and three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden have expanded their aid to low-income countries faster 
and have concentrated their aid programs most heavily on these 
countries. The other country which has recorded an exceptionally 
high rate of growth on its ODA commitments to low-income countries,
Table V I 1—11 Share of Donors' ODA Commitments
to Low-income Developing Countries (a) 
(1977)
Countries Share o f  Low- income Coun­t r i e s  ( f o )
% o f  donor'8 GNP % increase  1977 over 1970
A ustralia 33.6 0.16 277
Austria 96.8 0.12 1433
Belgium 80.7- 0.32 215
Canada 76.0 0.31 203
Denmark; 87.5 0.28 828
Finland 52.4 0.04 —
Prance 28.3 0.17 151
Germany 52.6 0.16 273
I ta ly 70.6 0.02 52
Japan 71.8 0.19 381
Netherlands 68.2 0.55 837
New Zealand 38.0 0.07 —
Norway 84.8 0.33 574
Sweden 86.9 0.76 936
Switzerland 89.6 0.17 786
United Kingdom 73.3 0.19 121
United States 52.3 0.10 28
DAC Total 57.3 0.16 158
a. Low-income : countries with a per capita  income of up to 400 
in 1976.
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation , 1978 Review, 
p. 106.
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is the Netherlands. These last four countries have all raised 
their total aid substantially in dollar volume as well as in share 
of their GNP. In 1977 these four countries occupied the four top 
places on the ranking table of aid performance.
The reasons accounting for the lower rates at which the other 
donors expanded their aid to lou-income countries, are varied. The 
particular choice of the countries with which a given donor coope­
rates is often determined by factors other than the basic needs of 
the recipient. In other words, the selection of recipients is much 
influenced by a series of factors such as the specific interests 
of donors, the aid-giving capacity, etc. ... Examples are the 
French traditional concentration of a substantial portion of 
aid on overseas departments and territories and on francophone 
countries ; the concentration of Japan's ODA on the Asian and Pa­
cific regions ; the decision by Australia to give priority to Papua 
New Guinea in the distribution of its aid, etc. ...
The statistical data from Table WII-12, which gives the share
Table V/11 — 1 2 Share of Donor's Commitments to LLDCs
1969-1971 1974 1977
Australia 1 .6 1 .6 9.8
Austria 7 .7 2.4 0.5
Belgium 22.3 16.9 23.6
Canada 6.2 17.5 42.2
Denmark 20.6 32.6 32.3
Pinland — 51.7 46.2
Prance 8.5 10.0 7.7
Germany 9.1 10.6 16.5
I ta ly 15 .2 25.8 24.2
Japan 1.7 2 .4 9.2
Netherlands 2 . 1 9.0 27.6
New Zealand — 9.7 13.6
Norway 18.6 28.6 37.6
Sweden 37.1 27.0 36.9
Switzerland 14.8 20.4 28.2
United Kingdom 13.4 10.8 17.2
United States 5.4 8.0 10.4
DAC Total 8.0 9.9 16.2
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation , 1978 Review.
of donor's aid programs going to LLDCs, rev/eal a similar aid 
figuration among DAC members. Although nearly all countries in­
creased their share of ODA commitments to LLDCs, they are the same 
donors which rank on the top of the aid effort.
If one could argue that the concentration of donor's 
aid programs on low-income recipients and, especially on LLDCs, 
contains more elements of genuine development assistance, then the 
Scandinavian countries, Netherlands and Canada have become the best 
aid performers in terms of a combined impact of ODA/GNP ratio and 
share of ODA going to low-income countries. This argument certain­
ly adds a new element to the discussion of the critaria used to 
select among possible recipients and consequently, to a better 
assessment of the genuine aid effort of the DAC countries.
b. Aid-tying Status
Another element which may indicate the willingness of donors 
to devote national resources to genuine development assistance is 
the tying status of their ODA disbursements. Table VII-13 shows, 
donor by donor, the share of untied aid in their ODA flows for the 
period 1975-1977. Tied aid includes all aid transactions for which 
procurement is limited to the donor country. The tying of aid is 
an act of self-interest designed to protect the donor's balance of 
payments, stimulate its private sector exports, and return a portion 
of aid to the donor via taxation. Aid is said to be untied when 
procurement may be undertaken in substantially all countries.
One could advance the argument that untied aid is more genuine­
ly linked to the needs of the recipient countries and less directly 
connected to specific interests and needs of donors. This would 
imply that untied aid is more directly related to the general idea 
of donors' responsibility for genuine development assistance and, 
consequently, would come closer to the notion of an international 
public good.
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Table VII-13 Comparative Performance of Untied
Aid (1975-1977)
Countries % o f  ODA Rank
Australis. 72.5 6
Austria 78.7 3
Belgium 31.0 16
Canada 46.6 10
Denmark 57.3 9
Finland 41.7 14
Prance 36.0 15
Sermany 74.1 5
Ita ly 59.8 8
Japan 46.1 12
Netherlands 46.5 11
New Zealand 81.5 1
Norway 80.4 2
Sweden 76.0 4
Switzerland 65.2 7
United Kingdom 43.5 13
United States 29.1 17
Total DAC 45.3
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation , 1976, 1977 
and 1978 fteview.
A test relating GNP and untied aid as a percentage of ODA 
showed a negative correlation coefficient of rg * -o.50 at 0.05 
level of significance for the period 1975-1977. This result may 
indicate a tendency for small countries to contribute relatively 
more untied aid to developing countries than large countries. Ue 
must wait for further research before this contrast with Olson's 
public good model can be confirmed.
Concentration of donor's development assistance on low-income 
countries and the status of aid-tying certainly add an interesting 
new element to the analysis of a donor's relative aid performance. 
Moreover, it qualifies the conclusions that Olson and Ruggie drew
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from their hypotheses. It confirms the argument that the size 
of a donor does not play the determinant role Olson and Ruggie 
assumed in their models to explain the aid performance of the 
DAC donors. Other explanatory elements are to be taken into con­
sideration .
c. A Composite Index of Aid Performance
A method to bring the ’quality' of aid into an assessment of 
the development efforts of donors is the construction of a composite 
index of aid performance. Various measures of aid performance could 
be selected to consolidate into a single index (l). Although the 
use of an index is always open to criticism , we tend to believe 
that an index of aid performance is a better approximation of the 
actual aid efforts of a donor.
We constructed an index of aid performance based on five cri­
teria : 1) ODA as a percentage of GNP (x 100) ; 2) percentage of 
ODA channelled through multilateral agencies ; 3) grants as a per­
centage of ODA ; 4) grant element to LLDCs as a percentage of ODA ; 
5) percentage of ODA that is untied. Reasoning that ODA as a per­
centage of GNP remains a fundamental indicator of donor effort, ue 
weighted this measure by a multiple of four before averaging it 
with the four other measures. Tables I/II-14 and W11 — 15 represent 
this index of aid performance for the period 1975-1977 and for 1978. 
The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands top the rankings, 
while 3apan and the U.S. are found at the bottom of the ranking 
table.
A correlation of the composite index uith GNP by means of
Spearman's rank order method yields a coefficient of correlation
of r » -0.28 for 1975-1977 and r * -0.38 for 1978. If population 
s s
is taken as the measure of size, then correlation of aid performance 
uith size tends to go in a stronger inverse direction (r * -0.38 
for 1975-1977 ; and rg * -0.41 for 1978). None of the correlations,
(1) A similar index of aid performance has been constructed by
Hoadley, 3 . S., Small States as Aid Donors, International Orqa- 
nizaticn, Vol. 34, Nr. 1, Winter 1980, p. 121-137.
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houever, reached statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
The only inference ue may say at this moment is that Olson's 
and R u g g i e’s hypotheses are not validated for the 1970s and, that 
further research uill be needed to analyze the specific relation­
ship between size and aid performance. The composite index of aid 
performance certainly provides a better idea of the genuine deve­
lopment effort of donors. It even seems to imply that size does 
not influence the aid performance of donors as Olson's and Ruagie's 
models predict.
Table VII-14 Index of Aid Performance (1975-1977)
Donors ODA as
% or gnp 
(x 100)
00An as 
% or 00A
Grant 
element 
as % 
or GNP
Grant 
eleaent 
of 00A 
to LLOCs
% of
00 A
untied
Index of 
aid per­
formance
Rank
Australia 46.6 16.3 100 100 72.5 60.4 6
Austria 18.2 28.0 86.5 78.5 78.7 43.1 14
Belgium 51.4 31.8 98.2 99.2 31.0 56.2 9
Canada 50.3 41.4 97.1 97.4 46.6 60.5 5
Denmark 58.2 44.7 96.6 91.7 57.3 65.4 4
Finland 18.0 44.0 93.3 90.9 41.7 42.5 15
Franca 61.1 14.7 91.7 93.2 36.0 60.0 7
Geraany 32.3 17.5 87.0 92.6 74.1 50.0 11
Italy 11.1 71.0 98.3 100 59.8 46.7 12
Japan 21.3 32.0 71.8 77.1 46.1 39.0 17
Natharlands 81 .0 32.3 90.4 95.1 46.5 73.5 3
Naw Zealand 44.1 21.0 98.8 100 81.5 59.7 8
Norway 73.6 46.5 100 100 80.4 77.7 2
Swadan 88.1 35.5 99.6 100 76.0 82.9 1
Switzerland 18.8 38.2 94.3 96.1 65.2 46.1 13
United Kingdom 37.4 34.8 97.0 97.4 43.5 52.8 10
United States 24.4 30.6 87.0 88.2 29.1 41.6 16
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation , 1976, 1977 and 
1978 Rsvieu.
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Table I/II-15 Index of Aid Performance (1978)
Donor« ODA aa 
% of GNP 
(x 100)
□0An as 
% of ODA
Grant 
aleaent 
as % of
ODA
Grant
alament
of 00 A 
to LLDCa
% of 
00A
untied
Index of 
aid per­
formance
Rank
Australia 45 28.6 100 100 77.5 60.7 7
Austria 27 32.0 65.0 99 32.4 42.1 16
Belgium 55 42.1 98.6 99 49.9 63.7 5
Canada 52 38. 0 96.0 100 49.6 61.5 6
Danmark 74 43.9 94.5 96.4 71.2 72.2 4
Finland 17 50.2 99 100 81 .8 50.9 12
F ranca 57 13.1 92.4 96.0 42.1 58.9 8
Germany 31 35.5 87.4 92.6 78.8 52.3 11
Italy 7 87.3 99.8 100 79.4 49.3 13
Japan 23 30.9 75.3 76.2 40.3 39.3 17
Netherlands 79 26.5 92.4 99.1 52.8 73.3 3
Neu Zealand 34 18.2 100 100 96.9 56.4 9
Norway 90 45.8 100 100 82.7 86.1 1
Sweden 90 39.6 99.9 100 87.8 85.9 2
Switzerland 20 41 .8 93.1 100 63.4 47.3 14
United Kingdom 39 42.1 92.9 99.2 44.2 54.3 10
United States 23 38.7 89.5 92.1 41.9 44.3 15
Source î OECD, Development Cooperation * 1979 Rev/ieu*
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2. The ChanQinq Relations uith Developing Countries
A second group of possible reasons for the departure from the 
predicted outcomes of both Olson's and Ruggie's models, is related 
to the changing relations of individual donors with developing 
countries. The changing relations appear to have played a major 
role in the changing trend of the aid performance of DAC countries. 
Political commitments, on the one hand, resulted for a feu donors 
in important bilateral aid flows during the 1960s which, subsequent­
ly, decreased. Economic progress, on the other hand, tended to 
make some developing countries normal commercial partners rather 
than recipients of aid. And also the long-term evolution of trade 
relations with the developing countries may have influenced the 
aid volume of a number of donors.
a. Political Commitments
When the ODA/GNP ratio reached its peak in the early 1960s, 
three donors '(France, U.K., Belgium) uere heavily engaged in a 
process of decolonization, and three other countries (Germany,
Italy, Dapan) uere providing uar reparation payments on a large 
scale. Subsequently, in the mid 1960s the American involvement 
in Vietnam was accompanied by massive transfers of concessional 
assistance to that country. These factors contributed significant­
ly to the high level of aid in the sixties and their diminishing 
importance accounts for a large part of the decline of the 
DAC ODA/GNP over the period.
Aid to newly independent countries by the former metropolitan 
countries took an important share of overall aid. Table 1/II-16 
shous that the grants extended in 1962 by Belgium, France and the 
U.K. to their former dependencies amounted to 0.08 per cent of 
DAC GNP. In 1976 these three donors' ODA to the same individual 
recipients amounted to only 0.03 per cent of DAC GNP.
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Table V I 1—16 Aid to Former Dependencies
(Net Disbursements - Percentage of 
donor's GNP)
1962 1976
Belgium to Zaire, Ruanda, Burundi 
for reference CDA/GNP
0.45
0.57
0.22
0.51
Franee to former Franch dependencies 
for reference ODA/GNP
0.84
1.26
0.19
0.62
United Kingdom to indeoendent Common­
wealth LDCs
for reference ODA/GNP
0.16
0.52
0.14
0.36
Total (in % of DAC GNP)
for reference ODA/GNP
0.08
0.52
0.03
0.33
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation > 1978 Review,
The effort in connection with this process of decolonization 
influenced considerably their aid volume performance. Uhile to­
tal ODA from France declined from 1.26 per cent of GNP to 0.62 
per cent between 1962 and 1976, French aid to recipients other 
than North Africa and other former dependencies remained stable 
on a level of 0.43 per cent of GNP. Belgian aid to recipients 
other than Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi increased considerably during 
this period (from 0.09 per cent in 1962 to 0.29 par cent in 1976), 
while total Belgian aid decreased to 0.51 per cent. The ODA made 
available in recent years in connection with decolonization, to 
Papua New Guinea by Australia and to Surinam by the Netherlands, 
for instance, still involved amounts that were large for the reci­
pients, but not in comparison with DAC GNP. Table VII-17 indicates 
that, to a large degree, the geographic distribution of the bilate­
ral aid flows of the former colonial powers still reflects his­
torical longstanding associations.
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Table VII-17 Geographic Distribution of Bilateral
Aid Flous of Former Colonial Powers 
(1965, 1971, 1977)
Percentage of total o d a b
1965 1971 1977
Australia to Papua Neu 
Guinea
70 69 56
Belgium to Zaire, Ruanda, 
Burundi
91 72 60
France to former French 
colonies
92 83.5 • •
Netherlands to Surinam, 
Dutch Antilles
43 30 24
United Kingdom to Common- 
uealth countries
90 71 66
Source I OECD, Development Cooperation , Annual Aid Revieus.
War reparation payments of Germany, Italy and Japan still 
constituted an important share of their ODA in the early sixties.
In 1963 reparation payments constituted 18 per cent of Germany's ODA, 
11 per cent of Italy's ODA and 49 per cent of Japan's ODA.
The ODA volume performance of Germany and Italy has been very 
significantly affected by the impact of the reparation payments 
on their aid figures. German ODA disbursements other than repa­
ration payments averaged 0.34 per cent during the period 1963-1965, 
about the same figure for the period 1975-1977 uhen reparation pay­
ments uere no longer paid. In the case of Japan, ODA other than 
reparation payments averaged 0.09 per cent of GNP in 1963-1965, 
i.e., belou half of the 1975-1977 level (Table I/II-18).
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Table VII-18 Reparation Payments
Germany Italy Japan
JjU % of GNP $  m % of GNP A  m % of GNP
1963 70 0.07 8 0.02 68 0.10
1964 63 0.06 6 0.01 63 0.08
1965 75 0.07 3 X 75 0.08
Source : OECD, Development C o operation, 1978 Revi eu, p. 127.
The American massive economic aid to Vietnam reached a peak 
of about 0.07 per cent of U.S. GNP in 1966, or 0.04 per cent of 
DAC GNP ( in 1966 ODA/GNP of DAC was 0.41 per cent ). It
was down to half this percentage in the early 1970s, and has been 
completely nil since 1975. In other words, American aid to Vietnam 
constituted a relatively large share ofDAC aid flows in the mid 1960s.
b. Economic Progress of some Developing Countries
Apart from these political commitments which influenced the 
aid performance of some donor countries, the improvement in 
the economic situation of a number of developing countries may 
have affected the aid performance of some DAC members. Signifi­
cant declines were recorded in the GNP percentage of aid flows to 
some groups of recipients. Firstly, OPEC countries, which in 1960 
received 0.06 per cent of DAC GNP, received only 0.01 per cent in 
1976. Instead they became an important donor group themselves.
Table VII-18 only serves to exemplify this trend. Secondly, Euro­
pean developing countries received development assistance from 
DAC countries amounting to 0.04 per cent of DAC GNP in 1960 ; the 
corresponding figure for 1976 was 0.01 per cent. Thirdly, a similar 
trend can be observed for some other countries which were major
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aid recipients but have now become partners on commercial terms 
(e.g., Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan). The decline of OAC ODA extended 
to these countries has not been offset by additional aid by DAC 
donors to the poorer recipient countries.
Table U 1 1 — 19 Net Disbursements of Concessional
Assistance by OPEC Members (a)
1970 1975-1977
In 4f million
for reference DAC
In % of GNP
for reference DAC
357
6,786.5
0.43
0.34
5,614.7
14,695.7
2.33
0.33
(a) OPEC members are Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Venezuela.
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation , 1978 Review.
c. The Relationship between Trade and Aid Volume
Another possible reason for the changing relations with deve­
loping countries is the growing importance attached to the rela­
tionship between trade and aid volume. The exports of the DAC 
countries to the developing countries as a percentage of DAC GNP 
rose from 2.10 per cent in 1963 to nearly 4.0 per cent in 1977 
(Table VII-20). Still, considerable differences exist among DAC 
countries as regards the share of exports going to developing coun­
tries.
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Table VII-20 DAC Co u n t r i e s 3 Exports to LDCs
(Percentage of DAC GNP)
1963 ........... 2.10 1971 ........... 2.38
1964 ........... 2.27 1972 ........... 2.39
1965 ........... 2.31 1973 ....... . 2.71
1966 ........... 2.30 1974 ........... 3.65
1967 ........... 2.21 1975 ........... 3.88
1960 ........... 2.25 1976 .......... 3.01
1969 ........... 2.31 1977 ........... 3.99
1970 ........... 2.34
a. Excluding Australia, Finland and New Zealand
Source î OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n . 1978 Review, 
p. 130.
If trade interests are important to a d o n o r’s foreign policy,
one should expect a positive relation between the share of LDCs
in the donor's exports and the donor's aid volume. This relation
was tested for two different periods. For the period 1964-1966,
we found a significant positive correlation between the share of
LDCs in donor's exports and the ODA/GNP ratio (r * 0.72). The
s
same set of variables was tested for the period 1975-1977 and the 
correlation coefficient between the two sets of variables proved 
to be not significant (r = -0.04). These diverging outcomes 
make us believe that, ceteris paribus, for the latter period the 
importance of the share of LDCs in a donor's exports does not seem 
to have had a decisive influence on the aid performance of a donor's 
country (Table VII—21).
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Table VII-21 Share of LDCs in Donor's Exports
Compared with Donor's ODA 
(1964-1966, 1975-1977)
Countries 1964 - 1966 1975 - 1977
Share of 
LDCs in 
Exports
(*)
Rank ODA as 
% of
GNP
Rank Share of 
LOCs in 
Exports
(%)
Rank 00A as 
*°f 
GNP
Rank
Australia 16.9 7 0.51 2 14.67 3 0.49 8
Austria 2.17 17 0.10 14 2.28 17 0.18 15
Belgium 13.15 9 0.49 5 5.87 10 0.51 6
Canada 9.28 12 0.23 9 5.23 12 0.50 7
Denmark 8.68 13 0.14 13 5.28 11 0.58 5
F inland 6.44 15 0.03 17 3.93 16 0.18 16
F ranee 25.77 4 0.78 1 7.92 9 0.61 4
Germany 16.38 a 0.39 6 8.82 7 0.32 11
I taly 24.74 5 0.10 15 8.54 8 0.11 17
3apan 42.7 1 0.23 8 20.02 2 0.21 13
Netherlands 19.1 6 0.36 7 10.36 6 0.81 2
New Zealand 9.87 11 0.19 11 11 .71 4 0.44 9
Norway 8 14 0.15 12 4.62 15 0.74 3
Sweden 9.98 10 0.20 10 4.97 14 0.8B 1
Switzerland 4.9 16 0.08 16 5.20 13 0.19 14
United Kingdom 29.39 3 0.49 4 10.99 5 0.37 10
United States 31 .7 2 0.50 3 23.7 1 0.24 12
Source : OECD, Overall Trade by Countries.
Uhat is more, if we compare the DAC countries' share of LDCs 
in their exports in 1964 with the overall change in the ODA/GNP 
ratio over the period 1964-1977, the correlation coefficient be­
tween the two sets of variables is r = -0.59 at a 0.05 signifi-
5
cance level (Table VII-22). This result would give the surprising 
implication that the best ODA volume performers tend to be among 
those countries which direct a comparatively small share of their 
exports to developing countries. Their relatively limited trade 
involvement with developing countries may have made it easier for
some countries to obtain aid appropriations, even though their 
ODA programmes were clearly not geared towards export promotion 
and not necessarily oriented towards their best potential market 
countries. It certainly implies that the relationship between 
trade and aid volume does not provide us with a readily accepted 
reason for the changing trend in the aid perfromance of DAC coun­
tries. It may explain in part but not justify the decline of the 
DAC ODA/GNP ratio since the early 1960s.
Table V I 1—22 Share of LDCs in D o n o r’s Exports
Compared with a Change in Donor's 
Volume Performance
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Countries 1964 share of LDCs 
in Exporta (Î)
1964 - 1977 change in 
ODA / GNP ratio 
(in points)
Japan 41.3 ♦ 0.06
United States 34.4 - 0.34
United Kingdom 29.7 - 0.16
F ranee 26.9 - 0.29
I taly 22.7 + 0.01
Netherlands 19.0 + 0.56
Australia 17.4 - 0.03
Germany 16.8 - 0.17
Belgium 12.9 - 0.01
Neu Zealand 11. ♦ 0.20
Sweden 10.2 + 0.82
Canada 10.2 ♦ 0.34
Denmark 8.9 + 0.49
Norway 8.4 + 0.67
Finland 7.1 + 0.13
Switzerland 4.5 + 0.12
Austria 2.1 + 0.16
Source : OECD, Overall Trade by Co u n t r i e s .
Conclusion
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These qualitative reasons, some of political nature, others 
of more economic nature, may well explain the interference of 
elements other than the size of the donor country in the analysis 
of the aid performance of donors. In the early sixties the com­
bined impact of political and economic interests seemed to concen­
trate on some particular donors uho happen to be the major 
d o n o r s .
The concentration of development assistance on bilateral aid 
flows for, political and economic reasons, blurs the result Olson 
predicted in his public good analysis and consequently must make 
us very careful in applying this analysis to the foreign aid sec­
tor. To what extent can one maintain that foreign aid is called 
an international public good, i.e., a donor country makes no dis­
tinction between its own foreign aid spending and that of other 
donors, without risking the danger of talking about a mere abstract 
public good box? Benefits from aid expenditures to developing 
countries do not seem to be equally shared among the industrial 
countries. On the contrary, actual benefits appeared to be rather 
divisible. Henceforth, the positive correlation coefficient be­
tween GNP and the ODA/GNP ratio in the 1960s was probably not so 
much the result of the implication that large countries were 
assuming a bioger share of the common burden of promoting world se­
curity - as Olson proposed in his theory of alliances -, but was 
mainly the result of the contributions of a few major donors pur­
suing their national interests.
Most of the other donors, which did not have specific economic 
and political interests to pursue, spent very little on develop­
ment assistance in the 1960s. Their scanty resources devoted 
to foreign aid were primarily channelled through multilateral 
agencies. For these countries, in particular the Scandinavian 
countries, foreign aid was primarily given for altruistic motives. 
They perceived that the genuine development task could, at that 
moment, best be achieved through multilateral assistance.
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In the case of defence spending, it might be true that small 
countries benefiting from the expenditures of large countries 
whatever they do, spend very little themselves. Equity of pre­
ferences for the good itself and for the way it should be produced, 
is assumed. This might be a reasonable assumption for the pro­
duction of the alliance good of security. Development assistance, 
however, is a task to which relatively very little money is 
appropriated by the budget. Moreover, diverging interests as 
regards the task of development assistance are more readily visible 
and the benefits derived from the aid disbursements are often di­
visible. Summarizing, the various preferences of donor countries 
introduce some important additional elements in the analysis of the 
foreign aid sector of which the public good application makes 
abstraction.
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3, The Impact of Large Donors
Another aspect that ue bring into the assessment of the de­
velopment assistance of donors is related to the changing aid 
performance of some DAC countries. The DAC aggregate figures, as 
regards the volume aid performance as well as the relation between 
multilateral and bilateral development assistance, have been heavily 
influenced by a feu large donors. In 1963-1965 the flows from the 
U.S., France and the U.K. amounted to nearly three-fourths of DAC ODA. 
In 1975-1977 their aid disbursements dropped to just over half of 
the total DAC ODA. Moreover, their combined ODA, which amounted 
to 0.57 per cent of their GNP in 1963-1965, fell subsequently to 
a low 0.31 per cent. Germany and, more strikingly, Japan, have 
taken a progressively larger share in DAC ODA but their ODA/GNP 
ratio declined or stagnated over the years. Also the evolution of 
donors' ODA as a percentage of DAC ODA and its change at real prices 
during the 1970s proves the relatively poor aid performance of the 
biggest donors (Table VII-23).
The remaining twelve countries as a group show clearly the best 
ODA performance in share of total DAC ODA as well as in proportion 
of GNP. Their share of total DAC ODA has grown from 23 per cent 
in 1963-1965 to nearly 30 per cent in 1975-1977. Their ODA/GNP 
ratio increased significantly from 0.23 per cent to 0.45 per cent 
(with considerable differences, admittedly, between individual 
countries in this group).
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Table VII-23 Evolution of ODA within DAC ODA
(1970-1977)
ODA as % of Increase in ODA at
• DAC ODA real prices from
1970 till 1977
1970 1977
Principal donors in 1970
United States 44.9 28.3 - 22.9
F ranee 14.3 15.4 + 9.0
Germany B.8 9.4 + 7.7
Japan 5.7 9.7 + 50.9
United Kingdom 6.6 6.2 0.6
Sub-total 81.3 69.1 9.7
Other DAC donors
Canada 5.1 6.75 ♦ 67.4
Australi a 3.0 2.9 + 2.4
Netherlands 2.9 8.1 + 104.4
Italy 2.2 1.3 - 33.0
Belgium 1.8 2.5 + 31.5
Sueden 1.7 5.3 + 193.0
Denmark 0.9 1.7 + 107.8
Noruay 0.5 2.0 + 260.0
Switzerland 0.4 o . a + 66.6
New Zealand 0.2 0.4 ♦ 87.6
Austri a 0.2 0.8 ♦ 408.4
F inland 0.1 0.3 + 217.6
Sub-total 19.7 30.9 + 80.4
DAC Total 100.0 100.0 + 8.8
Source : OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n , Annual Aid Reviews.
Figure VII-2 brings us to the changing shares of major donors 
in DAC ODA between the periods 1963-1965 and 1975-1977. Clearly 
indicated is the fact that the overall official development assis­
tance by DAC countries is heavily weighted by the individual U.S. 
performance.
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Figure VII-2 Share of Major Donors in DAC ODA
(1963-1965 and 1975-1977)
ODA/GNP ODA/GNP
0.48% Total DAC(100%) 0.33% Total DAC(100%)
0.23% O t h e r s (23.15%)
0 . 2 1 /a 3apsrr( 2.82%)
0.41% G e r m a n y (7.40%)
0.49% U.K. (7.83%)
0.87% F r a n e e (13.60%)
0.54% U . S . A . (52.60%)
0.45% 0thers(29.10%)
0 .21% J a p a n (8.76%)
0.32% Germany(l0.63%)
0.37% U . K . (6.23%)
0.61% F rance(l5.51%)
0.24% U . S . A . (29.80%)
1963-1965 1975-1977
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation. Annual Aid Reviews
Recent trends in the U.S. aid effort leave much to be desired. 
Although it is obvious that the U.S. has remained the largest 
single donor with a net disbursement of .$ 4,166.67 million in 
1975-1977, its aid performance record is quite disappointing, both 
absolutely and as a fraction of GNP. The monetary increase of its 
aid disbursements is more than offset by price erosion. And as per­
centage of GNP the U.S. aid disbursements have stabilized around a
lou level of 0.24 per cent compared with an average of 0.54 per 
cent in 1963-1965.
Table VII-24 compares the relative aid shares of the DAC members 
uith the relative GNP. The American share in total OAC GNP amounted 
to over half of DAC GNP in 1963-1965. Its contribution to DAC ODA 
amounted to 60 per cent. According to this comparison of relative 
shares the U.S. contributes a disproportionate part of the realiza­
tion of the DAC development assistance. It is plausible to argue 
that the undisputed American leadership in the early 1960s did have 
its positive effects on the total aid performance of DAC. Only the 
relative aid shares of three other countries, i.e., Belgium, France 
and U.K. exceed their relative shares of DAC GNP. If ue take this 
comparison of relative shares as a criterion for the disproportionate
Table VII-24 Relative DAC Aid Shares Compared to
Relative GNP
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Countries 1963 - 1965 1975 1977
GNP as % 
of DAC 
GNP
Aid as % 
of DAC Aid
GNP as % of
DAC GNP
Aid as % of 
OAC Aid
Australia 1.68 < 1 .78 2.14 3.14
Austria 0.71 > 0.12 0.99 > 0.S5
Belgium 1.26 < 1.43 1.67 < 2.60
Canada 3.81 > 1.36 4.31 < 6.57
Danmark 0.73 > 0.18 0.92 < 1.61
Finland 0.64 > 0.04 0.66 > 0.35
F ranee 7.46 < 13.62 8.39 < 15.5
Germany 8.58 > 7.40 10.86 > 10.63
I taly 4.43 > 1.01 4.23 > 1.42
Jaoan 6.43 > 2.82 13.61 > 8.76
Netherlands 1.38 > 0.87 2.16 < 5.30
New Zealand 0.39 > Q.15 0.31 < 0.41
Norway 0.52 > 0.17 0.75 < 1.66
Sweden 1.S2 > 0.53 1.74 < 4.66
Switzerland 1 .04 > 0.15 1.40 > 0.80
United Kingdom 7.61 < 7.83 5.50 < 6.23
United States 52.56 < 60.03 40.37 > 29.80
Source î OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n , Annual Aid Reviews.
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burden sharing of foreign aid, then all the other DAC members did 
not pay their fair share of the aid burden in 1963-1965. It cer­
tainly prov/es - from a different angle - the relevance of the spe­
cific political and economic interests which determined the aid 
performance of these four ’benevolent' donors in the mid 1960s.
The situation has been completely reversed in the 1970s. The 
American share in DAC GNP dropped to 40 per cent ; its correspond­
ing share in total DAC aid was more than halved to less than 30 
per cent. In 1975-1977 the U.S. contributed less than the amount 
one should expect it to pay according to its relative GNP share. 
Most countries, however, showed significant increases of their aid 
contributions as regards their DAC share as well as their ODA/GNP 
ratio. According to this comparison of relative shares, the U.S., 
Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, 3apan and Switzerland are bene­
fiting disproportionately from the pursuit of the development task 
of the total DAC.
Within this declining trend of total ODA it is also useful to 
consider the distinction between bilateral and multilateral deve­
lopment assistance (Table VII-25). In 1963-1965 the U.S. provided 
more than half (i.e., 57.6 per cent) of total bilateral ODA. This 
percentage dropped to just over 20 per cent in 1975-1977. American 
0DAn as a percentage of GNP dropped drastically from 0.52 per cent
D
to a near 0.17 per cent (See Table VII-3). On the other hand, the 
U.S. increased its share in multilateral ODA from 2.5 per cent to 
9 per cent, with a corresponding increase of ODA^ as a percentage 
of GNP from 0.02 per cent to 0.07 per cent.
The effect of the sharp decline of U.S. O D A g  on DAC ODAg  could 
not be offset by the increased shares of ODAg relative to total 
DAC 0 D A Q of nearly all other donors. The increased importance of 
multilateral ODA,  on the other hand, found a wide response in the 
increased shares of ODA^ of all 17 DAC members.
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Table VI1—25 Relative Shares of 0DAn and ODA*. Compared 
to Relative ODA
Countries
1963 - 1965 1975 - 1977
□DAg as % 
of DAC ODA
0DAn as % 
of DAC ODA
QOflg as % 
of DAC ODA
0DAn as % 
of DAC ODA
Australia 1.59 0.19 2.63 0.51
Austria 0.09 0.03 0.40 0.15
Belgium 1.28 0.15 1.77 0.82
Canada 1.03 0.33 3.85 2.72
Danmark G . 04 0.14 0.89 0.72
Finland 0.004 0.04 0.20 0.12
F ranee 13.19 0.43 13.23 2.27
Germany 6.88 0.52 7.70 2.92
Italy 0.75 0.25 0.41 1.01
Japan 2.61 0.21 5.97 2.80
Netherlands 0.56 0.33 3.59 1.71
New Zealand 0.13 0.02 0.32 0.09
Noruay 0.05 0.12 0.89 0.77
Sweden 0.21 0.32 3.00 1.65
Switzerland 0.09 0.06 0.49 0.30
United Kingdom 7.02 0.81 4.06 2.17
United States 57.57 2.46 20.68 9.12
Total DAC 93.64 6.36 70.10 29.90
Source : OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n . Annual Aid Reviews.
Some tentative conclusions may be drawn : 1) the pursuit of the 
task of development assistance by the DAC, i.e., the aid volume 
performance and the division over bilateral and multilateral aid 
flows, has been changing with the decreasing importance of the do­
minant participant : 2) the disproportionate burden sharing of the 
development assistance among the DAC members according to the size 
of the donor is no longer a significant element in the explanation 
of the aid effort of the DAC members ; 3) over the years there has 
been a trend to provide a greater share of development assistance 
through multilateral aid channels for all individual DAC members.
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4. The Aid-giving Capacity
A final explanation for the diversion from the results expected 
from Olson's and Ruggie's hypotheses is linked to the idea that the 
aid performance of a donor is a function of the aid-giving capacity 
rather than size. It would be reasonable to assume that DAC members 
mention their economic situation as an important factor which de­
termines the volume of their ODA. One could advance the argument 
of a positive relationship between the aid volume of a donor and 
such factors as growth and wealth in the donor country. A relation­
ship between the aid-giving capacity and the aid performance would 
then be linked to the idea that development aid is a superior good. 
In the following, we will explore this relationship.
a. Aid and GNP Growth
The decline of the DAC ODA/GNP ratio during the period of sus­
tained economic growth that lasted until 1973 and its temporary 
recovery in 1974 and 1975, at a time of slightly declining real 
GNP, may appear paradoxical at first sight. In fact, the period 
1963-1973 was not a period of decline but of progression of ODA/GNP 
ratios for most of the 17 DAC countries. As noted earlier, the 
DAC average was heavily influenced by the performance of a few 
large donors and, especially, by the disappointing aid effort of 
the U.S.
The ODA volume seems to be unrelated to the donor's actual or 
expected changes in GNP. Individual countries' records over the 
period 1960-1977 do not show the positive relationship between GNP 
growth and the change in the ODA/GNP ratio which could be expected 
if one assumes that the growth of GNP increases aid-giving capacity 
(Table VII-26). The correlation coefficient between the average 
yearly growth rate of real GNP and overall change in the ODA/GNP 
ratio for the period 1960-1977 is not significant (rg * -0.04). 
Countries like Japan and France with high growth rates decreased, 
in fact, their ODA/GNP ratio whereas countries like Sweden and
Denmark uith relatively low growth rates did significantly in­
crease their ODA/GNP ratio. Although the size of a donor country 
does not seem to explain donors' aid performance, as suggested 
by Olson's and Ruggie's hypotheses, neither does the relationship be­
tween aid volume and the GNP growth of donor provide a possible ex­
planation for the changed attitude of donors towards the task of 
development assistance.
Table VII-26 Growth of GNP and ODA Volume
Average Yearly Growth Rate of Real GNP 
and Overall Change in the ODA/GNP Ratio 
(1960-1977)
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GNP ODA GNP 00 A
3aoan 8.9 -0.03 Belgium 4.3 •
01
F ranee S.O -0.75 Germany 4.2
o«01
Norway 4.8 +0.71 Oenmark 3.8 +0.51
Canada 4.8 ♦0.32 Sueden 3.6 +0.94
Netherlands 4.7 ♦0.54 United Statas 3.3 -0.31
Austria 4.6 +0.24 Neu Zealand 3.2 + o • <D c
r
F inland 4.5 ♦0.10a Switzerland 3.2 ♦0.15
I taly 4.4 -0.12 United Kingdom 2.0 -0.18
Australia 4.3 ♦0.08 Total 0 AC 4.2 -0.20
a. Since 1970
b. Since 1966
Source : OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n . 1978 Review, p. 133.
b. Aid and GNP per capita
The same principle would seem to imply that, as a country 
grows richer over time, it should be able to devote a higher per­
centage of its GNP to aid. In the last years this tendency has . 
found expression in ranking tables comparing the relative positions 
of DAC members in respect of GNP per head with their relative po­
sitions concerning aid flows percentages and ODA per head. Eventually 
it appears that the aid volume has tended to become generally 
higher in the comparatively better-off countries. The argument 
would then read as follows : it is reasonable to assume that the
higher a country's GNP per capita, the greater the percentage of that 
GNP which it can devote to development assistance, and the higher 
its 00A per head.
This argument clearly contrasts with Olson's hypothesis. In the 
'Economic Theory of Alliances', Olson proved that there was no sta­
tistically significant relationship between per capita GNP and the 
defence budget. He concluded that the correlation between the size 
of an ally's national income and the percentage of its national in­
come spent on defence, could not be explained in terms of any rela­
tionship of these two variables with per capita income.
For the task of development aid Olson's statement seems less con­
vincing. We have tested the above assumptions for the relationship 
between GNP per capita and ODA/GNP ratio and also for the relationship 
between GNP per capita and ODA per head (Table VII-27 and VII-28).
Table VII-27 Comparative Aid-giving Performance (1963-1965)
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Country GNP per capita ODA ODA per head
i
Rank % of GNP Rank
S
Rank
United States 3.369 1 0.545 2 18.39 1
Sueden 2.436 2 0.167 11 4.06 9
Canada 2.424 3 0.17 10 4.12 8
Switzerland 2.180 4 0.071 16 1.55 13
Danmark 1.915 5 0.117 13 2.24 11
Franee 1.899 6 0.872 1 16.57 2
Australia 1.859 7 0.507 4 9.42 3
Germany 1 .809 8 0.412 6 7.45 6
United Kingdom 1 .731 9 0.492 5 8.51 5
Norway 1.724 10 0.161 12 2.78 10
Belgium 1.452 11 0.543 3 8.98 4
Netherlands 1.400 12 0.307 7 4.30 7
Austria 1.211 13 0.082 15 1.00 15
I taly 1.055 14 0.109 14 1.15 14
3  b o  a n 816 15 0.21 8 1.71 12
Ranks :
GNP / caoita 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
ODA as % of GNP 2 11 10 16 13 4 6 5 12 3 7 15 14 B
ODA per head 1 9 8 13 11 2 3 6 5 10 4 7 15 14 12
Source : OECD, Development Cooperation, Annual Aid Reviews.
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Table U 1 1 — 28 Comparative Aid-giving Performance (1975-1977)
Country GNP per capita 00A ODA per head
$ 3ank % of GNP Sank $ ■isnk
Suitzerland 9. 144 1 0.188 14 17.55 1 2
Sueden 8.985 2 0.881 1 79.17 1
United States 7.936 3 0.244 12 19.36 10
Canada 7.899 4 0.503 7 39.80 6
Norway 7.847 5 0.736 3 57.71 2
Denmark 7.650 5 0.562 5 44.51 4
Germany 7.464 7 0.323 11 24.13 9
Belgium 7.164 8 0.514 6 36.97 7
France 6.705 9 0.611 4 40.98 5
Netherlands 5.644 10 0.610 2 53.87 3
Australia 6.493 11 0.486 8 31.57 8
F inland 5.897 12 0.176 16 10.41 16
Austria 5.6C2 13 0.182 15 10.21 15
3aoan 5.104 14 0.213 13 10.87 14
New Zealano 4 . 166 15 0.441 9 18.38 11
United Kingdom 4.157 16 0.374 10 15.55 13
I taly 2.186 17 0.111 17 3.53 17
^anks :
GNP / capita 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
ODA as % of GNP 14 1 12 7 3 5 11 6 4 2 8 16 15 13 9 10 17
ODA per head 12 1 10 6 2 4 9 7 5 3 8 16 15 14 11 13 17
Source : OECD, Development C o o p e r a t i o n . Annual Aid Reviews.
Table VII-29 summarizes the trend of the rank correlation
coefficients for the period 1963-1977. The rank correlation
coefficient between ODA/GNP ratios for individual DAC countries
and their GNP per capita in 1963-1965 amounted to a not significant
r = 0.17. For the period 1975-1977 the test gave a correlation s
coefficient of r = 0.42. If we exclude Switzerland from the test.s  ?
we will arrive at a statistically relevant positive correlation 
between GNP per capita and ODA/GNP ratio, i.e., r = 0.55.
9
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More indicative for a possible importance of the aid-giving
capacity of a donor to assess its aid effort, is the relationship
between GNP per capita and ODA per head. This hypothesis was
tested for the period 1963-1977 and was found valid from the period
1966-1968 on. If we exclude Switzerland from the test - Switzerland
is contributing very little ODA compared to its wealth - an even
more positive relationship will be found between these two sets of
variables. For the period 1975-1977 the correlation coefficient
was r = 0.62 and even r = 0.72 without Switzerland, 
s s
Table UII-29 Aid-giving Capacity Correlations
1963-1965 1966-1968 1969-1971 1972-1974 1975-1977
GNP per 
capita - 
ODA/GNP
0.14 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.42 
(0 . 5 5 ) 3
GNP per 
capita - 
ODA per 
head
0.41
(0.45)a
0.59 
(0.65)3
0.70 a 
(0.76)
C.52 
(0.60)
0.62 a 
(0.72)a
a. Without Switzerland
Although the relationship between the wealth of a nation ex­
pressed in terms of GNP per capita and the aid effort of a nation 
does not show the expected satisfying results for both tested sets 
of variables, it still may indicate a possible element of explana­
tion for the changed aid performance of DAC countries. The most 
reasonable inference at the moment is that a tendency has been 
developing whereby the more wealthy donors are contributing more to 
development assistance. Further research must be undertaken to 
see if this tendency will continue to develop.
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Conclusion
In the final chapter ue haus tried to assess the aid perfor­
mance of the DAC donors on the basis of Olson's public good model 
and Ruggie's international cooperation model, both rooted in the 
setting of the Rational Actor Approach. The first section dealt 
with a discussion of the nature of the international good of deve­
lopment aid. It became clear that defining development aid as a 
mere international public good, exhibiting non-rivalness and non­
excludability, is very unrealistic. The least ue could say is that 
development aid is an international good containing simultaneously 
public and private good elements.
The assumption of equal preferences for the task of development 
aid makes abstraction from the diverging interests donors have in 
foreign aid. One may easily agree with the assertion that th%re 
is a common international interest in the economic and social deve­
lopment of the Third World generally. Houever, this common interest 
in development aid is very much linked to the pursuit of national 
interests that only aims at realizing national private benefits.
In other words, the public good nature of development aid becomes 
compromised by the national benefits drawn from specific aid con­
tributions. It implies that Olson's public good model, as to its 
application in the area of development cooperation, runs into some 
difficulties. To put it in another way : the mix8d nature of the 
international good of development aid makes the application of 
such an approach less promising.
In a second section we tested Olson's public good model and 
Ruggie's international cooperation model in the area of development 
cooperation. The hypotheses were tested for the aid performance 
of DAC for the period 1963-1977.
Olson's hypothesis, i.e., there is a significant positive 
correlation between the size of national income and foreign aid 
expenditures as a percentage of national income, is based on a 
public good argument. It predicts that small countries contribute 
disproportionately to the burden of development assistance than
large countries. The empi-rical testing resulted in a decreasing 
relevance of this hypothesis for the beginning of the period 
and a not significant correlation between the two sets of variables 
for the 1970s. In short,the disproportionate burden sharing of de­
velopment assistance among DAC members according to the sire of 
a donor was not confirmed by the results in the 1970s.
Ruggie's hypothesis, i.e., there is an inverse relationship 
between the ratio of multilateral/bilateral assistance and the to­
tal level of national resources, is based on an economics of scale 
argument. It predicts that small countries spend relatively more 
on multilateral developemnt assistance than on bilateral assistance, 
when compared to large countries. The empirical testing confirmed 
this hypothesis for nearly the whole period, though with a declin­
ing trend. However, no statistically significant outcome was 
achieved for the period 1975-1977. Briefly, Ruggie's hypothesis 
did not prove its validity for the later period of the 1970s.
The not entirely satisfactory results of the empirical testing 
of both models seem to imply that the size of a country is less an 
explanatory element in determining the actual aid performance of 
DAC countries in the 1970s than it was assumed by both models. 
Therefore, in the final section, we explored some possible reasons 
for the departure from the predicted outcomes of both Olson's and 
Ruggie's models. Ue introduced some additional explanatory ele­
ments which, we believe, would have to be included in an analysis of 
the aid performance of the DAC members.
This discussion about the relevance of genuine development 
assistance has made us aware of the complexity of the nature of 
the international good of development aid. Concentration of aid 
flows on low-income recipients and the aid-tying status are indi­
cators of a genuine aid effort. The introduction of these elements 
seemed to imply that size is less a determining factor of aid 
efforts than the economic models ue employed predict.
A second explanatory qualification of the changing trend of 
the aid performance of DAC donors is linked to the changing re­
lations of donors with developing countries. These relations,
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some of political nature, others of more economic nature, may 
uell explain the interference of elements other than the size 
of the donor country in the aid performance of donors. The public 
good model of Olson has made abstraction of the existence of va­
rious preferences of donor countries for development aid.
Thirdly ye discussed the impact of some large donors on the 
DAC aid performance. It is plausible to argue that the undisputed 
American leadership in the early 1960s had its positive effects on 
the total aid performance of DAC. With the decreasing importance 
of the dominant participant, the aid volume performance and the 
division over bilateral and multilateral aid flows have been 
changing, refuting the predicted outcomes of the models.
A final explanation is linked to the idea that the aid perfor­
mance of a donor is a function of the aid-giving capacity rather 
than size. It appears that there is a tendency for wealthier 
donors to contribute more to development assistance. Ue will 
have to wait for further research to see if this tendency will be 
confirmed.
The introduction of these qualifying aspects of explanation 
of the relative aid performance of DAC members has certainly 
blurred the neat and simple models from which Olson and Ruggie 
abstracted their hypotheses. However, the actual importance of 
specific interests of donors, of the decreasing role of the U.S. 
in providing development assistance, of the wealth of donors and 
of the selection of recipients according to genuine development 
assistance criteria has, in fact, affected the relative aid effort 
of DAC countries. We ended up with a more complex, but also with 
a more appropriate picture of the aid performance of DAC members 
for the period 1963-1977, The re-assessment of the aid performance 
of DAC countries lends credence to the presumption that the asso­
ciation of size of donors with the foreign aid behaviour is a more 
complex relation than Olson's and Ruggie's models seem to assume.
CONCLUSION
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The assessment of the applicability of the Rational Actor 
Approach to International Relations has been central to this 
study. Uith this our research is linked to the attempts to 
stimulate scientific analysis in International Relations. Ue 
adopted the neo-classical research program as the conceptual 
structure for the analysis. Because of the growing importance 
of the public choice theory to the explanation of non-economic 
processes, ue tried to interpret the behaviour of states towards 
international cooperation from a public goods perspective. In 
particular, we took Olson's theory of collective action as the 
main point of departure. Uithin this framework of reasoning the 
size of a country has proved to be an important explanatory source 
of foreign policy behaviour.
The use of the Rational Actor Model and a public goods per­
spective to the analysis of the behaviour of states towards inter­
national cooperation nou calls for some general conclusions. The 
qualifications ue proposed to Olson's original contribution have 
been commented at length in the theoretical parts of this study.
A chief point in Olson's theory of collective action is the 
relationship betueen an international organization and the nature 
of its output . The fact that public goods are presumably inherent 
in organizational or group efforts to attain a common objective 
appeared to have a special importance in the international context. 
Houever, Olson's conclusion that international organizations, 
international cooperation, and military alliances, uhether tacit 
or formal, produce public goods, has clearly overstated the re­
lationship betueen public goods and international organizations.
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Reference was made to goods other than public goods, since 
the production and consumption of goods of all kinds are intimate­
ly interrelated in international cooperation. In short, inter­
national organizations also provide benefits that are. private be­
tween the member countries. The existence of these private bene­
fits is a significant element in explaining the behaviour of 
states towards international cooperation and must be included in 
any formal analysis. Too often focus was exclusively on the pure 
public benefits of organizations, hereby ignoring important 
private and pure benefits. This has led to misguided inferences.
We tried to remedy this by broadening the discussion. We 
have looked at the international dimension of goods which are 
provided through international cooperation. Finally, we arrived 
at a fourfold classification of international goods, i.e., public 
goods, commons goods, club goods and private goods. The specific 
nature of the various categories of international goods was 
believed to have some specific implications on the actual behaviour 
of the individual states towards international cooperation. We 
concluded that from a conceptual viewpoint a public goods per­
spective can be useful if we take into consideration that inter­
national arrangements may provide simultaneously goods with differ­
ing characteristics, public good elements as well as private good 
elements, and that international arrangements may be dealt with 
in differing frameworks of cooperation.
As well as commenting the relevance of the public good concept 
to International Relations we also tried to complement Olson's 
theory of collective action. This was done by including Ruggie's 
joint production scheme into the analysis. The choice of a com­
bination of two goods, i.e., national arrangements and internation­
al arrangements, in the pursuit of a state's objective, was 
examined. Discussion was centered on the different impact of the 
returns to scale in the production of both national and inter-
national arrangements on states. According to this model the 
size of a country is instrumental in determining the composition 
of national and international arrangements to achieve a country's 
objective. The smaller a country, the more it will devote its 
resources to international arrangements to achieve its objective.
To resume our comments on the relationship between inter­
national organization and its output, two elements attracked our 
special attention. First, international arrangements provide 
simultaneously goods exhibiting different characteristics. Second­
ly, countries face a choice betueen national and international 
arrangements in the pursuit of their objectives. These two 
elements have an impact on the behaviour of states towards inter­
national cooperation.
Besides these more conceptual remarks on the application of 
Olson's public goods theory to International Relations, we also 
contested one of Olson's major conclusions, i.e., the exploitation 
hypothesis. It tells that large countries are exploited by 
small ones with regard to the cost-benefit ratio of public goods. 
The policy application of this theory is that small countries 
need not to cooperate with large ones about the provision of pub­
lic goods. We pointed out some of the applications of this 
theory to International Relations.
However, with the help of the reaction process, we argued 
that the introduction of different preferences for the consumption 
of a public good could modify Olson's exploitation thesis. We 
showed that Olson's ideas about burden-sharing are not completely 
accurate. He makes the simplifying assumption that tastes are 
homogeneous throughout the organization or the arrangement 
affected by public goods. Yet, we believe that preferences play 
a critical role in determining the actual provision of public 
goods (cfr. Chapter V fl). Under certain conditions the income 
effects of a public good reverse the disproportionality of the
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burden-sharing, i.e., the country with the relatively smaller 
output prior to the reaction process may bear a disproportionate­
ly larger share of the public g o o d’s costs after the process.
Thus, in contrast to Olson's model, the cost-benefit ratio of 
the smaller country may be greater than that of the larger 
country. The results demonstrated conditions that may bring 
forth international cooperation betueen large and small countries 
about public good supplies.
By introducing different preferences into Olson's model, ue 
may find organizations in uhich one member supplies all of a pub­
lic good and/or uhere one member pays almost all costs of increas­
ing the supply of a public good. Indeed, ue may even encounter 
circumstances under uhich a small country provides more of a pub­
lic good than a large member. Without information on preference 
patterns or income effects, it is not possible to say uhich share 
should be contributed by each member to any given public good. 
Statements about one member exploiting another cannot be made 
without this information. Unfortunately, ue rarely possess an 
operational concept uhich allous us to allocate cost-shares in 
public goods provision. Further research should have to be under­
taken to investigate the preference patterns of countries as to 
public goods.
The last part of the research has been dedicated to the 
assessment of the Rational Actor Model in the area of development 
cooperation. The evaluation of the aid performance by the DAC 
donors on the basis of the Rational Actor Approach proved to be 
less illuminating than most applications of Olson's public goods 
theory to International Relations made us assume.
It uas amply indicated that development aid is an inter­
national good containing simultaneously public and private good 
elements. Moreover, the existence of the different rationales
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for foreign aid allocation tended to indicate that an analysis 
of development aid based upon mere Rational Actor assumptions 
may contain some misguided inferences. In effect, preferences 
for the realization of development aid widely varies from donor 
to donor. The international common interest in development aid 
is often tied to the pursuit of national interests. The many 
national benefits that are drawn from the foreign aid disburse­
ments have certainly compromised the public good nature of devel­
opment aid. Finally, we defined the actual aid effort of a 
donor as the result of mixed motives, or a synthesis of altruism 
and self-interest. The Rational Actor Model, however, only deals 
with aid donors guided by their individual self-interest and 
makes abstraction of the altruistic rationale for foreign aid 
allocation, a not totally unimportant motive in development 
cooperation. Resuming the relevance of a public goods per­
spective to the area of development cooperation, we are inclined 
to conclude that the applicability of both the Rational Actor 
Model and Olson's public goods theory is not totally satisfactory.
The results of the empirical assessment of both Olson's pub­
lic goods model and Ruggie's joint production scheme indicated 
a change in the aid performance by the donor countries as re­
gards the aid volume as well as the composition of the aid flows. 
Both models considered the size of a donor instrumental in ex­
plaining the aid performance of donors. However, the inference 
we drew from the empirical test was that size was no longer an 
explanatory source of foreign aid behaviour, as both models 
made us believe.
Therefore, we re-assessed the aid performance of DAC countries 
in order to explore some possible reasons for the departure from 
the outcomes predicting an association between size and aid per­
formance. The importance of specific interest of donors, the 
impact of large donors, the w e a l t h  of nations and the 'quality*
of aid have certainly blurred the neat assumptions of the 
Rational Actor Approach. The inclusion of these factors into 
the analysis certainly provides a more appropriate picture of 
the aid performance by DAC donors. It also proves the difficul­
ties inherent to scientific analysis in International Relations.
As a final conclusion ue may recall some points of the 
assessment of the Rational Actor Approach to the area of devel­
opment cooperation. The abstract nature of the public good 
concept often thwarts the incorporation of the economic theory 
of public goods into International Relations, particularly into 
the area of development cooperation. The problem appears to be 
the involvement of a large number of different considerations 
relevant to cooperation in development aid. The ability of 
academics to separate particular issues, e.g., development coope­
ration, from ongoing political, military, and economic relations, 
does not mean that studies in International Relations can easily 
follow this pattern. The larger the number of issues inter­
twined, the less likely that individual nation-states will per­
ceive any particular issue as primarily one of public goods.
The many different interests involved in the area of development 
cooperation illustrate this point. In short, there is a rather 
weak link between the theory of public goods and its applicabili­
ty to development cooperation.
The public goods problem follows from the assumption of 
isolated rationality of the units involved. By broadening the 
logic of collective action to the field of International Relations 
we transposed the individual-group relationship towards the 
state-international system relationship, assuming collective 
rationality. Thus, for the course of the study, we assumed a 
consistency of choices at the aggregated level of the state in 
spite of the internal decision-making process within the state.
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The Rational Actor Model deals with rational states guided by 
their individual self-interest. However, the results of the 
empirical tests seem to indicate that nation-states have become 
'irrational' in their foreign aid behaviour. It is certainly 
true that plain self-interest can not be considered as the only 
rationale for foreign aid allocation. The most reasonable 
inference we may draw at this moment is that the aid performance 
of nation-states can not fully be explained by the economic 
theory we used : aid donors do not seem to be guided by 'economic 
reasoning' and the size of a donor does not any longer seem to 
determine the foreign aid behaviour.
This scientific undertaking clearly illustrates the difficul­
ty of a combined application of the Rational Actor Approach and 
a public goods perspective to the analysis of the aid performance 
by the DAC countries. However, attempts must be continued to 
search for passible applications of economic theory to Inter­
national Relations, particularly to the area of development 
cooperation. Further research is also needed to hypothesize about 
the association of the size of donors and their actual aid per­
formance.

11 uas Zuchten, zoeken, zuerven immer voort
lang duren ’t laatste uoord
en euen lang dan toch
uat groeten aan de zee
op 't einde van een lang verhaal
en 'k moet mijn stem tejug volgen 
stuivend *t natte schilferzand 
tot pletsen zilver plassen 
tussen glooien uindpatronen
en als avondgroet de volle maan zien uenken 
effen tussen uitte uolkenvelden
Léonce Bekemans





